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1.1 Interactive decision theory
Good decision making is a field of research explored from different scientific
perspectives, from mathematical programming to psychological aspects in
framing decisions. Many of the decision situations we face involve other,
possibly antagonistic, decision makers that affect our options and the conse-
quences of our decisions. And reversely, our decisions may affect the options
and consequences of decisions of the others. In this thesis we deal with de-
cision making in such an interactive setting. To analyze interactive decision
problems we use tools from interactive decision theory.
Interactive decision theory is a more descriptive name for game theory : the
study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelli-
gent rational decision-makers (Myerson (1981)). It is a research discipline
that considers the logical side of interactive decision making. Game theory
is usually divided into two branches. In competitive, non-cooperative game
theory players act individually and strategically against each other to mini-
mize their individual costs (or maximize individual profits). For an extended
introduction we refer to Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). Cooperative game
theory studies situations in which players cooperate in order to reduce joint
costs, and analyzes how one can fairly allocate the joint costs or the joint cost
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savings. A commonly used model in cooperative interactive decision theory
is a transferable utility game in which one assigns a value to each subcoali-
tion of decision makers. Allocation proposals are evaluated based on these
coalitional values. For an extended introduction we refer to Sudhölter and
Peleg (2007). In some cooperative situations, however, one cannot determine
the costs or cost savings of a subcoalition of decision makers, but the decision
makers still have to share their joint costs. In that case the model of cost
sharing (see e.g. Moulin (2002)) can be an appropriate tool to find adequate
allocations of the costs.
Applications of interactive decision theory can be found in, e.g., Biology
(Nowak and Sigmund (2004)), Philosophy (De Bruin (2005)), Political Sci-
ence (Myerson and Weber (1993)) and especially in Economics and Manage-
ment Science.
1.2 Operational decision making
In this thesis we analyze interactive decision making on an operational level
in an economic environment: the problems allow for a quantitative analytical
approach, where information is transparent and the interactive problem has
a managerial – as opposed to policy – nature. Using appropriate tools from
interactive decision theory we analyze how decision makers can decide on,
e.g., a good strategy to minimize individual costs or on how to fairly allocate
the (possible) benefits that follow from cooperative behavior.
Examples of such interactive decision problems on an operational level
are, in a cooperative setting, inventory games (Meca, Timmer, Garćıa Jurado,
and Borm (2004)) and in a non-cooperative setting, capacity allocation games
(Cachon and Lariviere (1999)).
As its subtitle indicates, this thesis covers interactive decision making in
the context of purchasing situations and in the context of mutual liability
problems.
Purchasing is the formal process of buying goods and services in order to
accomplish organizational goals. On an operational level, purchasing in-
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volves supplier selection and pricing agreements for frequently used tangible
goods, like scribbling-pads for a university, needles for a hospital or mops
for janitorial services. In interactive purchasing situations multiple buying
organizations interact with similar (or possibly the same) suppliers for the
procurement of the same commodity. Decisions to be made in interactive
purchasing concern if and how to cooperate with other buying organizations.
If so, one has to tackle the important question of how to allocate possible cost
savings. And if not, how to interact with the supplier(s) on an individual
strategic level, while taking into account the presence and behavior of the
other purchasers.
Mutual liability problems model the interrelationship between decision mak-
ers, based on financial obligations. We will investigate the scenario where a
group of agents is related by having mutual liabilities, but reaches the point
in time where the agents want to cash their claims. None of the agents worry
about the possible insufficient cash in the current assets, until individuals
start cashing their claims. This will lead to a cascading effect and thereby
will reveal the possibly insufficient cash level of agents and the agents typ-
ically might not obtain all of what they, however rightfully, claim. Here a
decision has to be made regarding how the total amount of available cash
can be fairly distributed among the agents.
In the next section we provide a compact overview of this thesis. An ex-
tensive introduction of each of the different topics we study can be found at
the beginning of each chapter.
1.3 Overview and results
One of the most basic and probably oldest allocation problems that can be
modeled in an interactive decision framework is a bankruptcy problem (cf.
O’Neill (1982)). In a bankruptcy problem a (possibly) insufficient mone-
tary amount has to be divided over a group of claimants. Aumann and
Maschler (1985) have characterized one of the most well-known bankruptcy
rules, the Aumann-Maschler rule, using the axiom of consistency. Chapter 2
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introduces mutual liability problems as a generalization of bankruptcy prob-
lems, where every agent not only owns a certain amount of cash money, but
has outstanding claims and debts towards the other agents as well. Assum-
ing that the agents want to cash their claims, we analyze mutual liability
rules which prescribe how the total available amount of cash can be allo-
cated among the agents. In particular we focus on bankruptcy rule based
bilateral transfer schemes. Existence of these schemes is established and it
is seen that within the class of hierarchical mutual liability problems, for
each bankruptcy rule such a transfer scheme is unique. Although in general
a bankruptcy rule based bilateral transfer scheme need not be unique, we
show that the resulting bankruptcy rule based transfer allocation is. This
leads to the definition of bankruptcy rule based mutual liability rules. For
hierarchical mutual liability problems an alternative characterization of such
mutual liability rules is provided. Moreover, we show that the axiomatic
characterization of the Aumann-Maschler bankruptcy rule on the basis of
consistency can be extended to the corresponding mutual liability rule. We
conclude with a discussion of alternative approaches to solve mutual liability
problems.
Chapter 3 introduces a new class of interactive cooperative purchasing situa-
tions. In a maximum cooperative purchasing (MCP) situation the unit price
of a commodity depends on the largest order quantity within a cooperating
group of players. Due to quantity discounts offered by the supplier, players
can obtain cost savings by purchasing cooperatively. However, to establish
fruitful cooperation a decision has to be made about an adequate allocation
of the corresponding cost savings. In analyzing MCP-situations from the
perspective of allocation by using the model of transferable utility games, we
define corresponding cooperative MCP-games. We show that if the supplier
offers quantity discounts, there exists a stable and efficient allocation of the
cost savings: the Direct Price solution. In the Direct Price solution each
player pays the unit price that follows from maximal cooperation among the
group of purchasers. However, in this allocation a player with the largest
order quantity, who is decisive for the lower unit price, receives no cost sav-
ings at all. For this reason we consider two well-known solution concepts
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from the theory of cooperative games: the nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969))
and the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)). We show that the nucleolus of an
MCP-game can be derived in polynomial time from the Direct Price solu-
tion, using a so-called nucleolus determinant. To show this result we provide
an explicit general alternative characterization of the nucleolus. Moreover,
using the special structure of MCP-games we find an explicit expression for
the Shapley value. Interestingly, the Shapley value can be interpreted as a
specific tax and subsidize system. For illustrative purposes the behavior of
the three solution concepts is compared numerically.
In Chapter 4 we study capacity restricted cooperative purchasing (CRCP)
situations from the perspective of cost sharing. A CRCP-situation is a pur-
chasing cooperative with individual order quantities with respect to a certain
commodity. Here, the sum of the order quantities determines the unit price.
Instead of facing one supplier with sufficient supplies, the group faces two
suppliers with (possibly) insufficient individual supplies. The combined ca-
pacity of the two suppliers, however, is sufficient. We show that to minimize
joint ordering costs, the cooperative should order as much as possible at one
of the two suppliers, and the remainder at the other one. To find suitable
cost allocations of the total purchasing costs we model the CRCP-situation
as a cost sharing problem and we find that the cost function of the corre-
sponding cost sharing problem is piecewise concave. The domain of the cost
function can be divided in separate intervals on which the function is concave;
the maximally concave intervals. We introduce tailor-made and context spe-
cific cost sharing rules for cost sharing problems with piecewise concave cost
functions, in which we first divide the vector of order quantities into sepa-
rate vectors for the different maximally concave intervals, using a bankruptcy
rule. Subsequently, for each maximally concave interval and corresponding
vector we use the well-known serial cost sharing rule (Moulin and Shenker
(1992)) to allocate the costs of that specific interval over the organizations.
Finally, by summing these allocated costs we obtain the allocation according
to the piecewise serial rule. Inspired by the context of CRCP-situations, we
provide a piecewise serial rule that, on the class of cost sharing problems
with piecewise concave cost functions, satisfies unit cost monotonicity, and a
6 Chapter 1. Interactive operational decision making
piecewise serial rule that satisfies monotonic vulnerability with respect to the
absence of the smallest player. Furthermore we provide a characterization of
the proportional piecewise serial rule. Numerical comparison with the serial
cost sharing rule further supports the claim that these two piecewise serial
cost sharing rules are suitable methods for allocating the purchasing costs of
a CRCP-situation.
Capacity restricted strategic purchasing (CRSP) situations are the non-coop-
rative siblings of CRCP-situations. Here each member of a group of pur-
chasers has an individual order quantity with respect to a commodity. The
group faces two suppliers with possible insufficient individual supplies. In-
stead of purchasing cooperatively the purchasers act individually. In a CRSP-
situation each purchaser strategically splits his order over the two suppliers
in order to obtain his desired order quantity for the lowest possible cost.
How an individual purchaser should place his order, depends, amongst oth-
ers, on fulfillment policies of the suppliers. Such a policy prespecifies how
the supplier allocates his capacity over the orders in case the total number
of units ordered exceeds the capacity limit of the supplier. In Chapter 5 we
study CRSP-situations by analyzing equilibrium behavior in non-cooperative
games corresponding to several scenarios with respect to the fulfillment poli-
cies of the suppliers. These games are called ordering games. In the first
scenario, fulfillment can be based on fixed preferences of the suppliers with
respect to the identity of the players. Second, fulfillment can also be based
on the order size of the purchasers, we differentiate among the policy small
before large (SBL) and large before small (LBS). Third and finally, suppli-
ers can fulfill orders proportionally. If suppliers preferences are fixed and
identical, the ordering game has an equilibrium. If the policy is based on
SBL, we show that there does not necessarily exists an equilibrium. On the
other hand, if fulfillment is based on LBS, there exists an equilibrium in the
ordering game. When orders are fulfilled proportionally, then if there exists
an equilibrium in the ordering game, we show that it can only be found at
the boundaries of the strategy space. Finally, we develop an approximation
of the ordering game by means of a so-called matrification of the strategy
space. Also here, we analyze equilibrium behavior in the different scenarios.
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1.4 Basic notation
The set of all nonnegative integers is denoted by N, the set of all real numbers
by R, the set of nonnegative reals by R+ and the set of positive reals by R++.
For a finite set N , the cardinality of N is denoted by |N |. The collection
of all subsets of N is denoted by 2N . RN denotes the set of real-valued
vectors with coordinates corresponding to N . An element of RN is denoted
by x = (xi)i∈N . For every S ∈ 2
N\{∅}, the unit vector 1S ∈ RN is such that
1
S
i = 1 if i ∈ S and 1
S
i = 0 if i ∈ N\S. We denote (y)
+ = max{y, 0} for all
y ∈ R.
By Π(N) we denote the collection of all permutations of N where σ ∈
Π(N) is a bijection from {1, . . . , |N |} to N . Next θ : RN → R|N | is such that
for x ∈ RN and i ∈ {1, . . . , |N |}, θi(x) = xσ(i), with xσ(1) ≥ xσ(2) ≥ . . . ≥
xσ(|N |).
For any two vectors x, y ∈ Rt we have that x is lexicographically smaller
than y if x = y or if there exists an s ∈ {1, . . . , t} such xk = yk for all
k ∈ {1, . . . , s − 1} and xs < ys. x ≤L y denotes that x is lexicographically
smaller than y.
Let A ⊂ RN be a finite collection of vectors. Then, span(A) denotes the
linear hull of A, i.e., all linear combinations of vectors from A, and conv{A}
denotes the convex hull of A, the set of all convex combinations of vectors
from A.
With A = (aij) ∈ R
N×N , the diagonal of A, diag(A) ∈ RN is for all i ∈ N
defined by diagi(A) = aii.
Let X be a convex subset of RN . A function f : X → R is concave on X
if for any x1, x2 ∈ X and any λ ∈ [0, 1], f(λx1 + (1− λ)x2) ≥ λf(x1) + (1−
λ)f(x2). f is strictly concave if for any x1, x2 ∈ X with x1 6= x2 and any
λ ∈ (0, 1), f(λx1+(1−λ)x2) > λf(x1)+ (1−λ)f(x2). Moreover f : X → R
is convex if −f is concave.
Let g : R → R. If g is differentiable and concave, then any x ∈ R with
g′(x) = 0 will be a global maximum. If g is twice differentiable, then g is
concave if g′′(x) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ R, and g is strictly concave if if g′′(x) < 0
for all x ∈ R. If g is nondecreasing and concave, then for any x, y ∈ R with




and g(x+ z)− g(x) ≥ g(y+ z)− g(y) for
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any z ∈ R+.
Chapter 2
On solving mutual liability
problems
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, which is based on Groote Schaarsberg, Reijnierse, and Borm
(2013), we make a side-step from the operations management context to a
more financially oriented class of problems: we will consider so-called mutual
liability problems as a generalization of bankruptcy problems.
The classical bankruptcy problem, consisting of a single estate that is not
sufficient to fulfill the demands of multiple claimants, is formally introduced
by O’Neill (1982). However, the problem has been known since centuries:
the old Babylonian Talmud explains by means of numerical examples how
one should divide a deceased’s estate over his creditors. Also, in the first half
of the twentieth century Benson (1935) and Kocourek (1935) studied estate
division problems with multiple claimants from the perspective of law. In
their work, the claimants possibly have different and circular priorities. It
was Tyre (1980) that mentioned the missing link between mathematics and
legal thought in such problems with so-called circular priorities.
Shortly later O’Neill (1982) considers claims problems without circulari-
ties from a mathematical perspective. A bankruptcy rule prescribes, for each
bankruptcy problem, how to divide the estate over the claimants. In the
literature one can find a wide variety of bankruptcy rules, which arise from
9
10 Chapter 2. On solving mutual liability problems
both an axiomatic as well as a game-theoretic analysis, see for an overview
Thomson (2003). One of the most renowned bankruptcy rules has been devel-
oped by Aumann and Maschler (1985). They have introduced a bankruptcy
rule that explains the examples in the Talmud. Moreover, it is shown that
the Aumann-Maschler (AM) rule is the unique rule satisfying two appealing
properties: consistency and the Concede & Divide-principle.
The classical bankruptcy problem has been extended in different ways, e.g. to
multi-issue allocation situations in which the estate has to be divided among
a group of agents with claims stemming from different issues, see Calleja,
Borm, and Hendrickx (2005), to stochastic bankruptcy games (Habis and
Herings (2013)) and to allocating the losses due to financial distress within
a business sector (Van Gulick (2010)). Lately, a main trending topic in this
context is multiple estates. In a recent work by Bjorndal and Jornsten (2009)
a bankruptcy problem with multiple banks (estates) is represented by a flow
model. The banks can have separate claims on each other and there is a set
of agents having separate claims on those banks. Palvolgyi, Peters, and Ver-
meulen (2010) consider the case of agents with non-homogeneous preferences
over multiple estates. Here the agents have a single claim, but the utility per
estate differs. The problem is analyzed from a non-cooperative perspective
and focusses on how the agents should divide their claims into subclaims over
the estates. Moulin and Sethuraman (2013) analyze bipartite rationing prob-
lems with multiple estates and agents with a single claim, but in which the
agents are not necessarily compatible with all estates. These compatibilities
are represented by a bipartite graph. By analyzing the flows in the graph
and using a consistency axiom, bankruptcy rules are extended to this setting.
In this chapter we introduce mutual liability problems with multiple estates
of a rather different nature. In financial accounting a liability is defined as
“an obligation of an entity arising from past transactions or events, the settle-
ment of which may result in the transfer or use of assets, provision of services
or other yielding of economic benefits in the future.”1 Usually a liability is
1Loosely quoted from the framework of the International Financial Reporting Standards
Foundation.
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associated with an uncertainty, but this need not be the case. The more
creditors an agent has, the higher the liabilities. We investigate the scenario
where a group of agents is related by having mutual liabilities, but reaches
the point in time where the agents want to cash their claims. None of the
agents worry about the possible insufficient cash in the current assets, until,
for some exogenous reason, individuals start cashing their claims. This will
lead to a cascading effect and will reveal the possibly insufficient cash level of
agents and therefore the agents typically might not obtain all of what they,
however rightfully, claim.
This approach can be seen as a deterministic model of the monetary
interrelationships between banks, governments and companies in case of a
financial crisis and threatening bankruptcy of banks. Moreover mutual lia-
bilities relate to the claims problems with circular priorities from e.g. Benson
(1935) and Tyre (1980).
A mutual liability problem can be represented by a matrix in which an entry
represents a claim from one agent on another agent. The diagonal entries
represents the players’ cash levels.
A special class of mutual liability problems is the class of hierarchical mu-
tual liability problems in which the claim matrix is triangular. This implies
that we can index the agents, such that every agent only claims from agents
with a lower index. In this sense there is a hierarchy among the agents. For
an example, think of the vertical relations in a supply-chain: insufficient cash
of a buyer may lead to insufficient cash of his supplier(s).
In this chapter we analyze mutual liability problems from an allocation per-
spective: if in a mutual liability problem the agents reach the stage that
they want to cash their claims and remove all current liabilities, how should
the total amount of available cash be fairly distributed among the agents?
In this setting, we implicitly assume that there is an independent author-
ity charged with the task of fairly solving the mutual liability problem. A
mutual liability rule prescribes for each mutual liability problem how to al-
locate the total cash among the agents. We assume each allocation to stem
from a so-called bilateral transfer scheme that satisfies some basic require-
ments. More specifically, we consider bankruptcy rule based transfer schemes
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in which the incoming cash plus available cash of every agent is allocated
among his claimants according to a specific bankruptcy rule. We show that
for every bankruptcy rule there always exists a bankruptcy rule based trans-
fer scheme, which is not necessarily unique. Interestingly, it is seen that each
bankruptcy rule based transfer scheme leads to the same bankruptcy rule
based transfer allocation, so allocation-wise a unique outcome is provided.
For the subclass of hierarchical mutual liability problems, it is shown that
there is also a unique bankruptcy rule based transfer scheme.
These results imply that each bankruptcy rule can be extended to a mu-
tual liability rule: a bankruptcy rule based mutual liability rule. We provide
an explicit characterization for the AM-based mutual liability rule, by ex-
tending the properties of consistency and the Concede & Divide-principle
from the bankruptcy setting to the context of mutual liability problems.
Profiting from the special structure of hierarchical mutual liability prob-
lems, one can extend bankruptcy rules in an alternative recursive way into
mutual liability rules. It is shown that for each bankruptcy rule the result-
ing allocation coincides with the allocation prescribed by the corresponding
bankruptcy based mutual liability rule, thus providing another characteriza-
tion of bankruptcy based mutual liability rules on the class of hierarchical
mutual liability problems.
We conclude the chapter with a sketch of two alternative approaches to
solve mutual liability problems. The first alternative involves reducing non-
hierarchical problems into more tractable hierarchical mutual liability prob-
lems by bilaterally and cyclically leveling the claims. We see, however, that
there is no straightforward procedure how to eliminate the cycles and that
different procedures may result in different reduced problems. The second
alternative is inspired by the hydraulic rationing methods for claims prob-
lems (Kaminski (2000)).
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2.2 we formally intro-
duce mutual liability problems. Then, in Section 2.3 we give a short intro-
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duction to bankruptcy rules, define bankruptcy rule based transfer schemes
and corresponding bankruptcy rule based transfer allocations. Section 2.4
studies mutual liability rules and in particular bankruptcy based mutual li-
ability rules in a hierarchical setting, while Section 2.5 analyzes bankruptcy
based mutual liability rules on the general class of mutual liability problems,
including the characterization of the AM-based mutual liability rule. Section
2.6 concludes with two alternative ways to solve mutual liability problems.
2.2 Mutual liability problems and mutual li-
ability rules
A classical bankruptcy problem involves an estate E that has to be divided
among a finite group of agents N , all having a nonnegative claim di, i ∈ N ,
on the estate. We summarize these claims into a vector d = (di)i∈N . The set
of all bankruptcy problems (E, d) on N is denoted by BN .
In a mutual liability problem, a finite group of economic agents, denoted
by N , have been interacting for a certain time period. Their past eco-
nomic transactions have resulted in a situation in which the agents have
claims on each other (think of debtors and creditors or accounts payable and
receivable). As in bankruptcy problems, we assume that these claims are
known, rightful and justifiable. Further, every agent has a certain nonnega-
tive cash level or cash reserve with which he can (partially) pay his possible
debtors. A mutual liability problem can be represented by a nonnegative
matrix C ∈ RN×N+ . Here each cell cij ∈ C represents the claim of agent j on














agent i will never be able to satisfy all his claimants. We will, however, not
impose any restrictions except nonnegativity on the matrix C beforehand.
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The main question is how to divide
∑
i∈N cii over the agents in N .
We denote by LN the set of all mutual liability problems on N . A mutual





for all C ∈ LN .
We will distinguish a class of mutual liability problems with a special trian-
gular structure. A mutual liability problem C ∈ LN is called a hierarchical
mutual liability problem if, by reordering the agents, C can be transformed
into an upper triangular matrix with zeros below the diagonal. The set LN,∆
contains all hierarchical mutual liability problems on N . A mutual liability
rule that is defined on the domain of hierarchical mutual liability problems
is called a hierarchical mutual liability rule.






1 3 1 4
2 2 2 6





The matrix should be interpreted in the following way. Agent 1 has a cash
level of 3. He has a claim of 2 on agent 2 and a claim of 1 on agent 3, while
agent 2 and 3 have a claim of 1 and 4 on agent 1. Agent 2 has a cash level of
2. He has no further claims, than the 1 on agent 1 we already mentioned, but
agent 1 and 3 have a combined claim of 8 on him. This means in particular
that agent 2 will never be able to pay off his debts. Agent 3 has a cash level
of 1, agent 1 has a claim of 1 on his cash, while agent 3 has a claim of 4 on
agent 1 and a claim of 6 on agent 2. /






4 2 4 4
0 3 0 1
0 0 2 3
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The claim matrix is upper triangular, since agent 1 only faces claims and has
no claims on agents 2, 3 or 4. Furthermore, agent 2 has a claim on agent 1
but faces claims only from agents 3 and 4. Agent 3 has a claim on agent 1
and faces a claim of only agent 4, while agent 4 faces no claims at all, but
he has a claim on all other three agents. /
Mutual liability problems can be seen as a generalization of bankruptcy
problems. Each bankruptcy problem (E, d) ∈ BN with N = {1, 2, . . . , n}
corresponds to a hierarchical mutual liability problem C(E, d) ∈ LN̄ with







0 1 · · · n
0 E d1 · · · dn













2.3 Bankruptcy rule based transfer schemes
Before elaborating on bankruptcy rule based transfer schemes, we provide
some details on bankruptcy rules and the Aumann-Maschler rule in particu-
lar.
2.3.1 On the Aumann-Maschler rule
A bankruptcy rule ϕ : BN → RN assigns to every bankruptcy problem
(E, d) ∈ BN a vector ϕ(E, d) ∈ RN , such that
∑
i∈N




0 ≤ ϕ(E, d) ≤ d and such that monotonicity is satisfied: for all (E, d) ∈ BN
and all (E ′, d) ∈ BN with E ′ ≥ E, we have ϕ(E, d) ≤ ϕ(E ′, d). Note that the
class BN also contains bankruptcy problems (E, d) in which E is sufficient to
fulfill the claims d and in that case ϕ(E, d) = d for any bankruptcy rule ϕ.
Note that any bankruptcy rule is continuous in the estate (cf. Yeh (2008)):
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for a sequence of nonnegative estates E1, E2, . . . that converges to E and for
any nonnegative claim vector d ∈ RN , the sequence ϕ(E1, d), ϕ(E2, d), . . .
converges to ϕ(E, d).
For a detailed overview on bankruptcy rules we refer to Thomson (2003). Our
focus will be mainly on the Aumann-Maschler rule (Aumann and Maschler
(1985)), which is based on the constrained equal awards-rule.
The constrained equal awards-rule CEA is, for all (E, d) ∈ BN and all i ∈ N ,
defined by
CEAi(E, d) = min{λ, di},
where λ ∈ R is such that
∑
i∈N min{λ, di} = min{E,
∑
j∈N dj}.















d) if E <
∑





j∈N dj ≥ 2E.
For bankruptcy problems involving two agents, AM satisfies the Concede &







if d1 + d2 ≥ E,
d1 if d1 + d2 < E.
Here (E−d2)




indicates that the total amount of the estate that
is not conceded, is divided equally.
So far, bankruptcy rules are defined on a fixed but arbitrary finite agent
set N . Alternatively, bankruptcy rules can also be viewed as rules on the
class B of bankruptcy problems with arbitrary but finite N . On the class B,
AM can be characterized by means of the C&D-principle and the property
of consistency.
Here, a bankruptcy rule ϕ on B is called consistent if for each finite agent
set N , each (E, d) ∈ BN and all T ∈ 2N\{∅}, we have that
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ϕ(E, d)|T = ϕ(
∑
j∈T
ϕj(E, d), d|T ).
Note that (
∑
j∈T ϕj(E, d), d|T ) ∈ B
T .
Consistency of a rule requires that a possible reallocation of the total
amount which has been allocated to a coalition T , on the basis of to the same
bankruptcy rule, does not change the initial individual allocations within this
coalition.
Example 2.3.1 Let N = {1, 2, 3} and let (E, d) ∈ BN be a bankruptcy
problem with E = 16 and d = (6, 8, 12).
We will allocate E according to the AM-rule. Since
∑
j∈N dj = 26 < 2E, we
have that






d) = (6, 8, 12)−CEA(10, (3, 4, 6)).














To illustrate consistency: if we send agent 3 away with AM3(E, d) = 8
1
2
and let agents 1 and 2 reallocate the remaining amount 71
2
based on their
claims of 6 and 8, we see that
AM(AM1(E, d) + AM2(E, d), d|N\{3}) = AM(7
1
2




= (AM1(E, d), AM2(E, d)).
/
2.3.2 Towards transfer schemes
To devise mutual liability rules, we will explicitly consider bilateral monetary
transfer schemes on which the allocations prescribed by the rule are based.
Let C ∈ LN . Then, the matrix P = (pij) ∈ R
N×N is a transfer scheme
for C, if
(i) for all i ∈ N , pii = cii,
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(ii) for all i, j ∈ N with i 6= j, 0 ≤ pij ≤ cij,
(iii) for all i ∈ N ,
∑
j∈N\{i} pij ≤ pii +
∑
j∈N\{i} pji.
The interpretation is the following: pij, i 6= j, corresponds to the monetary
transfer from agent i to j. For technical reasons and for computational
convenience we require (i). The second condition states that the payment
pij is nonnegative, but not higher than claim cij of agent j on i. The third
condition requires that the sum of outgoing payments of i does not exceed
his available cash plus incoming payments.
Let P(C) denote the set of all possible transfer schemes for the mutual
liability problem C ∈ LN .
A transfer scheme directly leads to an allocation of the available cash. Let
C ∈ LN and let P ∈ P(C). Then, we define αP ∈ RN as the P -based transfer
allocation, i.e., for all i ∈ N
αPi = pii +
∑
j∈N\{i}
(pji − pij). (2.2)

































Example 2.3.2 Reconsider the mutual liability problem C ∈ LN of Exam-
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The first two conditions (i) and (ii) can easily be checked. To verify condition
(iii), observe that
p12 + p13 = 5 ≤ p11 + p21 + p31 = 5.5
p21 + p23 = 3 ≤ p22 + p12 + p32 = 3
p31 + p32 = 1 ≤ p33 + p13 + p23 = 6.5.
Note that P leads to the P -based transfer allocation αP = (0.5, 0, 5.5). /
Next, we introduce a specific type of transfer schemes, called bankruptcy rule
based transfer schemes.




cij if j 6= i,
0 if j = i,
(2.3)
as the vector of claims on agent i. Then, P = (pij) ∈ R
N×N is called a
ϕ-based transfer scheme for C if,
(i) for all i ∈ N , pii = cii,










We denote by Pϕ(C) the set of all ϕ-based transfer schemes.
Example 2.3.3 Let N = {1, 2, 3} and consider the mutual liability problem
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For this, observe, e.g., that d2(C) = (100, 0, 12) and p23 = AM3(p22 +
p12, d
2(C)) = AM3(12, (100, 0, 12)) = 6. Furthermore α
P = (0, 0, 6).









belongs to PAM(C). Note that αP̃ = αP . /
The next lemma shows that a ϕ-based transfer scheme is indeed a transfer
scheme.
Lemma 2.3.4 Let C ∈ LN and let ϕ be a bankruptcy rule. Then, Pϕ(C) ⊂
P(C).
Proof: Take P = (pij) ∈ P
ϕ(C). It is sufficient to show that condition
(ii) of a ϕ-based transfer scheme implies conditions (ii) and (iii) of a transfer
scheme.
We start with showing (ii). Since ϕ is a bankruptcy rule, we have that for









≤ dij(C) = cij ,
which implies that
0 ≤ pij ≤ cij .
Next we show condition (iii), using the basic properties of a bankruptcy rule.
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A ϕ-based transfer scheme P satisfies an attractive property: in the corre-
sponding ϕ-based transfer allocation αP an agent can only receive a positive
amount if he paid off all his claimants.
Lemma 2.3.5 Let P ∈ Pϕ(C) for some C ∈ LN . Let i ∈ N . If αPi > 0,
then
pij = cij for all j ∈ N\{i}.












Moreover, since P is a ϕ-based transfer scheme, for all j ∈ N\{i}






















and using (ii) of ϕ-based transfer schemes, it follows that pij = cij, for all
j ∈ N\{i}. 
The next theorem shows that one can always find at least one ϕ-based transfer
scheme.
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Theorem 2.3.6 Let C ∈ LN and let ϕ be a bankruptcy rule.
Then, Pϕ(C) 6= ∅.
Proof: Using the following iterative procedure we construct a ϕ-based
transfer scheme for C.
For all i ∈ N , set di = di(C) and set Ei(0) = cii.
Then, recursively define, for all i ∈ N and k = 1, 2, . . .,










j) ≥ cii = E
i(0).










i(k−1), dj) = Ei(k).
Hence, by induction, for all i ∈ N
Ei(0) ≤ Ei(1) ≤ Ei(2) ≤ . . . (2.7)
Consider P = (pij) ∈ R
N×N , given by
pij =
{
cii for all i, j ∈ N with i = j,
limk→∞ ϕj (E
i(k), di) for all i, j ∈ N with i 6= j.
(2.8)
Note that the limit in (2.8) exists, because {Ei(k)}∞k=0 is an increasing se-
quence, while ϕ is monotonic and bounded from above.
Moreover, condition (ii) of a ϕ-based transfer scheme is satisfied since for
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The second equality follows from continuity of ϕ, the third equality follows
from (2.6) and the last equality follows from (2.8). 
2.4 Hierarchical mutual liability problems
As Example 2.3.3 shows, a general ϕ-based transfer scheme need not to be
unique. For hierarchical mutual liability problems, however, there is a unique
ϕ-based transfer scheme.
Theorem 2.4.1 Let C ∈ LN,∆ and let ϕ be a bankruptcy rule. Then,
|Pϕ(C)| = 1.
Proof: Let N = {1, . . . , n}. By the upper triangularity of C, we can as-
sume, without loss of generality, that cij = 0 if i > j. Let P = (pij) and
P̃ = (p̃ij) both be ϕ-based transfer schemes for C.
Clearly, if i > j,
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the fact that P and P̃ are ϕ-based transfer schemes implies for all j ∈ N\{1}
p1j = p̃1j = ϕj(c11, d
1(C)).
Now consider i ∈ N an assume that for all g ∈ {1, . . . , i − 1} and h ∈


















and thus for all j ∈ N\{i}









i(C)) = p̃ij . 
This theorem implies that on LN,∆ a ϕ-based transfer allocation is uniquely
defined for every bankruptcy rule ϕ. Hence, we can extend each bankruptcy
rule to a hierarchical mutual liability rule.
Let ϕ be a bankruptcy rule. The corresponding hierarchical ϕ-based mu-
tual liability rule ρϕ : LN,∆ → RN is for all C ∈ LN,∆ defined by
ρϕ(C) = αP ,
where P is the unique ϕ-based transfer scheme for C.
An alternative way of using a bankruptcy rule to solve hierarchical mutual
liability problems, is the following recursive procedure that we first illustrate
by means of an example.
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4 2 4 4
0 3 0 1
0 0 2 3






In the recursive procedure we start with agent 1, who has no claims on the
other agents. His cash, c11 = 4, is divided on the basis of a bankruptcy prob-
lem with estate 4 and claims, 2, 4 and 4. Hence we treat this subproblem of
the mutual liability problem as a bankruptcy problem (4, (2, 4, 4)). Selecting
ϕ = AM as an appropriate bankruptcy rule, AM(4, (2, 4, 4)) = (1, 1.5, 1.5).
Thus agent 2 gets 1 from agent 1’s cash and agents 3 and 4 both receive 1.5.







4− 1− 1.5− 1.5 0 0 0
0 3 + 1 0 1
0 0 2 + 1.5 3










0 0 0 0
0 4 0 1
0 0 3.5 3






In C1 agent 2 has no claim on agent 1 anymore and we allocate c122 = 4 on
the basis of the bankruptcy problem (4, (0, 1)). Since AM(4, (0, 1)) = (0, 1),
this means that 1 is transferred to agent 4 while agent 2 keeps an amount of






0 0 0 0
0 3 0 0
0 0 3.5 3













0 0 0 0
0 3 0 0
0 0 0.5 0






The diagonal, i.e (0, 3, 0.5, 7.5), of this matrix can be viewed as an allocation
which solves this hierarchical mutual liability problem based on a recursive
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application of the AM-rule.







4 1 1.5 1.5
0 3 0 1
0 0 2 3






Note that this is the AM-based transfer scheme with corresponding transfer
allocation αP = (0, 3, 0.5, 7.5). /
The formal definition of how to extend mutual liability rules in the recursive
way as described in the previous example is provided below.
Let C ∈ LN,∆ and let ϕ be a bankruptcy rule. Set N = {1, . . . , n} and
assume that cij = 0 for all i, j ∈ N with i > j. Set C
0 = C. Recursively, for
j = 1, . . . , n− 1, define Cj ∈ LN,∆ by
cjii =
{


















0 if i = j and k 6= i
cj−1ik if i 6= j and k 6= i.
Finally set
Crec = Cn−1.
Correspondingly, the hierarchical recursive ϕ-based mutual liability rule ξϕ :
LN,∆ → RN is defined by
ξϕ(C) = diag(Crec)
for each C ∈ LN,∆.
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Interestingly, for every bankruptcy rule ϕ, the recursive ϕ-based mutual lia-
bility rule ξϕ and the hierarchical ϕ-based mutual liability rule ρϕ coincide.
Theorem 2.4.3 For all bankruptcy rules ϕ,
ρϕ = ξϕ.
Proof: Let C ∈ LN,∆ and let ϕ be a bankruptcy rule. Set N = {1, . . . , n}
and assume that cij = 0 for all i, j ∈ N with i > j. Let P = (pij) be the
unique ϕ-based transfer scheme for C. Then, we have that for all i ∈ N
ρϕi (C) = α
P




















ii is determined recursively using
(2.10). Thus it is sufficient to show that for all i ∈ N









For i = 1, (2.11) is satisfied since

























The first equality follows from (2.10), the second equality holds because
pk1 = 0 for all k ∈ N\{1} and the last equality follows from condition
(ii) of ϕ-based transfer schemes.
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Note that, for all j ∈ N\{1}




= cjj + p1j.










k=j+1 pjk if j ≤ i− 1.










k=j+1 pjk if j = i.










































where the first equality follows from the definition of ξ and the second equality
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2.5 General mutual liability problems
As seen in Example 2.3.3, the AM bankruptcy rule allows for multiple AM-
based transfer schemes for a non-hierarchical mutual liability problem. For
an arbitrary bankruptcy rule, however, there is always a unique ϕ-based
transfer allocation.
Theorem 2.5.1 Let C ∈ LN , let ϕ be a bankruptcy rule and let P, P̃ ∈
Pϕ(C). Then,
αP = αP̃ .
Proof: On the contrary suppose that αP 6= αP̃ . For notational convenience,
set αP = α and αP̃ = α̃.
Let N = {1, . . . , n}. Without loss of generality we assume that, α1 < α̃1.
Since 0 ≤ α1 < α̃1, Lemma 2.3.5 implies that, for all j ∈ N\{1}
p̃1j = c1j . (2.12)
Since







(p̃j1 − p̃1j) > c11 +
∑
j∈N\{1}
(pj1 − p1j) = α1,
there must be an agent j ∈ N\{1} for which
p̃j1 − p̃1j > pj1 − p1j .
Therefore, by (2.12),
p̃j1 − p1j ≥ p̃j1 − c1j = p̃j1 − p̃1j > pj1 − p1j
and hence
p̃j1 > pj1.
Without loss of generality we assume that j = 2.
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Note that p21 < p̃21 ≤ c21. Thus, by Lemma 2.3.5, α2 = 0 and therefore
α1 + α2 < α̃1 + α̃2, i.e.,
c11 + c22 +
∑
j∈N\{1}




<c11 + c22 +
∑
j∈N\{1}


















Thus there must be an agent ` ∈ N\{1, 2} with
p̃`1 − p̃1` > p`1 − p1`
or
p̃`2 − p̃2` > p`2 − p2`.
Without loss of generality we assume that ` = 3 and that p̃31−p̃13 > p31−p13.
Then,
p̃31 − p13 ≥ p̃31 − c13 =p̃31 − p̃13 > p31 − p13.
Thus we conclude that p̃31 > p31 and, using Lemma 2.3.5, that α3 = 0 and
α1 + α2 + α3 < α̃1 + α̃2 + α̃3.
We can continue with this reasoning with respect to agent 4, 5, . . . , n. As
a result we will find that α1 + α2 + . . . + αn < α̃1 + α̃2 + . . . + α̃n, which is
not possible because of efficiency of a ϕ-based transfer allocation. 
Hence, we can introduce ϕ-based rules for general mutual liability problems.
Let ϕ be a bankruptcy rule. The corresponding ϕ-based mutual liability rule
ρϕ : LN → RN is for all C ∈ LN defined by
ρϕ(C) = αP ,
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where P is a ϕ-based transfer scheme for C.
The final part of this section will provide an axiomatic characterization of
ρAM as a ϕ-based mutual liability rule on the class L of all mutual liability
problems with an arbitrary but finite set of players by extending the C&D-
principle and the property consistency for bankruptcy rules to general mutual
liability rules.
In bankruptcy problems the principle of Concede & Divide is defined for
problems with two claimants. However, in a mutual liability problem with
two agents, every agent faces only one (possible) claimant. For such mutual
liability problems the allocation prescribed by any ϕ-based mutual liability
rule is unique. This is shown in the following lemma.







Proof: Note that for all i ∈ N , di(C) has at most one positive claim. Take
P = (pij) ∈ P
ϕI (C). Then, with N = {i, j},
pij = ρ
ϕI




j (pii + pji, d
i(C)).
Hence, P ∈ Pϕ
II





Instead, we will define a Concede & Divide principle for mutual liability prob-
lems with three agents, in which every agent has two (possible) claimants.
A mutual liability rule f satisfies the Concede & Divide-principle (C&D) if
for each N with |N | = 3 and for for each C ∈ LN , there exists an underlying
transfer scheme P ∈ P(C) such that f(C) = αP and for each player i ∈ N ,
his ‘estate’ ei = cii +
∑
` 6=i p`i is allocated among the remaining two players,
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Example 2.5.3 Reconsider the mutual liability problem C ∈ LN of Exam-


















with ρAM(C) = αP = (0, 0, 6). We check that the entries in P satisfy (2.13).
Here, e1 = p11 + p21 + p31 = 5, e
2 = 3 and e3 = 7. Both player 1’s and
player 3’s estate are sufficient to satisfy their claimants, hence p12 = c12 = 1,




e2 − (e2 − c21)







and p23 = 2. /
Next, we define the property of consistency for a mutual liability rule. This
property is defined on the class L of mutual liability problems with arbitrary
but finite N . The consistency property requires that a reallocation of the
total amount which has been allocated to a coalition T , on the basis of that
rule and an underlying transfer scheme, does not change the initial individual
allocations within this coalition. A mutual liability rule f for L is called
consistent if for all N and for all C ∈ LN there exists a P ∈ P(C) such that
f(C) = αP and such that for all T ∈ 2N\{∅} with CT,P ∈ LT ,
f(CT,P ) = f(C)|T , (2.14)
where CT,P ∈ RT×T is defined, for all i, j ∈ T , by
cT,Pij =
{
cij if i 6= j,
cii +
∑
k∈N\T (pki − pik) if i = j.
(2.15)
Note that there is only a consistency requirement for T if CT,P ∈ LT . As is
seen in the following example, it can indeed happen that CT,P /∈ LT .
2.5. General mutual liability problems 33
Example 2.5.4 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Reconsider the hierarchical mutual






4 2 4 4
0 3 0 1
0 0 2 3












4 1 1.5 1.5
0 3 0 1
0 0 2 3





and ρAM = (0, 3, 0.5, 7.5).









which is a mutual liability problem and the unique AM-based transfer scheme









while ρAM (CT,P ) = (0, 3, 7.5). We see that the consistency requirement for









which is not a mutual liability problem and therefore does not impose a
consistency requirement. /
The AM-based mutual liability rule satisfies consistency and C&D.
Theorem 2.5.5 ρAM is consistent and satisfies C&D.
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Proof: We start with proving C&D. Let C ∈ LN with |N | = 3. Let i ∈ N
and set N\{i} = {j, k}. Consider an arbitrary P ∈ PAM(C). Obviously
ρAM(C) = αP by Theorem 2.5.1. Moreover,




Since the bankruptcy rule AM satisfies the C&D principle for bankruptcy











Next, we show consistency. For this, let C ∈ LN , consider an arbitrary
P ∈ PAM (C) and let T ∈ 2N\{∅} be such that CT,P ∈ LT . It suffices to
show that ρAM(C)|T = ρ
AM (CT,P ).




pij if i 6= j
pii +
∑
k∈N\T (pki − pik) if i = j.
(2.16)
We first show that P T ∈ PAM(CT,P ), which implies that αP
T
= ρAM(CT,P ).
For this, note that cT,Pii = p
T
ii for all i ∈ T . It remains to prove that for










This is true because for each i ∈ T and j ∈ T\{i}
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where the third equality follows from consistency of AM , the fourth equality
follows from the fact that P ∈ PAM (C), while the last equality follows from
(2.16).
The proof is finished if we show that αP
T
= ρAM(C)|T . For this, note that


























We conclude this section with a characterization of the AM-based mutual
liability rule.
Theorem 2.5.6 Let ϕ be a bankruptcy rule. Then, ρϕ = ρAM if and only if
ρϕ satisfies consistency and C&D.
Proof: For the “only if”-part, we refer to Theorem 2.5.5. To prove the
“if”-part, let ϕ be a bankruptcy rule such that ρϕ satisfies consistency and
C&D. As we have seen before, the class B of bankruptcy problems is a
subclass of L by identifying each (E, d) ∈ BN with N = {1, . . . , n}, with







0 1 · · · n
0 E d1 · · · dn
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E p01 · · · p0n














p0i if i ∈ N,
E −
∑
j∈N p0j if i = 0.
Moreover, for all i ∈ N
ρϕi (C(E, d)) = α
P
i = p0i = ϕ(c00, d
0(C)) = ϕi(E, d). (2.17)
Thus ϕ(E, d) = ρϕ(C(E, d))|N .
If we can show that
(i) C&D of ρϕ on L implies C&D of ϕ on B,
(ii) consistency of ρϕ on L implies consistency of ϕ on B,
then, ϕ = AM (cf. Aumann and Maschler (1985)) and consequently ρϕ =
ρAM .
For this, we first show that P is the unique transfer scheme for C(E, d)
that leads to the transfer allocation αP and for this reason C&D and consis-
tency of ρϕ can only have implications on P .
Let P̃ = (p̃ij) ∈ P(C(E, d)) be an arbitrary transfer scheme for C(E, d)







E p̃01 · · · p̃0n










and there must be a player i ∈ N with p̃0i 6= p0i. Hence, α
P̃ 6= αP .
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With respect to (i), let N = {1, 2} and (E, d) ∈ BN . Let i ∈ N and
{j} = N\{i}. We need to show that
ϕi(E, d) =
{






C&D on L and (2.17) imply that ϕi(E, d) = ρ
ϕ
i (C(E, d)) and, with c0i =
C0i(E, d) and c0j = C0j(E, d), that
ρϕi (C(E, d)) =
{
c0i if e


















With respect to (ii), let (E, d) ∈ BN and T ∈ 2N\{∅}. We have to prove that
ϕ(E, d)|T = ϕ(
∑
j∈T
ϕj(E, d), d|T ).
Let T = {k1, . . . , kt}. Then, using (2.15) and (2.17),
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Clearly, CT∪{0},P (E, d) ∈ LT∪{0},∆ and
CT∪{0},P (E, d) = C(E −
∑
j∈N\T
ϕj(E, d), d|T ).
Using consistency, we find for all i ∈ T that





ϕj(E, d), d|T )).
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By equation (2.17), for all i ∈ T
{
ρϕi (C(E, d)) = ϕi(E, d)
ρϕi (C(E −
∑
j∈N\T ϕj(E, d), d|T )) = ϕi(E −
∑
j∈N\T ϕj(E, d), d|T )
and therefore,
ϕ((E, d))|T = ϕ(E −
∑
j∈N\T
ϕj(E, d), d|T ) = ϕ(
∑
j∈T
ϕj(E, d), d|T ),
where the last equality follows from (2.1). 
2.6 Alternative approaches
In this section we discuss two alternative approaches to analyze mutual lia-
bility problems: a reduction approach and a hydraulic approach.
2.6.1 Reduction approach
In the reduction approach a general mutual liability problem is reduced to
a more tractable hierarchical mutual liability problem. The main difference
between hierarchical and non-hierarchical mutual liability problems is the
(non-)existence of cycles of claims.
In this section we show that, by eliminating these cycles, it is possible to
reduce a general mutual liability problem to a hierarchical mutual liability
problem, but that such a reduction is not possible without changing the na-
ture of the mutual liability problem. There are choices to be made. Different
reduction choices can result in different reduced hierarchical mutual liability
problems.
The possibilities regarding reduction steps and the subsequent effects will
be illustrated in the following example.
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A natural first step in reducing a general mutual liability problem is to as-
sume that on a bilateral level the claims are already settled. Thus for all
pairs i, j ∈ N with i 6= j, cijcji = 0. The bilaterally leveled claim matrix
C̄ = (c̄ij) ∈ L




+ if j 6= i
cii if j = i.






4 4 0 6
0 8 0 11
1 3 6 0






which is still a non-hierarchical mutual liability problem.
Not only can we level claims bilaterally, we can also do this for longer cycles.
In the matrix C̄ we can find multiple cycles of claims. The longest one, with
length 4, goes from player 1 to player 2, then from player 2 to player 4, from







4 4 0 6
0 8 0 11
1 3 6 0






Since the lowest claim in this cycle is 1 (c̄31 = 1), we can reduce the cycle
by 1, which results in the following non-hierarchical mutual liability problem







4 3 0 6
0 8 0 10
0 3 6 0






In C1 we detect another cycle: from 2 to 4, to 3 and back to 2. We can
reduce the claims by an amount of 2, with the hierarchical mutual liability






4 3 0 6
0 8 0 8
0 1 6 0





is a hierarchical mutual liability problem; if we rearrange the rows and
columns in the order (1, 3, 2, 4), the matrix is upper triangular. We have
that ρAM(C1,∆) = (0, 2.5, 5, 17.5) 6= ρAM(C).
In the mutual liability problem C̄, we can also start with the cycle: from






4 4 0 6
0 8 0 11
1 3 6 0






In this case we can reduce all claims with an amount of 3 and we would







4 4 0 6
0 8 0 8
1 0 6 0






If we rearrange the players in the order (3, 1, 2, 4), then the matrix is upper
triangular. Note that ρAM(C2,∆) = (0, 2, 5, 18) which is different from both
ρAM(C) and ρAM(C1,∆). /
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2.6.2 Hydraulic approach
Kaminski (2000) states that a bankruptcy rule is called hydraulic if it can
be represented as a system of connected vessels. The vessels represent the
claim of a player and the liquid is the estate available. Inspired by hydraulic
representation of bankruptcy rules, one could search for hydraulic solutions
for hierarchical mutual liability problems. We will, however, not introduce a
general hydraulic framework for liability problems. The aim of this subsection
is to give an idea of a possible alternative approach. First, we describe a
hydraulic method by means of an example.
Figure 2.6.1: A hydraulic solution for Example 2.6.2
Example 2.6.2 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Consider the mutual liability problem
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Every agent’s cash can be seen as a vessel of liquid that is connected to its
claimants by a system of equally wide tubes. The tube from 1 to 3 can
only transfer c13 = 4 units of liquid, after this amount the tube is closed or
disconnected. Hence c13 is the capacity of tube13. The same holds for all
other entries in C. This is represented in Figure 2.6.1, in the left system of
connected vessels. The digit in a shaded area indicates the content level of
the vessel and the digit in a rhombus represent the capacity of a tube. We
open all the vessels simultaneously and let the liquid flow, until no flow is
possible anymore.
In this way, for agent 1, through every outgoing tube, an amount of 2 will
be transferred to vessels 2, 3 and 4. The remaining capacity of the tubes are
2, 1 and 3, respectively.
The initial content of the second vessel, 1, is divided equally among 3
and 4, but at the same time an extra amount of 2 flows into his vessel via
tube12 and this amount is also divided among 3 and 4. In this way we can
continue with vessel 3 and 4. The final result is shown in Figure 2.6.1, in
the righthand side system of connected vessels. The final allocation equals
(0, 0, 2.5, 6.5).
This hydraulic scheme fits with the CEA idea and in fact it can be shown
that for this example ρCEA(C) = (0, 0, 2.5, 6.5). /
Example 2.6.2 shows that one can model a hierarchical mutual liability prob-
lem as a system of connected vessels. We choose for a rationing method that,
in this example, coincides with the CEA-based mutual liability rule. We pre-
sume, but did not prove, that this is the case in general. There are, however,
many other hydraulic paths to follow.
Chapter 3




This chapter, which is based on Groote Schaarsberg, Borm, Hamers, and
Reijnierse (2013), introduces and analyzes a new class of interactive coop-
erative purchasing situations: maximum cooperative purchasing situations.
Before introducing this new class of problems, we first describe the rationale
behind interactive cooperative purchasing.
A purchasing cooperative consists of organizations that collaborate in their
purchasing process, e.g., in sharing information, bundling order quantities or
sharing transportation services, in order to obtain benefits. If we focus on
bundling order quantities, cooperative purchasing2 seems an easy and ratio-
nal solution for a group of purchasers facing quantity discounts. However, it
is not as simple as that. In this chapter we analyze interactive purchasing
situations where the unit price depends on the largest order quantity within a
group of players. According to Tella and Virolainen (2005) the main motives
of organizations to become member of a cooperative are to obtain information
and — in the long run — to obtain cost savings, due to increasing returns
2Cooperative purchasing is also referred to as group buying or group purchasing.
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to scale. Increasing returns to scale are analyzed in many micro-economic
situations, e.g., in the production industry (Hsu and Li (2009)) and health
care industry (Schneider, Miller, Ohsfeldt, Morrisey, Zelner, and Li (2008)).
In purchasing practise the increasing returns to scale of production often
translates in a quantity discount for the buyers or customers (cf. Monahan
(1984)). Naturally purchasers want to exploit these discounts, but they can-
not simply increase their order quantities. So organizations try to cooperate
in purchasing. But why do all hospitals in the US not unite themselves to
suppress pharmacists’ prices of medicines? How come all high-schools in the
Netherlands do not purchase computers cooperatively to obtain a substantial
price reduction?
The reasons are simple. Firstly, it is quite hard to manage and combine
the purchasing processes of a large group of organizations. But even if the
groups would be manageable, they would not easily form because of a second
reason: the group members should agree on how to divide the obtained cost
savings beforehand. Too simple cost savings allocation schemes may cause
some members of the cooperative to feel better off alone, to be better off in
sub-cooperatives or simply to think that the allocation method is not fair.
According to Schotanus (2007) the fair allocation of cost savings is one of the
main critical success factors for the stability of purchasing groups. Also in a
large-scale survey among logistic service providers in Flanders, it was found
by Cruijssen, Cools, and Dullaert (2007) that organizations believe in the
potential of horizontal cooperation, but consider the allocation of the actual
cost savings as one of the most important impediments of the cooperative.
A useful tool for finding fair allocations of cost savings that follow from
cooperative behavior is provided by cooperative game theory. The frequently
used model of transferable utility games fits the nature of cooperative pur-
chasing situations. In a transferable utility game (or TU-game) each coalition
of players is associated with a certain monetary value (transferable utility),
which corresponds to the benefits this coalition can obtain by optimal co-
operation amongst themselves, and without help from players outside the
coalition. These coalitional values can be used as a benchmark for dividing
the cost savings of the grand coalition (coalition of all players). Based on
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different ideas of fairness, multiple solution concepts for general cooperative
TU-games have been developed. A generally accepted concept of fairness is
the combination of efficiency and stability. Efficiency implies that we do not
allocate more than the value of the grand coalition, nor do we award a pos-
itive allocation to entities outside the players of the game. Stability means
that no coalition has an incentive to split off. The set of all efficient and sta-
ble allocations is called the core of a game. This set can, however, be empty.
While the core prescribes a set of possible allocations, one can also look for
single-valued solutions. Several single-valued or one-point solution concepts
for TU-games have been introduced in the literature. Due to their attractive
properties the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) and the nucleolus (Schmeidler
(1969)) are the most commonly studied and applied solution concepts. In
this chapter we will show that these two solution concepts result in suitable
allocation methods for a specific class of interactive purchasing situations.
We are not the first to investigate cooperative purchasing (CP)-situations.
Anand and Aron (2003) are pioneers in studying cooperative purchasing us-
ing analytical models. Amongst others, they derive optimal pricing schedules
for the supplier facing purchasing cooperatives. Also, from the purchasers
perspective analytical models have been developed, e.g., on the develop-
ment of purchasing groups in the health care industry (Nollet and Beaulieu
(2003)) and the formation of coalitions by means of the internet (Granot
and Sošić (2005)). There have appeared qualitative considerations in the
literature linking game theory and cooperative purchasing, but more in an
explanatory sense than in analyzing its exact implications, e.g., Blomqvist,
Kylheiko, and Virolainen (2002) or Tella and Virolainen (2005). Only re-
cently, CP-situations have been formally modeled as a game. Keskinocak
and Savasaneril (2008) analyze the situation where purchasers are possible
competitors. In Heijboer (2003), Schotanus (2007) and Nagarajan, Sošić, and
Zhang (2010) a purchasing cooperative is modeled as a cooperative transfer-
able utility game. The unit price depends on the sum of the order quantities;
the higher the total order quantity, the lower the unit price.
In this chapter we analyze situations that are not covered by the cooperative
46 Chapter 3. Game theoretic analysis of MCP-situations
models considered in the literature above. Consider the situation where a
general practitioner needs daily supplies like sterile needles, bandages, com-
presses and drugs. He can buy these supplies at a pharmaceutical company.
The pharmaceutical industry and its prices are not transparent, so one can
imagine that the general practitioner ends up with a high unit price. A large
hospital buys its supplies at the same pharmaceutical companies, but it has
greater knowledge of the market and a better bargaining position towards
its possible suppliers. As a result the hospital can negotiate for a lower unit
price. The general practitioner could try to set up some cooperative with the
hospital to decrease his own unit prices. Adding the two order quantities,
however, will not result in a lower unit price for both organizations. If the
single practitioner can use the terms and contract of the hospital, he would
be willing to pay a (small) fee to the hospital for this ‘riding along’. Both the
hospital and the general practitioner would then be better off in this small
cooperative.
This form of cooperative purchasing fits in a framework developed by
Schotanus (2007): a typology of organizational forms of cooperative purchas-
ing. One of these types involves piggy-backing groups, informal purchasing
cooperatives that wish to keep cooperation as simple as possible. Mostly it
enhances a relatively large organization that negotiates with the supplier on
its own and the resulting contract may be used by some smaller organiza-
tions. The example the author provides is a consortium of local governmental
institutions in the North of the Netherlands. These institutions have a piggy-
backing group that has existed for more than 20 years.
Now, let us describe this subclass of cooperative purchasing situations more
formally. In this chapter, we consider horizontal cooperation between two
or more organizations that find themselves at the same position in the sup-
ply chain. We consider a group of organizations all having individual order
quantities with respect to a certain commodity. The involved organizations
might be competitors in the end market but it is not likely that they will
influence the cooperation, since they are better off within a cooperative. The
Dutch Superunie is a good example. It is a purchasing cooperative consist-
ing of small competing supermarket chains, who must cooperate to remain
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competitive towards large organizations like Albert Heijn. For this reason we
assume that the fact that the organizations are possible competitors will not
influence the cooperation.
Like in previous work, we consider the bundling and sharing of purchasing
volumes and focus on the main motive on the long run: quantity discounts.
These discounts imply direct cost savings for the members of a coopera-
tive. Contrary to Schotanus (2007) and Nagarajan et al. (2010) we consider
purchasing situations where the unit price does not depend on the sum of
those order quantities, but on the maximum of the individual order quan-
tities. Each group of organizations can negotiate for their own terms and
unit prices separately. The outcome of each negotiation depends on the or-
ganization with largest order quantity and is independent of the size of order
quantities of other group members. The larger the largest order quantity,
the lower the unit price. Hence, by cooperating the organizations can obtain
a smaller unit price and obtain cost savings. Within a group of purchasing
organizations, the smaller organizations simply let the largest organization
add their order quantities to the total order. They use the terms and con-
tract of the larger organization and its individually negotiated unit price.
As explained by Schotanus (2007), the coordination costs for this form of
cooperative purchasing can be assumed to be relatively low.
We explicitly address the problem of finding suitable allocation methods
for the cost savings in this class of cooperative purchasing situations. To
this end we define a cooperative transferable utility game corresponding to a
maximum cooperative purchasing (MCP) situation, i.e., a CP-situation with
a max unit price function. In general, quantity discounts are a sufficient
condition for a nonempty core of an associated MCP-game as we can always
find a stable allocation of the cost savings. One of the core-elements is a
marginal vector of the MCP-game and can be obtained via the Direct Price
solution method in which every organization pays the price that follows from
the grand coalition. For the organization with largest order quantity this
implies that he receives no price reductions at all. This solution method is
such that the payoffs to organizations increase as the group size increases
(population monotonic). In terms of piggy-backing, however, this method
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leads to a cooperation fee equal to zero. Hence, the organization with largest
order quantity will not easily agree with the Direct Price solution as alloca-
tion method. Therefore we propose two alternative allocation methods: the
nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969)) and the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) of the
MCP-game.
The nucleolus of a TU-game minimizes the maximal unhappiness over all
coalitions, where the unhappiness of a coalition with respect to an allocation
is measured by the excess; the difference between the worth of the coalition
and what they together obtain in the allocation. If the core of a TU-game is
nonempty, the nucleolus is an element of this set.
In general, finding the nucleolus of a cooperative game is a hard task.
Kohlberg (1971) developed a criterion to check whether an allocation equals
the nucleolus of that game. Based on this criterion, several algorithms have
been developed to compute the nucleolus, all not of polynomial time. For a
compact overview see Leng and Parlar (2010). Reijnierse and Potters (1998)
explain which collections of coalitions are essential to determine the nucleolus
and show that these collections may differ from the ones of Kohlberg. In-
spired by the results of Potters, Reijnierse, and Ansing (1996) and Reijnierse
and Potters (1998), this chapter provides an alternative and explicit charac-
terization of the nucleolus for general cooperative games with a nonempty
core. To its advantage this characterization is more constructive in nature
than the Kohlberg criterion.
Using this new criterion, the nucleolus of an MCP-game can be found via
a so-called nucleolus-determinant: a collection of disjoint coalitions and their
corresponding excesses. It is shown that these excesses can be interpreted as
the fee the organizations in the coalition have to pay. Moreover we show how
to find a nucleolus-determinant recursively with an algorithm of polynomial
time.
The second single-valued solution concept we consider is the Shapley value.
The Shapley value incorporates all possible marginal contributions from a
player to a coalition and averages them over all coalitions, with a correction
to the size of the coalitions. However, computing all marginal contributions
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is quite time consuming in general. An alternative way of finding the Shapley
value of a TU-game is by using the decomposition of the game into a linear
combination of unanimity games. Due to the specific structure of MCP-
games, the decomposition into a linear combination of unanimity games can
be easily determined. Using this decomposition we derive an explicit expres-
sion for the Shapley value, which can be nicely interpreted as stemming from
a tax and subsidize system in which an individual organization receives or
pays a certain percentage of the cost savings of all two-player coalitions.
Both the nucleolus and the Shapley value are attractive solution concepts
from a general game theoretic point of view. We conclude the chapter with
a numerical comparison between the behavior of the Shapley value and the
nucleolus in MCP-situations and for illustrative reasons we also compare the
two game theoretic solution concepts with the Direct Price solution. We
see that for MCP-situations, the Shapley value and the nucleolus prescribe
rather similar allocation proposals and that the differences between the pre-
scribed proposals are relatively small. Generally speaking, the difference is
that organizations with order quantities close to the order quantity of the
largest player are expected to be better off in the Shapley value, while play-
ers with smaller order quantities are expected to better off in the nucleolus.
The difference between the two game theoretic solutions on the one hand and
the Direct Price solution on the other hand is, however, relatively large.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 3.2 we formally in-
troduce MCP-situations, define corresponding MCP-games, discuss some ap-
pealing properties of these games and explain their specific structure. Then,
in Section 3.3 we analyze the Direct Price solution and its relation to the core
of an MCP-game. In Section 3.4 an explicit alternative characterization is
provided for the nucleolus of an arbitrary cooperative game with a nonempty
core, and in Section 3.5 we calculate the nucleolus of an MCP-game, based on
this alternative characterization. Section 3.6 focusses on the Shapley value
of an MCP-game and Section 3.7 provides a numerical comparison between
the various allocation proposals.
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3.2 MCP-situations and corresponding games
This section provides the formal description of maximum cooperative pur-
chasing (MCP)-situations and defines corresponding cooperative MCP-games.
Formally, we have a player set N = {1, . . . , n}, n ≥ 2, with a vector of
order quantities q ∈ RN+ . There is a commonly known unit price function
p : [0,∞) → [0,∞) that maps an order quantity to some unit price. We
assume the unit price function to be weakly decreasing. For the remainder of
this chapter we assume, without loss of generality, that the order quantities
are arranged in nondecreasing order, i.e., 0 < q1 ≤ q2 ≤ . . . ≤ qn. The class
of all MCP-situations is denoted by M and a single MCP-situation is given
by the triple (N, q, p) ∈ M. Note that n, the number of players, is variable.
To analyze the allocation aspects of an MCP-situation we will construct
a corresponding cooperative TU-game. A cooperative game (N, v) is defined
by a finite set N of players and a function v on the set 2N of all subsets
(coalitions) of N . This function v is called the characteristic function and
assigns to each coalition S ∈ 2N a value v(S) ∈ R such that v(∅) = 0. The
value v(S) represents the joint monetary rewards a coalition S can accom-
plish or realize by optimal cooperation among themselves.
Consider a subgroup S ∈ 2N of purchasing organizations. The unit price
corresponding to that coalition of purchasers is determined by its member
with maximal order quantity. By assumption this is the player with highest
index. Hence S pays p(qs) per unit, with s = max{i : i ∈ S}. Without
cooperation a player i ∈ S would have paid p(qi) per unit. Looking at the
corresponding cost savings as monetary revenues, the characteristic function
of the cooperative MCP-game (N,w) corresponding to an MCP-situation








and it reflects the maximum cost savings a coalition S can establish. For
ease of notation we set pi = p(qi) for all i ∈ N . Specifically, from (3.1) it
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readily follows that the value of an arbitrary two-player coalition with i < j
equals
w({i, j}) = (pi − pj)qi. (3.2)
Since we assume the unit price function to be weakly decreasing we find a
specific order in the two-player coalitions. If j < k then for all i < j it holds
that
w({i, j}) ≤ w({i, k}). (3.3)
By the nature of cost savings, each MCP-game is nonnegative with all single
player coalitions having value 0. The following example illustrates an MCP-
game.
Example 3.2.1 Consider an MCP-situation (N, q, p) ∈ M with N = {1, 2,
3, 4}, q = (2, 4, 8, 12) and unit price function p : [0,∞) → [0,∞) with p(t) =
10+ 12
t
. Hence the individual ordering costs of player 1 are p(2)·2 = 16·2 = 32.
For players 2, 3 and 4, the individual ordering costs are 52, 92 and 132, re-
spectively. The following table represents the corresponding MCP-game.
S {1} {2} {3} {4} {1,2}
w(S) 0 0 0 0 6
S {1,3} {1,4} {2,3} {2,4} {3,4}
w(S) 9 10 6 8 4
S {1,2,3} {1,2,4} {1,3,4} {2,3,4} {1,2,3,4}
w(S) 15 18 14 12 22
Note that w({1, 4})+w({2, 4})+w({3, 4}) = w({1, 2, 3, 4}), while w({1, 3})+
w({2, 3}) = w({1, 2, 3}). /
The final observations we made in Example 3.2.1 are true in general. Since
the price depends on the maximum order quantity, the largest player s in a
coalition S solely determines the unit price. Every other player in coalition
S profits from the unit price decrease, independent of the order quantities of
the players in S\{s}. Thus the value of a coalition S consists of what every
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individual player in S can accomplish with the largest player in S. This leads
to the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2.2 Let (N,w) be the MCP-game corresponding to an MCP-
situation (N, q, p) ∈ M. Let S ⊂ N with |S| ≥ 2 and s ∈ S with s = max{i :



















The special structure of MCP-games fits in a framework of cost-coalitional
problems as provided by Meca and Sošić (2013). In such problems there is
a player or a group of players, called the benefactors, whose participation
in a cooperative always contributes to the savings of all members. In MCP-
situations the player or players with largest order quantity are the benefac-
tors. Furthermore, note that an MCP-game is not a k-game as described in
Van den Nouweland, Borm, Golstein Brouwers van, Groot Bruinderink, and
Tijs (1996)
A game (N, v) is monotonic if for all S, T ∈ 2N , with S ⊂ T , v(S) ≤ v(T ).
The game is superadditive if for all S, T ∈ 2N with S ∩T = ∅, v(S) + v(T ) ≤
v(S∪T ). These two properties imply that if a coalition adapts more players,
its value increases as well, and if a coalition breaks up in smaller coalitions
they cannot increase the cost savings. Hence, any player i ∈ N would like to
join the largest coalition possible, i.e., N\{i}.
Using Theorem 3.2.2, we can verify that each MCP-game is monotonic and
superadditive.
Corollary 3.2.3 Let (N, q, p) ∈ M and let (N,w) be the corresponding
MCP-game. Then, (N,w) is monotonic and superadditive.
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Proof: Since (N,w) is non-negative, it is sufficient to show that (N,w) is
superadditive. Take S, T ∈ 2N with s = max{i : i ∈ S} and t = max{t : t ∈
T}. Then, for all S, T ∈ 2N with S ∩ T = ∅ and without loss of generality
s < t,










w({j, t}) = w(S ∪ T ). 
3.3 The core and the Direct Price solution
As explained in the introduction of this chapter, within the game theoretic
literature one can find several ways or policies to allocate the value of the
grand coalition. The coalitional values v(S) in a game (N, v) form a natural
benchmark to evaluate an allocation method. We mentioned two basic eval-
uation properties, efficiency and stability. An allocation x ∈ RN is efficient if
∑
i∈N xi = v(N). An allocation x is stable if for all S ∈ 2
N ,
∑
i∈S xi ≥ v(S).
The set of efficient and stable allocations is called the core of a TU-game,
which is denoted by C(v). In general, this set can be empty.
A frequently studied property for a game is convexity . Convexity requires
that for all j ∈ N and S, T ∈ 2N with S ⊂ T ⊂ N\{j}, v(S ∪ {j})− v(S) ≤
v(T ∪ {j}) − v(T ). Hence, joining a large coalition T will lead to a larger
marginal contribution than joining a subset of this group of players S ⊂ T . It
is shown by Shapley (1967) that if (N, v) is convex, then C(v) 6= ∅. However,
an MCP-game is not necessarily convex.
Example 3.3.1 Reconsider the game of Example 3.2.1. This game is not
convex. If player 3 joins player 1, the extra cost savings are w({1, 3}) −
w({1}) = 9. If, however, player 3 joins the larger coalition {1, 4}, the extra
cost savings are w({1, 3, 4})− w({1, 4}) = 4, which is lower than 9, contra-
dicting convexity.
The core of this game is nonempty and is given by
C(w) =conv{(10, 8, 4, 0), (10, 8, 0, 4), (10, 6, 0, 6), (10, 2, 4, 6),
(9, 8, 0, 5), (5, 8, 4, 5), (9, 2, 4, 7), (5, 6, 4, 7), (9, 6, 0, 7)}.
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A special core element is the allocation (10, 8, 4, 0). This allocation can be
seen as the result of applying a direct pricing principle: every player pays
the price that can be negotiated for the grand coalition. In this case that
price is 11. Thus player 1 obtains cost savings for his own order quantity
of q1(p1 − p4) = 2(16 − 11) = 10, player 2 of 4(13 − 11) = 8, player 3 of
8(11.5− 11) = 4, and player 4 of 0. /
The direct pricing principle illustrated in Example 2.3.1 can be formalized.
Definition The Direct Price solution DP onM is such that for all (N, q, p) ∈
M and for all i ∈ N ,
DPi(N, q, p) = (pi − pn)qi.
Note that according to (3.2), DPi(N, q, p) = w({i, n}) for all i ∈ N and all
(N, q, p) ∈ M, with (N,w) the corresponding MCP-game. For an arbitrary
MCP-situation, the allocation resulting from the Direct Price solution be-
longs to the core of the corresponding MCP-game. Hence, any MCP-game
has a nonempty core.
Theorem 3.3.2 Let (N,w) be the MCP-game corresponding to an MCP-
situation (N, q, p) ∈ M. Then,
DP (N, q, p) ∈ C(w).
Proof: Using Theorem 3.2.2,
∑
i∈N
DPi(N, q, p) =
∑
i∈N
w({i, n}) = w(N).











where s = max{i : i ∈ S}. 
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Let (N, v) be a TU-game and let σ ∈ Π(N), where σ(k) is interpreted as
the player in position k. For σ ∈ Π(N), the marginal vector mσ(v) ∈ RN
corresponding to σ is defined by
mσσ(k)(v) = v({σ(1), . . . , σ(k)})− v({σ(1), . . . , σ(k − 1)}) (3.5)
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , |N |}. Note that for all σ ∈ Π(N), mσσ(1)(v) = v({σ(1)}). A
game (N, v) is convex if and only if all marginal vectors of that game belong
to the core. An MCP-game is in general not convex, but we will point out
several specific marginal vectors of an MCP-game (N,w) that are elements
of C(w).
Lemma 3.3.3 Let (N,w) be the MCP-game corresponding to an MCP-situ-
ation (N, q, p) ∈ M.
(i) The marginal vector corresponding to any σ1 ∈ Π(N) with σ1(1) = n,
is a core element.
(ii) The marginal vector corresponding to any σ2 ∈ Π(N) with σ2(1) = n−1
and σ2(2) = n, is a core element.
Proof: (i) Using (3.4) the marginal vector corresponding to σ1 is given by
mσ
1
(w) = (w({1, n}), w({2, n}), . . . , w({n− 1, n}), 0) = DP (N, q, p).
(ii) Using (3.4) the marginal vector corresponding to σ2 is given by
mσ
2
(w) = (w({1, n}), w({2, n}), . . . , w({n− 2, n}), 0, w({n− 1, n})).







w({n− 1, n}) +
∑
i∈S\{n−1}w({i, n}) if n ∈ S,
∑
i∈S\{n−1} w({i, n}) otherwise.
If n ∈ S, then w({n − 1, n}) +
∑
i∈S\{n−1} w(i, n) ≥
∑
i∈S w(i, n) ≥ w(S).




i∈S\{n−1}w({i, s}) = w(S), with




i (w) ≥ w(S) for all
S ∈ 2N . 
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The next theorem shows that if there are two players with lowest unit price,
the core of the MCP-game consists of one single point, the allocation pre-
scribed by the Direct Price solution. Moreover this is the only class of MCP-
situations for which the core of the MCP-game consists of one point, this is
shown in the next theorem.
Theorem 3.3.4 Let (N, q, p) ∈ M and let (N,w) be the corresponding
MCP-game. Then
C(w) = {DP (N, q, p)} if and only if pn−1 = pn.
Proof: Let C(w) = {DP (N, q, p)}. Then, according to Lemma 3.3.3,mσ1(w) =
mσ2(w) with σ1 and σ2 as defined there. Hence 0 = w({n − 1, n}) =
(pn−1 − pn)qn−1 and thus pn−1 = pn.
Let pn−1 = pn. This implies that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 2}, w({i, n − 1}) =
w({i, n}) and w({n − 1, n}) = 0. By Theorem 3.3.2 it is sufficient to show
that x ∈ C(w) implies that x = DP (N, q, p). Let x ∈ C(w). Then










= w({n− 1, n})
= 0.
Hence, xn = 0 = DPn(N, q, p).
Similarly we have for all i ∈ N\{n},

















w({i, n}) = w(N).
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Hence, for all i ∈ N\{n}, xi = w({i, n}) = DPi(N, q, p). 
The Direct Price solution coincides with the altruistic allocation of Meca and
Sošić (2013), where it is also used for describing the size of the core of the
game corresponding to cost-coalitional problems.
The Direct Price solution has the appealing property that the players in N
do not have a monetary incentive to reject a new agent j who wants to join
N .
Theorem 3.3.5 Let (N, q, p) ∈ M and consider a player j /∈ N with de-
mand qj. Then for all i ∈ N
DPi(N, q, p) ≤ DPi(N ∪ {j}, q̄, p),
where q̄ = (q`)`∈N∪{j}.
Proof: Let i ∈ N . There are two possibilities: either qj > qn or qj ≤ qn.
In the first case pj ≤ pn and DPi(N ∪ {j}, q̄, p) = (pi − pj)qi ≥ (pi − pn)qi =
DPi(N, q, p). In the second case, obviously DPi(N∪{j}, q̄, p) = DPi(N, q, p).

In fact, from Theorem 3.3.5 one readily derives that the Direct Price solu-
tion is population monotonic. Combining this with Theorem 3.3.4, we can
conclude that the Direct Price solution leads to a stable allocation scheme
in which each player’s payoff increases (non-decreases) as the grand coalition
of cooperative purchasers grows larger. This is also known as a population
monotonic allocation scheme (PMAS) as introduced by Sprumont (1990).
Example 3.3.6 Reconsider Example 3.2.1 with DP (N, q, p) = (10, 8, 4, 0).
This allocation is quite extreme as all bilateral profits go to the ‘smaller’
players. A less extreme allocation x would be to let the two players i and n





















=(5, 4, 2, 11).
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Figure 3.3.1: Core and Shared Set of Example 3.2.1
This allocation is not a core-element. It can be seen, however, that all
core-elements can be obtained if we allow differentiation with respect to





























In the tetrahedron of Figure 3.3.1, the dotted box represents all allocations
obtained via sharing methods. The polyhedron inside that box is the core of
the game. /
Based on the ideas of Example 3.3.6 we define a sharing rule δλ onM. Define
∆N as the set of all share vectors λ ∈ RN with for all i ∈ N , λi ∈ [0, 1]. Here
λi can be interpreted as the share player i obtains of his bilateral profits with
n.
Definition For all (N, q, p) ∈ M and all λ ∈ ∆N
δλi (N, q, p) =
{
λi(pi − pn)qi if i ∈ N\{n},
∑
j∈N(1− λj)(pj − pn)qj if i = n.
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= DP , for λ∗ ∈ ∆N such that λ∗i = 1 for all i ∈ N\{n}. Next,
consider the Shared Set , defined by
S(N, q, p) = {δλ(N, q, p)|λ ∈ ∆N},
as all possible allocations generated by a sharing rule. The next proposition
shows that all core elements can be generated via sharing rules.
Proposition 3.3.7 Let (N, q, p) ∈ M and let (N,w) be the corresponding
MCP-game. Then
C(w) ⊂ S(N, q, p).
Proof: Let x ∈ C(w). Define λ ∈ RN by λi =
xi
(pi−pn)qi
, i ∈ {1, . . . , n−1} and
λn = 1. Since, for all i ∈ N\{n}, 0 ≤ xi ≤ w(N) − w(N\{i}) ≤ w({i, n}),
we have λ ∈ ∆N . Obviously, δλi (N, q, p) = xi for all i ∈ N and hence
x ∈ S(N, q, p). 
3.4 The nucleolus of a game with a nonempty
core
In this section we derive an alternative characterization of the nucleolus of a
TU-game with nonempty core, which will be used in Section 3.5 to find the
nucleolus of an MCP-game.
Let (N, v) be a TU-game. We define CN = 2N\{∅, N} as the collection of
proper subsets of N . The imputation set is given by all individually rational









xj = v(N), xi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N
}
.
An element x ∈ I(v) is called an imputation. Let E(S, x) = v(S)−
∑
j∈S xj
be the excess of coalition S ∈ 2N with respect to an imputation x ∈ I(v).
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Note that θ(x) ∈ R|2
N | is the vector of excesses arranged in non-increasing
order. The nucleolus nuc(v) (Schmeidler (1969)) of a TU-game (N, v) with
I(v) 6= ∅, is the unique imputation which lexicographically minimizes θ. Thus
for all x ∈ I(v),
θ(nuc(v)) ≤L θ(x).
The nucleolus minimizes the maximum dissatisfaction level over all coalitions
and it is a stable solution concept, i.e., if C(v) 6= ∅, then nuc(v) ∈ C(v).
Finding the nucleolus of a TU-game is not easy, in general it takesO(|N |×
2|N |) steps3. To check whether a certain imputation x ∈ I(v) is the nucleolus
of the game, one can use the following criterion, due to Kohlberg (1971).
Let B1(x) = {T ∈ C
N |E(T, x) ≥ E(S, x) for all S ∈ CN} be the collection











Bk(x),E(T, x) ≥ E(S, x)







Let t ∈ N be such that Bt(x) 6= ∅ and Bt+1(x) = ∅.






Theorem 3.4.1 (Kohlberg (1971)) Let (N, v) be a TU-game with C(v) 6= ∅
and let x ∈ I(v). Then, x = nuc(v) if and only if Br(x) is balanced for all
r ∈ {1, . . . , t}.
Here a collection B ⊂ CN is balanced if there exists a vector λ ∈ RC
N
satisfying λS > 0 for all S ∈ B and λS = 0 for all S /∈ B, such that
∑
S∈B λS1
S = 1N .
3Let g : X → R. We say f(x) is of the order g(x), or O(g(x)), if there exists M ∈ R+
and xo ∈ R such that |f(x)| ≤ M |g(x)| for all x ∈ X with x > xo.
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From this theorem Kohlberg (1972) derived a procedure to calculate the
nucleolus of a cooperative game, by solving one large linear program. Due
to Potters et al. (1996) there is a faster method to determine the nucleolus.
The rough idea is based on efficiency of the nucleolus. If one has found two
disjoint coalitions S and T that belong to B1(nuc(v)) and one also knows
their corresponding excesses, then one also knows the excesses that belong
to N\S, N\T , S ∪ T and N\(S ∪ T ). As a follow up Reijnierse and Potters
(1998) provide a sufficient condition for a collection of coalitions to deter-
mine the nucleolus of a game. This condition can be used to formulate a new
alternative criterion to check whether a certain imputation is the nucleolus
of the game.
For a collection B ⊂ CN define
H(B) = {S ∈ 2N |1S ∈ span{1N , [1T ]T∈B}}.
An alternative way of finding H(B) is using H-closed sets. A collection of
coalitions W ⊂ 2N is H-closed, if
(i) N ∈ W
(ii) for all R ∈ W, N\R ∈ W
(iii) for all R,U ∈ W with R ∩ U = ∅, R ∪ U ∈ W.
Then, H(B) is the smallest H-closed set containing B.
The following theorem gives an explicit alternative characterization of the
nucleolus of a game with a nonempty core.
Theorem 3.4.2 Let (N, v) be a TU-game with C(v) 6= ∅. Let x ∈ I(v).
Then x = nuc(v) if and only if there exists a sequence D1,D2, . . . ,Dτ of
nonempty subcollections of CN with the following properties
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(ii) there exists a sequence of real numbers γ1, γ2, . . . , γτ such that E(S, x) =
γr for every S ∈ Dr and γ1 ≥ γ2 ≥ . . . ≥ γτ .
(iii) for all S ∈ CN\Dτ we have S ∈ H({T ∈ Dτ : E(T, x) ≥ E(S, x)}).
Proof: “only if”-part: Let x = nuc(v) and t ∈ N is such that Bt(nuc(v)) 6= ∅
and Bt+1(nuc(v)) = ∅. Set τ = t and Dr = Br(nuc(v)) for all r ∈ {1, . . . , τ}.
Then, by Theorem 3.4.1 it is obvious that the sequence satisfies Properties
(i) and (ii) and since Dt = C
N also Property (iii) is satisfied.
“if”-part: Let x ∈ I(v) and let t ∈ N be such that Bt(x) 6= ∅ and Bt+1(x) = ∅.
Let the collections D1, . . . ,Dτ and the numbers γ1, γ2, . . . , γτ be such that
Properties (i), (ii) and (iii) are satisfied. For all r ∈ {1, . . . , t}, define
κr = E(S, x) for S ∈ Br(x). Obviously κ1 > κ2 > . . . > κt. We will
show that x meets the Kohlberg criterion, proceeding by means of induction.
If κ1 = γτ , define ` = τ . Otherwise, γr = κ1 > γr+1 for some r ∈ {1, . . . , τ −
1}, define ` = r. Then, κ1 = γ1 = . . . = γ` and D` ⊂ B1(x). Hence
B1(x) = D` ∪ {S /∈ Dτ |E(S, x) = κ1}.
For any S ∈ B1(x) with S /∈ Dτ
{T ∈ Dτ : E(T, x) ≥ E(S, x)} = D`.
Hence, by Property (iii), S ∈ H(D`).
In order to prove that B1(x) is balanced, it is sufficient to show that for any







T for some µ ∈ R2N\{∅}.
Moreover, since D` is balanced there exists a vector λ ∈ RCN with λT > 0




T = 1N .






(µNλT + µT )1
T




T + α(1S −
∑
T∈D`
(µNλT + µT )1





(λT − α[µNλT + µT ])1T = 1N .
Choosing α > 0 small enough, we derive that D` ∪ {S} is balanced.
Proceeding by induction we assume that Bk(x) is balanced for some k ∈
{2, . . . , τ − 1}. We will show that Bk+1(x) is balanced too. If κk+1 ≤ γτ ,
define ` = τ . Otherwise, γr ≥ κk+1 > γr+1 for some r ∈ {1, . . . , τ − 1}. In
this case, define ` = r. Then, D` ⊂ Bk+1(x). Hence,
Bk+1(x) = D` ∪ {S /∈ Dτ |E(S, x) = κk+1}.
It is sufficient to prove that for any S ∈ Bk+1(x) with S /∈ Dτ , D` ∪ {S}
is balanced. Since S ∈ H(D`) and D` is balanced, we can use the same
argument as for the induction base. There exists a vector µ ∈ R2N\{∅}, and




(λT − α[µNλT + µT ])1T = 1N .
Again, choosing α > 0 small enough, we derive that D`∪{S} is balanced. 
3.5 The nucleolus of MCP-games
This section explains how one can compute the nucleolus of an MCP-game.
We start with the following easy observation.
64 Chapter 3. Game theoretic analysis of MCP-situations
Proposition 3.5.1 Let (N,w) be an MCP-game corresponding to MCP-
situation (N, q, p) ∈ M. Then,
nuc(w) = DP (N, q, p) if and only if pn−1 = pn.
Proof: If pn−1 = pn, then by Theorem 3.3.4, C(w) = {DP (N, q, p)} and
hence nuc(w) = DP (N, q, p).
Let nuc(w) = DP (N, q, p). Then, for all S ∈ CN such that n ∈ S,
E(S, nuc(w)) = w(S)−
∑
i∈S







Since {S ∈ 2N\{N, ∅}|n ∈ S} is not balanced, the Kohlberg criterion (Theo-
rem 3.4.1) implies that there is a coalition S ⊂ N\{n} with the same excess
as a coalition containing n, i.e.


















with s = max{i : i ∈ S}. Hence, ps = pn and consequently pn−1 = pn. 
Next we provide an explicit relation between the Direct Price solution of an
MCP-situation and the nucleolus of the corresponding MCP-game. For this
we use a so-called nucleolus-determinant . First, we simply state the recur-
sion to find such a nucleolus-determinant. This recursion is rather technical.
Then, an explicit expression for the nucleolus is provided. The interpreta-
tion of this nucleolus-determinant and the nucleolus itself are given after the
proof. Finally, by means of an example, we explain how one can use this
recursion. Furthermore we show that this recursion leads to an algorithm of
polynomial time to find the nucleolus of an MCP-game.
Denote pS = ps if s = max{i : i ∈ S}.
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Nucleolus-Determinant-recursion
Input : (N, q, p) ∈ M.
Initialization:















for all S ∈ F1
}
,






































, S ∈ Fr.
Set Fr = {S|S ⊂ N\{n}, S\
⋃r−1
k=1 Sk 6= ∅},
F̃r = {T ∈ Fr |fr(T ) ≥ fr(S) for all S ∈ Fr } .
Choose Tr ∈ F̃r,






and r = r + 1.
Otherwise: set τ = r − 1. STOP
Output : A nucleolus-determinant {(S1, e1), (S2, e2), . . . , (Sτ , eτ )}, with (S1,
. . . , Sτ ) a partition of N\{n}.
Theorem 3.5.2 Let (N, q, p) ∈ M and let (N,w) be the corresponding
MCP-game.
Let {(S1, e1), (S2, e2), . . . , (Sτ , eτ )} be a nucleolus-determinant. Then, for all
66 Chapter 3. Game theoretic analysis of MCP-situations
r ∈ {1, . . . , τ} and all i ∈ Sr






In the proof of Theorem 3.5.2 we use the following lemma.
Lemma 3.5.3 Let (N, q, p) ∈ M and let (N,w) be the corresponding MCP-
game. Let i ∈ N and S ∈ 2N be such that n ∈ S ⊂ N\{i} and let x ∈ I(w)
be such that xi ≤ w(N)− w(N\{i}). Then,
E(S ∪ {i}, x) ≥ E(S, x).
Proof: Since xi ≤ w(N)− w(N\{i}),
E(S ∪ {i}, x)− E(S, x) = w(S ∪ {i})− w(S)− xi
= qi(pi − pn)− xi
≥ qi(pi − pn)− w(N) + w(N\{i})
= 0.

Proof of Theorem 3.5.2: For all r = 1, . . . , τ , and for all i ∈ Sr we set
{




For all r ∈ {1, . . . , τ}, let Tr ∈ F̃r be the coalition the recursion chose. Define
for all r ∈ {1, . . . , τ}
Dr = Tr ∪ {N\{i}}i∈Sr .
We will show that the sequence D1, . . . ,Dτ satisfies the three properties of
Theorem 3.4.2.
Property (i)
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Clearly, we have that Dr is balanced for all r ∈ {1, . . . , τ}. Hence the se-
quence D1, . . . ,Dτ satisfies Property (i) of Theorem 3.4.2.
Property (ii)
Regarding Property (ii), we first prove that for all r ∈ {1, . . . , τ}, E(S, x) =
er for all S ∈ Dr.
Take r ∈ {1, . . . , τ}. Then for all i ∈ Sr














qi(pi − pn) + xi
= −qi(pi − pn) + qi(pi − pn) + er
= er.
For Tr itself it holds that






















= fr(Tr)(1 + |Tr ∩ Sr|)− |Tr ∩ Sr|er
= er(1 + |S ∩ Sr|)− |S ∩ Sr|er
= er.
To finish the proof of Property (ii) it remains to show that e1 ≥ e2 ≥ . . . ≥ eτ .
Note that Tr+1 ∈ Fr. Suppose that for some r ≤ τ − 1, er < er+1. Then by
definition of er,
fr+1(Tr+1) = er+1 > er ≥ fr(Tr+1).












































For (3.6) to hold, we must have that Tr+1 ∩ Sr 6= ∅. Denote








Then, however, Inequality (3.6) would imply that


























































































































|Tr+1 ∩ Sr|er > 0,
































that establishes a contradiction.
Property (iii)
Regarding Property (iii). Let S ∈ CN\Dτ .
We will prove that S ∈ H({T ∈ Dτ |E(T, x) ≥ E(S, x)}).
Case 1 : n ∈ S
Let r ∈ {1, . . . , τ} be such that
{
N\{j} ∈ Dr for some j ∈ N\S,
N\{i} ∈ Ds with r ≥ s for all i ∈ N\S.
Then, N\{i} ∈ Dr for all i ∈ N\S and by Lemma 3.5.34, for all i ∈ N\S,
E(S, x) ≤ E(N\{j}, x) ≤ E(N\{i}, x).
Since 1S = (|S| − n+ 1)1N +∑i∈N\S 1N\{i}, we have that S ∈ H({T ∈ Dτ :
E(T, x) ≥ E(S, x)}).
Case 2 : n /∈ S.









= fτ (S)(1 + |S ∩ Sτ |)− |S ∩ Sτ |eτ
≤ eτ (1 + |S ∩ Sτ |)− |S ∩ Sτ |eτ
= eτ .
4Note that since e1 ≤ 0, Property (ii) implies that er ≤ 0 for all r ∈ {2, . . . , τ}. Hence,
xi ≤ DPi(N, q, p), and thus xi ≤ w(N) − w(N\{i}) for all i ∈ N\S. The condition in
Lemma 3.5.3 is satisfied.
70 Chapter 3. Game theoretic analysis of MCP-situations














= fr(S)(1 + |S ∩ Sr|)− |S ∩ Sr|er
≤ er(1 + |S ∩ Sr|)− |S ∩ Sr|er
= er.




Sk, there is an Sk such that i ∈ Sk and hence




S ∈ H({T ∈ Dτ : E(T, x) ≥ E(S, x)}). 
In the proof of Theorem 3.5.2 we showed that er ≤ 0 for all r ∈ {1, . . . , τ}.
Here, er is the excess of coalition Tr. Thus the nucleolus of an MCP-game
modifies the Direct Price solution. It can be interpreted in the following way.
Every player in Sj should pay a fee −ej to player n for using his discounted
unit price. Thus a nucleolus-determinant puts every player in a certain fee-
class and determines the heights of those fees. From Proposition 3.5.1 it is
clear that if pn−1 = pn, the fee of all players equals zero.
Before showing that the nucleolus of an MCP-game can be found using an
algorithm with polynomial time-complexity, we want to make a short remark.
Remark
We sketch how a similar algorithm for determining the nucleolus of an MCP-
game can be derived from the results of Arin and Feltkamp (1997). That
paper introduces an algorithm for computing the nucleolus of a veto-rich
game: games in which for all coalitions one of the players is needed in order
to obtain a positive payoff. The algorithm they develop is exponential in the
number of players. Formally, we can transform an MCP-game (N,w) into a




w({i, n})− (w(N)− w(N\S)).
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One can show that for every game with a nonempty core (N, v), nuc(N, v) =
−nuc(N,−v∗) where (N, v∗) represents the dual game of (N, v), i.e., for all
S ∈ 2N
v∗(S) = v(N)− v(N\S).
Also for any additive game a ∈ RN , nuc(va) = nuc(v) + a, where for all
S ∈ 2N




Since (N, w̄) is an additive game minus the dual game of (N,w), the nucle-
olus of (N,w) can be directly obtained from the nucleolus of (N, w̄).
However, when applying the general algorithm of Arin and Feltkamp (1997),
one does not obtain a direct interpretation of the allocations proposed by
the nucleolus in terms of the parameters of the underlying MCP-situation.
Therefore, we have chosen to develop a situation-specific algorithm, that
explicitly depends on the prices p and the quantities q. Moreover, the al-
gorithm allows for a specific acceleration step to make it polynomial, as is
shown below.
Example 3.5.4 Consider the following MCP-situation (N, q, p), with N =
{1, 2, 3, 4}, q = (10, 45, 100, 250) and p = (10, 8, 7, 5). Let (N,w) be the
corresponding MCP-game. We are going to compute the nucleolus of the
corresponding MCP-game (N,w), using the nucleolus-determinant recursion.
We have F1 = {S|S ⊂ {1, 2, 3}} and the values for f1(S), S ∈ F1 are
Table 3.5.1: Values of fr(S)
S {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} {1,2,3}
f1(S) −25 −67.5 −100 −55 −7313 −9623 −7712
f2(S) −6712 −100 −70 −9712 −9623 −95
f3(S) −100 −9712 −11414 −10834
presented in Table 3.5.1, in the second row. From this table we can conclude
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that F̃1 = {1}, hence T1 = {1}, S1 = {1} and e1 = −25. From this step in
the recursion one can conclude that: nuc1(w) = 50− 25 = 25 and
{
E({1}, nuc(w)) = −25
E(N\{1}, nuc(w)) = −25.
The next step in the nucleolus-determinant recursion is to find T2 ∈ F̃2, where
F2 equals {{2}, {3}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}}. The values for f2(S), S ∈
F2, are also given in Table 3.5.1, in the third row. Thus T2 = S2 = {2} with
e2 = −67.5. Hence nuc2(w) = 67.5 and
{
E({2}, nuc(w)) = −67.5
E(N\{2}, nuc(w)) = −67.5.








E({1, 2}, nuc(w)) = w({1, 2})− (nuc1(w) + nuc2(w)) = −72.5
E(N\{1, 2}, nuc(w)) = w({3, 4})− (nuc3(w) + nuc4(w))
= w({3, 4})− (w(N)− nuc1(w)− nuc2(w))
= −92.5
Hence, F3 = {{3}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}}, and f3(S), S ∈ F3, can be found
in the last row of Table 3.5.1. In this step we find that T3 = {1, 3} thus
S3 = {3} with e3 = −97.5. Thus for player 3, nuc3(w) = 102.5. Now
S1∪S2∪S3 = N\{4}, hence we can stop and determine nuc4(w) = −(−25−
67.5− 97.5) = 190.
This procedure is faster than the general way of computing the nucleolus,
but it is still exponential in the number of players. In the next paragraphs we
again calculate the nucleolus of this example, but use a polynomial method.
If we look closer at the function f1(S), we can find a coalition T1 belonging
to F̃1 more efficiently. To do so, we need to maximize
∑
j∈S qj(p4 − pS)
1 + |S| ,
over all coalitions in F1. Since p4 is always less than the unit prices of players
1, 2 or 3, the fraction is negative. Thus it is wise to have pS and |S| large,
but
∑
j∈S qj low. So we need to determine the price setter of S, and then
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add smaller players to increase |S| and keep ∑j∈S qj small. If we have that
player 3 is the price setter and it is beneficial to add player 2, then adding
player 1 must also increase the fraction. Thus T1 has the following structure,
T1 = {1, . . . , m, z},
where z is the largest player in the coalition, the price setter, and we add
smaller players 1 up to m. If m = 0, then T1 = {z}. For this example we
can make the following combinations:
(m, z) (0, 1) (1, 2) (1, 3) (0, 2) (2, 3) (0, 3)
S {1} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2} {1, 2, 3} {3}
In Table 3.5.1 we can see that f1({1}) is maximal, thus z = 1.
Also we can speed up the search for a coalition T2 belonging to F̃2. We
need to maximize the following fraction
∑
j∈S qj(p4 − pS)− |S ∩ S1|e1
1 + |S\S1|
,
over all S ∈ F2. Either pS = p2 or pS = p3, since {1} /∈ F2. If adding player
k not yet in S1 increases the fraction, then also adding player j < k with
j /∈ S1 increases the fraction. We only add player 1 if q1(p4 − pz) < e1. Thus
T2 has the following structure
T2 =
(
{1, . . . , m, z} ∩N\S1
)
∪ {i ∈ {1} : qi(p4 − pz) > ei}.
Since q1(p4 − p3) = −20 > −25, it is always beneficial to add player 1 to a
coalition with player 3 being the price setter. Hence we start by comparing
the values of f2({1, 3}) and f2({1, 2, 3}) and find that f2({1, 2, 3}) is the
highest. Since q1(p4 − p2) = −30 < −25, we do not want to add player 1
to a coalition with player 2 being the price setter. Now we need to compare
f2({1, 2, 3}) with f2({2}) and we find that f2({2}) is the highest, hence T2 =
{2}.
Following the same reasoning as for step 2 in the recursion we know that
pS = p3 and T3 has the following structure
T3 = {3} ∪ {i ∈ {1, 2} : qi(p4 − p3) > ei}.
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We only add player 1 if q1(p4 − p3) > e1 and player 2 if q2(p4 − p3) > e2. In
the previous round we found that q1(p4 − p3) > e1, hence we add player 1 to
player 3 and since q2(p4 − p3) = −90 < −67.5 we do not add player 2. Thus
T3 = {1, 3}. /
Example 3.5.4 shows that one can speed up the Nucleolus-determinant re-
cursion at the point of determining a coalition Tr belonging to F̃r. T1 has
the structure {1, . . . , m, z} for some 0 ≤ m < z ≤ n − 1, thus ∑n−1z=1 z =
1
2
(n−1)(n−2) numbers need to be compared to find T1. Furthermore Tr for
r ∈ {2, . . . , τ} has the structure
{z} ∪
(

































Then, we add players from
⋃r−1
k=1 Sk if that further increases fr. Hence, by
comparing at most (n−1)2 numbers, we can find Tr ∈ F̃r for all r ∈ {2, . . . , τ}
with τ ≤ n − 1. From these observations we can readily derive that the
nucleolus of an MCP-game can be found in polynomial time.
Theorem 3.5.5 Let (N, q, p) ∈ M be an MCP-situation with (N,w) the
corresponding MCP-game. Then, nuc(w) can be determined in O(n3) time.
3.6 The Shapley value of MCP-games
In this section we analyze the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) of an MCP-
game and show that it is a suitable allocation method for an MCP-situation.
An explicit context-specific expression for the Shapley value is provided.
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Originally the Shapley value is introduced as the average of all |N |! marginal
vectors of a TU-game. We introduced marginal vectors in Section 3.3 in
Equation (3.5). Let (N, v) be a TU-game. Then, the Shapley value φ(v) ∈






There is another method for calculating the Shapley value of a TU-game,
which we will use in determining the Shapley value of an MCP-game. For
this we need the notion of unanimity games. For T ∈ 2N\{∅} the unanimity
game (N, uT ) is defined by
uT (S) =
{
1 if T ⊂ S,
0 otherwise,
for all S ∈ 2N . Thus the unanimity game (N, uT ) states that without all
players in T , a coalition S ∈ 2N has value zero.
Every TU-game (N, v) can be written in a unique way as a linear combi-






Example 3.6.1 We consider the MCP-situation of Example 3.2.1 without
player 4. Hence N = {1, 2, 3}, q = (2, 4, 8) and p(t) = 10 + 12
t
, for t ∈ R+.
We are going to decompose the corresponding MCP-game into a linear com-
bination of unanimity games. The following table represents the correspond-
ing MCP-game, and for illustrative purposes also the unanimity games u{1},
u{1,2} and uN .
S {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
w(S) 0 0 0 6 9 6 15
u{1}(S) 1 0 0 1 1 0 1
u{1,2}(S) 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
uN(S) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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To find a vector c ∈ R2N\{∅} such that w = ∑T∈2N\{∅} cTuT , we start with
the singletons. We have that c{1}u{1} = w({1}), hence c{1} = 0. Simi-
larly c{2} = c{3} = 0. Secondly, c{1,2}u{1,2} + c{1}u{1} + c{2}u{2} = w({1, 2}).
Hence, c{1,2} = w({1, 2}) = 6 and similarly c{1,3} = w({1, 3}) = 9 and
c{2,3} = w({2, 3}) = 6. Finally, c{1,2,3} = w({1, 2, 3}) −
∑
T∈2N\N cT =
15− 6− 9− 6 = −6. /
In case of an MCP-game, the coefficients for a linear decomposition into
unanimity games, can be determined quite easily using Theorem 3.2.2. For all
T ∈ 2N with |T | ≥ 2 define aT , bT ∈ T such that T ∩ {1, . . . , bT} = {aT , bT },
i.e., player aT is the player within T with lowest index and player bT is the
player within T with second lowest index.
Theorem 3.6.2 Let (N,w) be an MCP-game corresponding to an MCP-





Then, for |T | = 1, cT = 0 and for |T | ≥ 2, we have that
cT = (−1)|T |w({aT , bT }). (3.7)
In the proof of Theorem 3.6.2, we use the following lemma.




















−1 if a is even,

















(−1)j(1)a−j = (1− 1)a = 0,
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where the second equality follows from the binomium of Newton.
(ii) This follows immediately from (i). 
Proof of Theorem 3.6.2: First note that for all T ∈ 2N\{∅} the coefficients
in the decomposition of w can be determined recursively in the following way:




Hence, for |T | = 1, cT = w({i}) = 0. Let |T | = 2. According to (3.8)
cT = w(T ) = (−1)|T |w(T ) = (−1)|T |w({aT , bT}).
Thus for |T | = 2, (3.7) is valid. To prove (3.7), we will use induction on the
number of players in T .
Assume that for all |T | ≤ k − 1
cT = (−1)|T |w({aT , bT}).
Let |T | = k and for ease of notation we set T = {t1, t2, . . . , tk} such that
qt1 ≤ qt2 ≤ . . . ≤ qtk . Clearly aT = t1 and bT = t2. Then, by (3.8) and by









The last sum in (3.9) can be rewritten by counting the number of proper
sub-coalitions S containing player th and ti with h < i such that S ∩
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w({th, tk}) + w({t1, t2})(−1)k−1.









w({th, tk}) −w({t1, t2})(−1)k−1
= −w({t1, t2})(−1)k−1
= w({aT , bT})(−1)|T |.

For any TU-game (N, v) with v =
∑
T∈2N\{∅} cTuT , the unique decomposition





|T | . (3.10)
Hence, using the decomposition in Theorem 3.6.2, we can compute the Shap-
ley value of an MCP-game. For all i ∈ N , define PP (i) = {(k, `)|k < `, ` <
i, k ∈ N, ` ∈ N} as the collection of preceding pairs, pairs of players with
index smaller than i.
Theorem 3.6.4 Let (N,w) be an MCP-game corresponding to (N, q, p) ∈
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(n− ` + 2)(n− `+ 1)(n− `)w({k, `}). (3.11)
In the proof of Theorem 3.6.4 we use the following lemma.
Lemma 3.6.5 (Poblete, Munro, and Papadakis (2006) , Table 1) For
t ∈ N let at =
1
x+ t












Proof of Theorem 3.6.4: Let i ∈ N and let S be the collection of all



















(−1)|T |w({aT , bT})
|T | , (3.12)
where
(i) S1 = {T ∈ S|i = bT },
(ii) S2 = {T ∈ S|i = aT },
(iii) S3 = {T ∈ S|i > bT }.
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For T ∈ S1, setting |T | = 2+ t with t ∈ {0, . . . , n− 2} and for one particular

























= w({k, i})(2− 1)!(n− i)!
(n− i+ 2)!
= w({k, i}) 1
(n− i+ 2)(n− i+ 1) ,
















(n− i+ 2)(n− i+ 1)w({k, i}). (3.13)
For T ∈ S2, setting |T | = 2+ t with t ∈ {0, . . . , n− 2} and for one particular


























(n−m+ 2)(n−m+ 1)w({i,m}). (3.14)
For T ∈ S3, setting |T | = 3+ t with t ∈ {0, . . . , n− 3} and for one particular
















= (−1)w({k, `})(3− 1)!(n− `)!
(n− `+ 3)!
= w({k, `}) −2
(n− `+ 2)(n− ` + 1)(n− `) .









(n− `+ 2)(n− `+ 1)(n− `)w({k, `}). (3.15)
Filling (3.13), (3.14) and (3.15) in (3.12) results in (3.11) for all i ∈ N . 
Hence, instead of computing all marginal vectors, one can determine the
Shapley value of an MCP-game in a single step. The following example
explains how the Shapley value of an MCP-game can be interpreted.
Example 3.6.6 Consider the following 5-player MCP-game corresponding
to a 5-player MCP-situation with q = (1, 2, 3, 4, 10) and p1 = 12, p2 = 11,
p3 = 9.5, p4 = 7.5 and p5 = 4. The table below provides the values of the
2-player coalitions only. The other coalitional values can be easily deter-
mined using Theorem 3.2.2, e.g. w(N) = w({1, 5})+w({2, 5})+w({3, 5})+
w({4, 5}) = 8 + 14 + 16.5 + 14 = 52.5.
S {1,2} {1,3} {1,4} {1,5} {2,3}
w(S) 1 2.5 4.5 8 3
S {2,4} {2,5} {3,4} {3,5} {4,5}
w(S) 7 14 6 16.5 14
Expression (3.11) can be split in three parts:
- a positive part due to cost savings with players with a lower index,
- a positive part due to cost savings with players with a larger index,
- a negative part, due to paybacks to pairs of players with a smaller index
(the preceding pairs).
For this example, the three parts are represented in the Tables 3.6.1, 3.6.2
and 3.6.3, respectively.
Table 3.6.1 indicates that player 3 gets 1
12
of the cost savings he can obtain
with player 1 and also 1
12
of the cost savings he can make with player 2,
while player 5 gets 1
2
of the cost savings he can make with any of the other
players. Note that all fractions are the same per row, i.e., per player under
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consideration.
Table 3.6.2 indicates that player 3 gets 1
6
of the cost savings he can make with
player 4 and 1
2
of the cost savings he can make with player 5. Note that in
Table 3.6.2 all fractions are the same per column, i.e., per player with larger
index. Moreover, the matrix in Table 3.6.2 is the transpose of the matrix in
Table 3.6.1. These two tables represent what the players receive, but in
Table 3.6.1: Cost savings with players with lower index


























Table 3.6.2: Cost savings with players with higher index



























Negative {1,2} {1,3} {1,4} {2,3} {2,4} {3,4}
Player 1
Player 2
Player 3 − 1
30
w({1, 2})
Player 4 − 1
30
w({1, 2}) − 1
12
w({1, 3}) − 1
12
w({2, 3})
Player 5 − 1
30
w({1, 2}) − 1
12
w({1, 3}) − 1
3
w({1, 4}) − 1
12
w({2, 3}) − 1
3
w({2, 4}) − 1
3
w({3, 4})
total we allocate too much this way. If we sum all entries in the last row in
Table 3.6.1 and the last column in Table 3.6.2, we already obtain w(N). So
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Figure 3.6.1: Composition of the Shapley value of Example 2.6.6
(3.16)
According to the remaining negative part of (3.11), each two-player compo-
nent of (3.16) is paid by all players with higher index than the player with
the highest index in the two-person coalition at hand. One can think of this
payback as a taxation on the basis of the relative size of the order quantity.
Table 3.6.3 indicates that 1
6
w({1, 3}) is paid back equally by players 4 and















































In Figure 3.6.1 the three building blocks of the Shapley value of this example
are visualized. The white bars represent the cost savings with players with
lower index, the grey bars are the cost savings with players with higher index
and the black bars represent paybacks. /
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In fact, Theorem 3.6.2 and Theorem 3.6.4 can be generalized to all zero-
normalized and nonnegative TU-games with an ordering on the players such
that (3.3) and (3.4) are satisfied. A game, however, that satisfies (3.3) and
(3.4) does not need to be an MCP-game. This is illustrated in the following
example.
Example 3.6.7 Consider the 5-person TU-game (N, z) that satisfies (3.4)
and the values of all two-player coalitions given by the following table.
S {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} {1,4} {2,4}
z(S) 4 7 5 9 7
S {3,4} {1,5} {2,5} {3,5} {4,5}
z(S) 6 11 9 7 5
Clearly, (3.3) is satisfied. Suppose (N, z) is an MCP-game. Thus there are
vectors q and p such that (3.2) holds for all i, j ∈ N with i < j. In particular
we find that p2 = p1 − 4q1 , p3 = p1 −
7
q1
and p4 = p1 − 9q1 .








, which contradicts the fact that z({2, 4}) = 7 and z({2, 3}) = 5.
/
3.7 Numerical examples
This section takes a numerical look at the Direct Price solution, the nucleolus
and the Shapley value as allocation rules for MCP-situations. In the previous
sections we have discussed the three solution concepts from an analytical
point of view. The Direct Price solution lets every player pay the lowest
available unit price, provided by the largest player. The nucleolus lets every
player pay a fee for using the low unit price of the largest player. These
fees correspond to the determining excesses of the nucleolus. Whereas the
nucleolus only looks at price reductions due to the presence of the largest
player, the Shapley value considers all pairwise cost savings of the players.
Depending on a player’s relative size, he can gain more cost savings with
another player. In order to prevent too skewed cost allocations, small players
are subsidized for the fact that they could obtain some cost savings without
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the presence of larger players. These subsidies are paid by taxing players
with higher cost savings.
In practice, organizations that join a purchasing cooperative might not know
the exact details of their fellow cooperation members, except the quantity
discount of the largest player. Naturally, they like to know what their share
in the total cost savings would be. Therefore we will simulate for several in-
stances the expected allocation of cost savings to an organization that joins
an MCP-situation, according to these three solution concepts.
As input for the simulation we take 5-player MCP-situations with integer-
valued order quantities and with fixed q1 and q5. The order quantities q2, q3
and q4 are unknown, but in between q1 and q5. We restrict to cases where
qn−1 < qn and we use the following unit price function:




with t ∈ (0,∞) and x ∈ [0.25, 1.25]. This type of unit price functions ad-
equately represents most quantity discount schemes seen in practice, as ex-
plained by Schotanus (2007). We determine by simulation what a random
player with order quantity q1 ≤ t < q5 can expect as his share in the cost
savings — according to the Direct Price solution, the nucleolus or the Shap-
ley value — in such an MCP-situation. For MCP-situations with a larger
group of players, similar results can be obtained.
One step of the simulation is executed as follows. For fixed q1, q5 and x, the
order quantities q2, q3 and q4 are randomly and simultaneously drawn from a
discrete uniform distribution. Then, the Direct Price solution, the nucleolus
and the Shapley value of the corresponding MCP-game are calculated. We
are interested in the share in cost savings for a player with order quantity
t ∈ {q1, q1 + 1, q1 + 2, . . . , q5 − 1}, regardless of the fact that he is player
2, 3 or 4. Hence, we store these allocations per different value of qi, inde-
pendent of the index i. This run is repeated successively. Then, for every
t ∈ {q1, q1 + 1, . . . , q5 − 1} we average the stored Direct Price solutions, nu-
cleoli and Shapley values over the number of times they have appeared. This
simulation is executed for twelve different instances. First, for q1 = 1 and
q5 = 20 and for each of the discount parameters x = 0.3, x = 0.5, x = 0.8 and
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x = 1.1 we derived approximately 1500 MCP-situations. Second, for q1 = 1,
q5 = 40 and for each of the discount parameters x = 0.3, x = 0.5, x = 0.8
and x = 1.1 we derived approximately 11000 MCP-situations. And third,
for q1 = 10 and q5 = 50 we derived approximately 11000 MCP-situations,
for x = 0.3, x = 0.5, x = 0.8 and x = 1.1. For larger values of q1 and q5 the
attainable quantity discounts for the several players become very small.
In Figure 3.7.1 one can find the results of the simulations with respect to
the MCP-situations with q1 = 1, q5 = 20 and the four different discount
parameters x. For fixed x, we have 19 different values of t, 1, 2, . . . , 19, each
having an expected share in cost savings according to the Direct Price solu-
tion, the nucleolus and the Shapley value. The 19 points belonging to the
Figure 3.7.1: Expected payoffs in a 5-player MCP-game with q1 = 1 and
q5 = 20
nucleolus and the 19 points belonging to the Shapley value are connected by
the light grey line and dotted grey line, respectively. The black line connects
the 19 points belonging to the Direct Price solution. E.g. a point on the
light grey line represents the expected share of cost savings for a player with
order quantity t in such an MCP-situation according to the nucleolus.
In Figure 3.7.2 one can find the results of the same situation, only in this
case q5 = 40 and in Figure 3.7.3 one can find the results of a situation with
q1 = 10 and q5 = 50.
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Figure 3.7.2: Expected payoffs in a random 5-player MCP-game with q1 = 1
and q5 = 40
Figure 3.7.3: Expected payoffs in a 5-player MCP-game with q1 = 10 and
q5 = 50
For the situation with q1 = 1 and q5 = 40 we also compared the expected
shares in cost savings to players 1 and 5 for 9 different values of x, they can
be found in Table 3.7.1.
We can make the following observations. The curve of the nucleolus always
lies below the curve of the Direct Price. This is a confirmation of the results
from Section 3.5. The Direct Price solution gives all bilateral profits to
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Table 3.7.1: Expected payoffs to player 1 and 5 for q1 = 1 and q5 = 40
x φ̄1 ¯nuc1 D̄P 1 φ̄5 ¯nuc5 D̄P 5
0.3 6.1073 5.3565 8.0321 13.9026 14.1642 0
0.4 7.0825 6.5056 9.2562 13.3979 13.3889 0
0.5 7.7681 7.5305 10.1026 12.1327 11.7777 0
0.6 8.2865 8.3917 10.6879 10.6323 10.2442 0
0.7 8.6152 9.1919 11.0927 9.0905 8.4306 0
0.8 8.8631 9.8080 11.3726 7.7002 6.9363 0
0.9 9.0455 10.3163 11.5662 6.4195 5.5601 0
1.0 9.1663 10.7434 11.7000 5.2371 4.2668 0
1.1 9.2664 11.0067 11.7925 4.4524 3.5057 0
players 1, 2, 3 and 4, while within the nucleolus players 1 up to 4 have to pay
player 5 for joining the purchasing cooperative. The curve of the Shapley
value does not always lie below the curve of the Direct price. This is due to
the fact that the Shapley value need not lie in the core of the game. In all
situations the behavior of the Shapley value is less volatile as the nucleolus
and the nucleolus is less volatile as the direct price solution. We can see this
from the figures by looking at the range of the curves. The Shapley value
curve has the smallest range while the Direct Price solution has the largest.
We continue by comparing the nucleolus with the Shapley value. In all three
situations, the players with order quantities close to q5 are better off with
the Shapley value and the players with somewhat smaller order quantities
are better off with the nucleolus. In general we can also conclude that,
although the nucleolus and the Shapley value are different game theoretic
solution concepts, for MCP-situations their behavior with respect to the
input parameters of the model, is quite similar and the expected differences
for a player are small.
If we compare Figure 3.7.1 with Figure 3.7.2 we can see that the size of player
5 does not have much effect on the differences between the allocations of the
nucleolus and the Shapley value.
In all three figures we can see that increasing the discount parameter x,
makes the three solution concepts come closer to each other. This is partly
due to the fact that the total savings obtained decreases as x increases. Also,
for larger x, the threshold for players to prefer the Shapley value over the
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nucleolus tends to decrease. For players with order quantities close to q1 the
nucleolus becomes more attractive as x increases.
From Table 3.7.1 we can draw a similar conclusion as above. For larger x, the
smallest player has a better position than player 5. In case of x = 1.1 (q1 = 1
and q5 = 40), the expected share in total cost savings of player 1 equals 36
and 43 percent for the Shapley value and nucleolus, respectively. For player 5,
these expected shares equal 16 percent (Shapley) and 12 percent (nucleolus).
While for the instance with x = 0.3, player 1’s expected shares are 12 percent
(Shapley) and 11 percent (nucleolus), and for player 5 the expected shares
for both the Shapley value and the nucleolus equal 26 percent.
Chapter 4




In the previous chapter we dealt with a special class of interactive purchas-
ing situations. One of the main underlying assumptions in Chapter 3 and
in cooperative purchasing in general is that the capacity of the supplier is
sufficient to fulfill the total order of the group of purchasers. Although com-
monly assumed, one should realize that in practice the capacity of a supplier
is limited. In particular, while a purchasing cooperative gets larger, the sup-
plier’s capacity might be exceeded and the cooperative has to use a second
supplier. Capacity restrictions in cooperative purchasing situations will be
the main topic of this chapter.
Not much literature can be found on capacity restrictions within coopera-
tive purchasing. Supplier selection and order quantity allocation for a single
purchaser has been studied from different perspectives. Berger, Gerstenfeld,
and Zeng (2004) argue that maintaining a relationship with multiple suppli-
ers can be a good strategy to decrease supply chain risks. Jayaraman and
Srivastava (1999) developed a mixed integer programming model for selecting
suppliers and for allocating the total order quantity among the selected sup-
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pliers. Ghodsypour and O’Brien (1998) incorporated an analytical hierarchy
process for allocating orders among suppliers based on both quantitative and
qualitative criteria. Ghodsypour and O’Brien (2001) provide an algorithm
for quantity allocation where the possible suppliers have limited capacities.
Suppliers’ optimal pricing strategies in a multiple supplier environment have
been discussed in, e.g., Marvel and Yang (2008) and Hsieh and Kuo (2011).
More precisely, Marvel and Yang (2008) discuss pricing strategies when two
suppliers face a purchasing cooperative. From a purchasers’ perspective,
however, a purchasing cooperative with capacity restricted suppliers has not
yet been studied.
In this chapter we consider a purchasing cooperative with individual order
quantities with respect to a certain commodity. Here, the sum of the order
quantities determines the unit price. Instead of facing one supplier with suffi-
cient supplies, as in the classical CP-situations described by Schotanus (2007)
and Nagarajan et al. (2010), the group faces two suppliers with (possibly)
insufficient individual supplies. The combined capacity of the two suppliers
is however sufficient. Like in regular cooperative purchasing situations, the
unit price of a supplier weakly decreases with the size of the total order, that
is, however, up to his capacity bound. These unit prices or quantity discount
schemes are not necessarily the same for both suppliers. We show that in
these capacity restricted cooperative purchasing (CRCP) situations individ-
ual cost savings are not guaranteed. Nevertheless, the group of purchasers is
assumed to cooperate. Think of a group of departments, a group of ministries
or a group of municipalities with a joined purchasing programme.
We are interested in finding the answers to two questions. Firstly, how to split
the total order over the two suppliers such that the total purchasing costs are
minimized? Secondly, how to adequately divide the total purchasing costs
over the group of purchasers?
For the first question, we show that there is a straightforward solution by
solving a minimization problem. We will show that it is optimal to order as
much as possible at one supplier and the possible remainder at the other.
The second problem is more involved. To find suitable cost allocations we
model the CRCP-situation as a cost sharing problem.
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Generally, a cost sharing problem involves a set of users of a certain ‘tech-
nology’ and each of the users has an individual level of demanded output.
To produce the total demanded output a certain level of input or costs is
needed. The relationship between input and output, is represented by a cost
function, where the function describes for each level of output the needed in-
put (costs). How to fairly distribute the needed input, based on the desired
output and the cost function is the central theme in cost sharing literature.
In Moulin (2002) one can find an overview of different types of cost sharing
problems and multiple cost allocation mechanisms.
In our setting the input needed can be represented by a monetary value:
purchasing costs. The output is the sum of the individual order quantities.
The cost function of the cost sharing problem corresponding to a CRCP-
situation provides for each level of order quantities, the minimal purchasing
costs. These minimal purchasing costs follow from dividing the order quan-
tities optimally over the two suppliers. The resulting cost sharing problem
corresponding to a capacity restricted cooperative purchasing situation then
falls within the class of so-called one-input-one-output-technologies, such as
airport problems (cf. Littlechild and Thomson (1977)) or single-product in-
ventory problems. In this class the output is a single homogeneous divisible
good.
We show that the cost function of a cost sharing problem corresponding
to a CRCP-situation is piecewise concave and that the concave intervals are
determined by so-called involuntary switches from one supplier to the other
supplier. The switches are called involuntary because the restricted capacity
of one supplier forces the purchasing group to also place an order at the sec-
ond supplier. A concave cost function implies unlimited increasing returns to
scale, whereas the piecewise concave cost function implies limited increasing
returns to scale: after a certain output level, new investments are needed.
According to Swoveland (1975) piecewise concave cost functions are a realis-
tic representation of returns to scale in a production environment. For this
reason, we broaden our view to general piecewise concave cost functions in
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the search for allocation methods for CRCP-situations.
In Chapter 3 we argued that finding a fair cost allocation method is one
of the critical success factors for cooperative purchasing. Especially in the
presence of differences in order quantity size, organizations with a large order
quantity could get the feeling that organizations with a small order quantity
profit from their size, without making any further contributions.
As Moulin (2002) points out, when there are no quantity discounts, the fair
distribution of purchasing costs should simply follow Aristotle’s proportion-
ality: Equals should be treated equally, and unequals, unequally in proportion
to relevant similarities and differences. However, since both suppliers have
a decreasing unit price function, quantity discounts will be present and we
need to look for a more sophisticated allocation method.
For cost allocation methods of the purchasing costs in a CRCP-situation,
there are two desirable properties. Firstly, the quantity discounts should be
incorporated in the cost allocation, i.e, organizations with large order quan-
tities do not pay a higher unit price than organizations with smaller order
quantities. A second desirable effect of an allocation method is that orga-
nizations with large order quantities do profit, in terms of cost allocations,
from the presence of players with smaller order quantities. Loosely formu-
lated: the smaller players are not considered as profiteers.
In the process of finding a suitable cost allocation method for CRCP-situations
we start by considering the three main cost sharing rules: the Shapley-Shubik
formula (Shubik (1962)), Aumann-Shapley pricing (Aumann and Shapley
(1974)) and the serial cost sharing rule (Moulin and Shenker (1992)). There
are two main arguments for Friedman and Moulin (1999) to conclude that
from the three main cost sharing methods, the serial cost sharing rule is most
appropriate for one-input-one-output-technologies such as the cost sharing
problems we consider. First, since the cost sharing problem corresponding
to a CRCP-situation concerns only homogeneous inputs and outputs, the
Aumann-Shapley pricing boils down to average cost pricing, i.e. dividing
the total purchasing costs proportionally (based on order quantities) over
the purchasers. As argued before, this method neglects the quantity dis-
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counts that are present in cooperative purchasing. Second, one of the main
properties of the Shapley-Shubik formula is, that it is invariant to the scale
in which the output is measured, which is not of any relevance in a situation
in which order quantities are for a single good.
Furthermore, there are arguments in favor of the serial cost sharing rule.
For concave cost functions, the serial cost sharing rule satisfies properties
that are attractive from the perspective of CRCP-situations. Firstly, the
serial rule satisfies unit cost monotonicity : when organization 2 has a higher
demanded output than organization 1, organization 2 does not pay a higher
cost per unit than organization 1. Secondly, the serial rule satisfies monotonic
weakness for the absence of the smallest player (MOWASP). This property
implies that when the player with smallest order quantity is absent, every
remaining player’s cost allocation increases. More precisely, this increase in
cost allocation (weakness) is monotonic in the size of the order quantity.
However, these rather compelling properties are lost when we add ‘piecewise’
to the cost function’s recipe. We explicitly show that for cost sharing prob-
lems with piecewise concave cost functions, the serial rule in general does not
satisfy unit cost monotonicity or MOWASP.
Therefore, we introduce a new context specific class of cost sharing rules
for cost sharing problems with piecewise concave cost functions, in which we
first divide the vector of order quantities into separate vectors for the different
concave intervals, using a bankruptcy rule. Subsequently, for each concave
interval and corresponding vector we use the serial rule to allocate the costs
of that specific interval over the organizations. Finally, by summing these
allocated costs we obtain the allocation according to the piecewise serial rule.
In particular, we consider the piecewise serial rule where we divide the vector
of order quantities into separate vectors, using the proportional rule and the
constrained equal losses-rule. It will be shown that the proportional rule is
the only bankruptcy rule for which the piecewise serial rule satisfies unit cost
monotonicity. For the constrained equal losses piecewise serial rule we will
show that when the organization with smallest order quantity is not present
in the cooperation, the group of remaining organizations can be split in a
group of smaller organizations for which the allocated costs decrease and a
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group of larger organizations for which the allocated costs increase. Also,
here there is a monotonic relation: the larger the order quantity, the higher
the increase (or the smaller the decrease) in cost allocation. This property is
a weaker variant of MOWASP and is called monotonic vulnerability for the
absence of the smallest player (MOVASP).
Both the properties unit cost monotonicity and MOVASP are inspired by the
CRCP context. Unit cost monotonicity implies that in the cost allocation
a purchaser with a higher order quantity obtains a lower unit price, i.e., a
higher quantity discount. MOVASP implies that the organization with the
largest order quantity has either the least decrease or the highest increase in
cost allocation when the smallest player is absent. Hence, it creates a group
cohesiveness in which the organization with smallest order quantity can con-
tribute to lower cost allocations of organizations with larger order quantities.
For illustrative purposes we conclude the chapter with a numerical compari-
son of the cost allocations of CRCP-situations according to the two piecewise
serial rules and the serial cost sharing rule. These examples further support
the claim that the two piecewise serial rules are appropriate allocation meth-
ods for CRCP-situations.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 formally describes
a capacity restricted cooperative purchasing situation. In Section 4.3 we
model a CRCP-situation as a cost sharing problem and show that the cost
function is piecewise concave. As an alternative to the serial cost sharing
rule, we introduce the piecewise serial rules in Section 4.4 and we derive
characterizing properties of the proportional and constrained equal losses-
variants. Section 4.5 briefly discusses the differences in cost allocations of
CRCP-situations according to the two piecewise serial rules and the serial
cost sharing rule, on the basis of a numerical analysis.
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4.2 Capacity restrictions in cooperative pur-
chasing
After a brief description of regular cooperative purchasing situations, this
section will provide the formal description of capacity restricted cooperative
purchasing situations.
A cooperative purchasing situation (cf. Schotanus (2007)) is given by a finite
set of players N , with a vector of individual order quantities q ∈ RN+ . There
is a commonly known unit price function p : R+ → R+ that maps an order
quantity to some unit price. In a cooperative purchasing situation, the sum
of the individual order quantities determines the unit price. It is assumed
that p is non-increasing and that the turnover function p(t)t is increasing
and concave on [0,
∑
j∈N qj]. This latter assumption results in the corre-
sponding cooperative purchasing TU-game (N, z), for all S ∈ 2N defined by
z(S) =
∑




j∈S qj), to be convex. Hence, in a coop-
erative purchasing situation there exist stable and efficient allocations of the
cost savings gained by purchasing cooperatively.
In a capacity restricted cooperative purchasing (CRCP) situation, there is a
finite player set N = {1, . . . , n}, with n ≥ 2 and again a vector of individual
order quantities q ∈ RN+ . There are two suppliers providing this commodity:
A and B. Both suppliers have a limited capacity QA, QB ∈ R++. The com-
bined capacity is, however, sufficient,
∑
j∈N qj ≤ QA + QB. Both suppliers
have a linearly decreasing unit price function. For A, pA : [0, QA] → R+ and
for B, pB : [0, QB] → R+, are given by
pA(t) = α1 − α2t, t ∈ [0, QA] (4.1)
and
pB(t) = β1 − β2t t ∈ [0, QB], (4.2)
respectively, where t denotes the order size and α1, α2, β1, β2 ∈ R+.
Note that for all t ∈ [0, QA], p′A(t) ≤ 0 and that p′′A(t) = 0.
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It is a natural assumption that the revenue of a supplier does not decrease if
t increases. For supplier A this is the case if α1 and α2 are such that for all
t ∈ [0, QA], the revenue of A, cA(t) = pA(t)t, is nondecreasing. Hence for all
t ≤ QA, we assume









Note that both cA and cB are differentiable and concave on [0, QA] and [0, QB]
respectively.
For the remainder of this chapter, we assume, without loss of generality
that
QA ≤ QB
and that the order quantities are arranged in nondecreasing order, i.e.,
0 < q1 ≤ q2 ≤ . . . ≤ qn.
When we refer to a smaller player, we refer to a player with smaller order
quantity and thus smaller index. When we refer to a larger or bigger player,
we refer to a player with a larger order quantity or larger index.
A CRCP-situation on player setN , is given by Z = (q, [α1, α2, QA], [β1, β2, QB]).
We denote the set of all CRCP-situations on N by ZN .
The main assumption of this chapter is that the players are purchasing co-
operatively. The next example shows that, contrary to regular cooperative
purchasing situations and maximum cooperative purchasing situations, in
CRCP-situations we cannot easily determine whether cooperation leads to
cost savings.
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Example 4.2.1 LetN = {1, 2, 3} and let Z = (q, [α1, α2, QA], [β1, β2, QB]) ∈
ZN be given by q = (8, 9, 15) and
{
pA(t) = 18− 13 t, t ∈ [0, 16]
pB(t) = 25− 12 t, t ∈ [0, 20].
If player 1 would be on his own, he would like to order 8 at A with purchas-
ing costs cA(8) = pA(8)8 = 122
2
3
. Similarly player 2 would like to order 9
at A with purchasing costs cA(9) = 135. Also, player 3 prefers ordering 15
at supplier A with purchasing costs cA(15) = 195. This is not a feasible set
of individual orders, since 8 + 9 + 15 > 16 = QA. Also, if the three players
purchase cooperatively they cannot simply sum their individual ‘desired’ or-
ders at the two suppliers. In this example the lowest ordering costs for order
quantity 8 + 9+ 15 = 32 can be obtained by ordering 20 at B and 12 at A./





i∈N qi, then the problem boils down to a regular cooperative
purchasing situation, simply by taking the minimum of the two functions as
unit price function p.
4.3 Cost sharing problems corresponding to
CRCP-situations
CRCP-situations can be modeled and analyzed by using the concept of cost
sharing.
4.3.1 One-input-one-output cost sharing problems
The nature of our CRCP-situation matches a special class of cost sharing
problems: one-input-one-output-technologies . In this class, the order quanti-
ties are scalars and enter additively in the continuous cost function. Such a
cost sharing problem on N = {1, . . . , n} is represented by a pair (C, q), with
q ∈ RN+ such that q1 ≤ . . . ≤ qn, and C : [0, Q] → R+ with Q ≥
∑
i∈N qi
is such that C is continuous and nondecreasing, and with C(0) = 0. Here
the argument t in C(t) represents the total demanded output. We denote by
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CSN the set of all such cost sharing problems on N .
A cost sharing rule f is a mapping f : CSN → RN , such that ∑i∈N fi(C, q) =
C(
∑
i∈N qi) and f(C, q) ≥ 0.
4.3.2 Optimal ordering policy
Let Z = (q, [α1, α2, QA], [β1, β2, QB]) ∈ ZN . In the corresponding cost shar-
ing problem (CZ , q), CZ(t) gives for each t ∈ [0, QA+QB] the corresponding
ordering costs. These ordering costs follow from an optimal splitting of t
over the suppliers A and B. An ordering policy for t is a pair (tA, tB) such
that 0 ≤ tA ≤ QA, 0 ≤ tB ≤ QB and tA + tB = t. Here, tA represents the
total order at supplier A and tB the total order at supplier B. For ordering
policy (tA, tB) the ordering costs are
cA(tA) + cB(tB) = pA(tA)tA + pB(tB)tB.
An ordering policy is optimal if the associated ordering costs are minimal.
Thus the minimal ordering costs CZ(t) for t are determined by
CZ(t) = min{cA(tA) + cB(tB)|tA + tB = t, 0 ≤ tA ≤ QA, 0 ≤ tB ≤ QB}.
Theorem 4.3.1 Let Z = (q, [α1, α2, QA], [β1, β2, QB]) ∈ ZN and let (CZ , q) ∈











min{cB(t), cA(t)} t ∈ [0, QA]
min{cB(t), cA(QA) + cB(t−QA)} t ∈ (QA, QB]
min{cA(t−QB) + cB(QB),
cA(QA) + cB(t−QA)} t ∈ (QB, QA +QB].
(4.3)
Proof: Take t ∈ [0, QA +QB]. Then,
CZ(t) = min{cA(tA) + cB(tB)|tA + tB = t, 0 ≤ tA ≤ QA, 0 ≤ tB ≤ QB}
= min{cA(tA) + cB(t− tA)|tA ∈ [(t−QB)+,min{QA, t}]}.
Let g : [(t−QB)+,min{QA, t}] → R+ be defined in the following way,
g(tA) = cA(tA) + cB(t− tA).
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B(t− tA)(t− tA) + 2p′B(t− tA)




Hence g is concave and thus the minimum of g can be found at the boundaries
of the domain of g: either tA = (t−QB)+ or tA = min{QA, t}.
The proof is complete if we can show that we can separate the cases as in
(4.3).
If t ≤ QA, then tA = 0 or tA = t and consequently tB = t or tB = 0. Thus
CZ(t) = min{cB(t), cA(t)}.
If QA < t ≤ QB, then tA = 0 or tA = QA and consequently tB = t or
tB = t−QA. Thus
CZ(t) = min{cB(t), cA(QA) + cB(t−QA)}.
If t > QB, then tA = t − QB or tA = QA and consequently tB = QB or
tB = t−QA. Thus
CZ(t) = min{cA(t−QB) + cB(QB), cA(QA) + cB(t−QA)}. 
This theorem implies that the cost function of the cost sharing problem
corresponding to a CRCP-situation follows from the minimum of two policies.
Corollary 4.3.2 Let Z = (q, [α1, α2, QA], [β1, β2, QB]) ∈ ZN and let (CZ , q) ∈
CSN be the corresponding cost sharing problem. Let t ∈ [0, QA +QB]. Then,
CZ(t) = min{cA(min{QA, t}) + cB((t−QA)+),
cA((t−QB)+) + cB(min{QB, t})}. (4.4)
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To minimize ordering costs, one has to compare two extreme policies: order
as much as possible at one of the two suppliers and the remaining part at
the other one. Depending on the unit price functions and the total order
quantity t one might prefer A over B or B over A.
The following two examples show how one can use Theorem 4.3.1 and Corol-
lary 4.3.2 in finding the cost function of the cost sharing problem correspond-
ing to a CRCP-situation.































Figure 4.3.1: Cost function of Example 4.3.3
Example 4.3.3 Let Z = (q, [α1, α2, QA], [β1, β2, QB]) ∈ ZN be such that
{
pA(t) = 18− 13t, t ∈ [0, 16]
pB(t) = 20− 12t, t ∈ [0, 20]
and let (CZ , q) ∈ CSN be the corresponding cost sharing problem.
Using Theorem 4.3.1 we can find the exact expression for CZ : cA and cB
intersect at t = 12, cA(QA) + cB(t − QA) ≥ cB(t) on [16, 20] and on [20, 36]
cA(QA) + cB(t − QA) ≥ cA(t − QB) + cB(QB). Thus we find the following
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A is preferred supplier


















min{cA(t), cB(t)} if t ∈ [0, 16],
min{cA(QA) + cB(t−QA), cB(t)} if t ∈ [16, 20],
min{cA(QA) + cB(t−QA),













t2 if t ∈ [0, 12],
20t− 1
2
t2 if t ∈ [12, 16],
20t− 1
2
t2 if t ∈ [16, 20],
20 · 10 + 18(t− 20)− 1
3









t2 if t ∈ [0, 12],
20t− 1
2
t2 if t ∈ [12, 20],
200 + 18(t− 20)− 1
3
(t− 20)2 if t ∈ [20, 36].
As mentioned in Corollary 4.3.2, the cost function C is the minimum of the
following two policies: order as much as possible at A and then go to B (1)
or order as much as possible at B and then go to A (2), the cost functions
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of these two policies are shown in Figure 4.3.2.
The minimum of these two cost functions coincides with the cost function
of Figure 4.3.1. Note that the cost function is piecewise concave with two
maximally concave intervals [0, 20] and [20, 36]. /
Example 4.3.4 Let Z = (q, [α1, α2, QA], [β1, β2, QB]) ∈ ZN be such that
{
pA(t) = 20− 12t, t ∈ [0, 16],
pB(t) = 18− 13t, t ∈ [0, 20].
Let (CZ , q) ∈ CSN be the corresponding cost sharing problem. Then, in
Figure 4.3.3 one can find the cost functions corresponding to the two extreme
policies (A or B). In this situation we see more switches between policy A or
B than in Example 4.3.3. This can also be seen from the explicit expression

























cB(t) if t ∈ [0, 12],
cA(t) if t ∈ (12, 16],
cA(16) + cB(t− 16) if t ∈ (16, 17],
cB(t) if t ∈ (17, 20],
cB(20) + cA(t− 20) if t ∈ (20, 34−
√
2],





cB(20) + cA(t− 20) if t ∈ (34 +
√
2, 36].
Note that also this cost function is piecewise concave. It has, however, 3
maximally concave intervals: [0, 16] [16, 20] and [20, 36]. /
We can generalize the observations we made in Example 4.3.3 and 4.3.4. In
Theorem 4.3.1 we have shown that the cost function is piecewise defined on
three separate intervals5. On each of the three intervals, [0, QA], [QA, QB],
[QB, QA +QB], C
Z takes the minimum of two continuous concave functions.
Thus the cost function CZ of the cost sharing problem corresponding to
CRCP-situation Z ∈ ZN is continuous piecewise concave. In most cases CZ
5With slight abuse of notation we use the notion of maximally concave intervals.
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A is preferred supplier







Figure 4.3.3: Two extreme policies of Example 4.3.4
will have two or three maximally concave intervals. Only if α1 = β1 and
α2 = β2 = 0, C
Z will be concave on [0, QA +QB].
For all CRCP-situations Z = (q, [α1, α2, QA], [β1, β2, QB]) ∈ ZN with α2 =
β2 = 0, the corresponding cost sharing problem (C
z, q) ∈ CSN has a convex
piecewise linear cost function. E.g., if α1 ≤ β1, then
CZ(t) =
{
α1t if t ∈ [0, QA],
α1QA + β1(t−QA) if t ∈ (QA, QA +QB].
The piecewise concavity of CZ is directly caused by the limitations of the
suppliers. Due to the capacity restrictions, at some point, the purchasers are
forced to start buying at the other supplier. These points are called invol-
untary switches . So the number of involuntary switches is either 0, 1 or 2.
In Example 4.3.3 there is one involuntary switch at the point t = QB and in
Example 4.3.4 there are two involuntary switches, at t = QA and at t = QB.
In the latter example, the cost function also switches between preferred sup-
plier, without violating concavity, on 4 different points. These switches are
called voluntary switches and they are caused by the minimization of the two
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ordering policies. Hence, they can occur on the entire domain of CZ .
Next, we investigate where these voluntary switches might take place. Let
Z = (q, [α1, α2, QA], [β1, β2, QB]) ∈ ZN and let (CZ , q) be the corresponding
cost sharing problem.
Consider the interval [0, QA]. Note that cA(0) = cB(0) = 0. A voluntary





Consider the interval (QA, QB]. Then, a voluntary switch occurs if there
exists a t ∈ (QA, QB] with cA(QA) + cB(t−QA) = cB(t), i.e., with
α1QA − α2Q2A − β1QA − β2Q2A + 2β2tQA + β1t− β2t2 = β1t− β2t2,
by rewriting we obtain
2β2t = α2QA + β1 − α1 + β2QA,
thus if
t =
β1 − α1 + (β2 + α2)QA
2β2
. (4.6)
Consider the interval (QB, QA +QB]. Note that if t = QA +QB, then
cA(t−QB) + cB(QB) = cA(QA) + cB(t−QA) = cA(QA) + cB(QB).
A voluntary switch occurs if there exists a t ∈ (QB, QA + QB) with
cA(t−QB) + cB(QB) = cA(QA) + cB(t−QA), i.e., with
α1QA − α2Q2A − β1QA − β2Q2A + 2β2tQA + β1t− β2t2
=β1QB − β2Q2B − α1QB − α2Q2B + 2α2tQB + α1t− α2t2,
or equivalently with
− (α2 + β2)t2 + (β1 − α1 + 2(β2QA − α2QB))t
+ (α1 − β1)(QA −QB)− (α2 + β2)(Q2A +Q2B) = 0 (4.7)
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Since (4.7) is a quadratic equation, there can be at most two voluntary
switches on (QB, QA +QB).
In total there can be maximally four voluntary switches. As we have seen
in Example 4.3.4 the cost function corresponding to a CRCP-situation can
make 2 involuntary switches as well as 4 voluntary switches.
4.4 Cost sharing rules for piecewise concave
cost functions
In this section we device a new class of cost sharing rules that are suitable
for cost sharing problems with piecewise concave cost functions. We focus
on this class of cost sharing problems since we are looking for allocation
methods for CRCP-situations and also since piecewise concave cost functions
are an accurate representation of limited economies of scale in production
environments. The examples and motivation for the rules will come from the
application of allocating costs in CRCP-situations. The new class of rules is
based on the serial cost sharing rule.
4.4.1 The serial cost sharing rule
In the introduction we argued that, of the traditional cost sharing rules, the
serial cost sharing rule is the most suitable rule for the class of cost sharing
problems under consideration, i.e., one-input-one-output-technologies.
The serial cost sharing rule is based on the requirement that a player’s costs
should not depend on the size of the order quantity of larger players. For
a concave cost function, this requirement implies that smaller players profit
less from the economies of scale than the larger players. If we think of
CRCP-situations in which large players generally account for more quantity
discounts, this seems a suitable solution method for dividing costs that fol-
low from purchasing cooperatively. The serial cost sharing rule (Moulin and
Shenker (1992)) , Ser, allocates the costs in the following way.
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Definition: The serial cost sharing rule, Ser, on CSN is such that for






n− j + 1 , (4.8)





qj + (n− i+ 1)qi.
Furthermore, for each i ∈ N , Seri(C, q) rewrites to the expression below,
which we will apply several times.
Lemma 4.4.1 Let (C, q) ∈ CSN . Then, for all i ∈ N ,
Seri(C, q) =
C(si)





(n− j + 1)(n− j) .






n− j + 1
=
C(si)

















(n− j)C(sj)− (n− j + 1)C(sj)
(n− j + 1)(n− j)
=
C(si)





(n− j + 1)(n− j) .
Here, the second equality follows from the fact that C(s0) = C(0) = 0. 
The property that characterizes the serial rule (Moulin and Shenker (1992))
is independence of the size of larger demands (ISLAD). Take (C, q) ∈ CSN .
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ISLAD implies that for all i, j ∈ N with qi ≤ qj , and for all (C, q̄) ∈ CSN
with q̄ = ((qk)k∈N\{j}, r), with r ≥ qj ,
Seri(C, q) = Seri(C, q̄).
The serial cost sharing rule also satisfies basic properties as demand mono-
tonicity , i.e., for all (C, q) ∈ CSN and all i ∈ N\{n}, si ≤ si+1 and thus
Seri(C, q) ≤ Seri+1(C, q),
and symmetry , i.e. for all (C, q) ∈ CSN and all i, j ∈ N with qi = qj , si = sj
and thus
Seri(C, q) = Serj(C, q).
For concave C the serial cost sharing rule obeys two favorable properties.
First, a player with a higher demand obtains a weakly lower cost per unit
than a player with a smaller demand.
Definition: A cost sharing rule f satisfies unit cost monotonicity if for






Proposition 4.4.2 Ser satisfies unit cost monotonicity on the class of cost
sharing problems with continuous, nondecreasing and concave cost functions.



















Hence it is sufficient to show that
C(si+1)− C(si)
(n− i) ≤
(qi+1 − qi)Seri(C, q)
qi
.
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n− j + 1 ,






Furthermore, by concavity of C,
C(si+1)− C(si)
(n− i) =
C(si + (n− i)(qi+1 − qi))− C(si)
(n− i)
≤ C(si + (qi+1 − qi))− C(si)
≤ (qi+1 − qi)
C(si)
si




Second, if the smallest player would not have been present in the cooperation,
the costs for every remaining player increase. More precisely, the increase in
ordering costs is larger for a player with a higher demand. So, although a
small player’s costs are independent of the size of larger demands, the larger
players do profit from cooperating with smaller players. In absolute terms,
the largest player profits the most.
A cost sharing rule satisfies monotonic weakness for the absence of the small-
est player (MOWASP) if for all (C, q) ∈ CSN with |N | ≥ 2,
0 ≥ f2(C, q)− f2(C, q|N\{1}) ≥ . . . ≥ fn(C, q)− fn(C, q|N\{1}). (4.9)
Proposition 4.4.3 Ser satisfies MOWASP on the class of cost sharing prob-
lems with continuous, nondecreasing and concave cost functions.
Proof: Let (C, q) ∈ CSN be a cost sharing problem, with C concave on
[0,
∑


















By concavity of C








thus ∆Ser2 ≤ 0.
Let i ∈ {3, . . . , n}. According to Lemma 4.4.1 we have
Seri(C, q) =
C(si)














(n− j + 1)(n− j) .
Hence,
∆Seri =
C(si)− C(si − q1)




C(sj)− C(sj − q1)
(n− j)(n− j + 1) −
C(s1)
n(n− 1) .
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We conclude the proof by showing that ∆Seri −∆Seri−1 ≤ 0. We have
∆Seri −∆Seri−1 =
C(si)− C(si − q1)




C(sj)− C(sj − q1)
(n− j)(n− j + 1)
− C(s1)
n(n− 1) −






C(sj)− C(sj − q1)




C(si)− C(si − q1)
n− i+ 1 −
C(si−1)− C(si−1 − q1)
(n− i+ 2)(n− i+ 1)
− C(si−1)− C(si−1 − q1)
n− i+ 2
=
C(si)− C(si − q1)
n− i+ 1
− (n− i+ 1 + 1)
(
C(si−1)− C(si−1 − q1)
)
(n− i+ 2)(n− i+ 1)
=
C(si)− C(si − q1)
n− i+ 1 −
C(si−1)− C(si−1 − q1)
n− i+ 1
≤ 0,
where the last inequality follows from the concavity of C and the fact that
si ≥ si−1. 
For piecewise concave functions, however, these two properties are lost.
Example 4.4.4 Let N = {1, 2, 3} and let (C, q) ∈ CSN be a cost sharing









t2 if t ∈ [0, 12],
20t− 1
2
t2 if t ∈ (12, 20],
200 + 18(t− 20)− 1
3
(t− 20)2 if t ∈ (20, 36].
Note that this cost sharing problem corresponds to the CRCP-situation from
Example 4.3.3.
C is piecewise concave with two maximal concave intervals [0, 20] and [20, 36].
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The serial cost sharing rule prescribes the following allocation of the total






















C(2 · 9 + 8)− C(3 · 8)
2
+ C(32)− C(2 · 9 + 8) = 1755
9
.




≈ 11.11 per unit, while player 2 pays
11.51 per unit and player 3 pays 11.70 per unit. Hence, in this example the
cost per unit are increasing rather than decreasing. /
Example 4.4.5 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and consider cost sharing problem


























t2 if t ∈ [0, 12],
20t− 1
2
t2 if t ∈ (12, 16],
192 + 18(t− 16)− 1
3
(t− 16)2 if t ∈ (16, 17],
20t− 1
2
t2 if t ∈ (17, 20],
2262
3
+ 20(t− 20)− 1
2
(t− 20)2 if t ∈ (20, 34−
√
2],
192 + 18(t− 16)− 1
3









(t− 20)2 if t ∈ (34 +
√
2, 36].
Note that this cost sharing problem corresponds to the CRCP-situation from
Example 4.3.4. Here C has three maximally concave intervals [0, 16], [16, 20]

















If player 1 would not have been present, however,







Thus cost allocations of player 2 and player 4 increase, while player 3’s cost
allocation decreases. /
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4.4.2 Piecewise serial rules
In this subsection we modify the serial cost sharing rule into piecewise serial
rules that are suitable for cost sharing problems with piecewise concave cost
functions.
We will pinpoint a specific rule that satisfies unit cost monotonicity and a spe-
cific rule that satisfies a weaker variant of MOWASP: monotonic vulnerability
for the absence of the smallest player. These two properties have nice inter-
pretations for the application we have in mind.Furthermore we characterize
one of the two cost sharing rules using the property of unit cost monotonicity.
Let CSN,m ⊂ CSN with m ∈ N+ denote the set of cost sharing problems
where the cost function is piecewise concave with m maximally concave in-
tervals. The j-th concave interval is denoted by [tj−1, tj ], j ∈ {1, . . . , m}.
Using this notation, the results of the previous paragraph, Proposition 4.4.2
and Proposition 4.4.3, can be read as results on the class CSN,1.
Next, we explain the idea for the piecewise serial rule by means of an ex-
ample.
Example 4.4.6 Let N = {1, 2, 3} and let (C, q) ∈ CSN,2 be a cost sharing









t2 if t ∈ [0, 12],
20t− 1
2
t2 if t ∈ (12, 20],
200 + 18(t− 20)− 1
3
(t− 20)2 if t ∈ (20, 36].
This is the cost sharing problem corresponding to the CRCP-situation of
Example 4.3.3.
C has two maximally concave intervals: [0, 20] and [20, 36]. If we can di-





j = 20 for the first interval and a suitable vector x
2 = q − x1
for the second interval, we can apply the serial cost sharing rule on each of
these two cost sharing problems.
The first interval has length 20 and in this interval the returns to scale are
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larger than in the second interval, see Figure 4.3.3. Hence, the players prefer
the first interval. The demands q can be considered as claims on the interval
[0, 20]. Thus to find a suitable vector x1 we can use a bankruptcy rule ϕ, for
bankruptcy problem (20, q) ∈ BN .
Arguing that large players should obtain a lower cost per unit than small
players, we can opt for a bankruptcy rule that allocates relatively more to
large claims than to smaller claims. The constrained equal losses-rule is such






) = (4, 5, 11).
Hence for the second interval we have x2 = q − x1 = (4, 4, 4), i.e., we use
only the first twelve units of the second interval.
On interval [0, 20] we have cost sharing problem (C1, x1) with C1(t) = C(t)
for t ∈ [0, 20] and on the second interval we have cost sharing problem (C2, x2)
where C2(t) = C(t)−C(20) = C(t)− 200 for all t ∈ [20− 20, 36− 20]. Both

























and by symmetry of Ser
Ser1(C
2, x2) = Ser2(C








Thus the cost allocation according to the combination of constrained equal
loss and the serial rule is (56, 63, 81) + (56, 56, 56) = (112, 119, 137).
However, we could also argue that the players should have relatively equal
rights to all of the intervals, which can be realized by dividing q proportion-
ally over the intervals.
Then, x1 = 20
32
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So, when dividing q proportionally over the two intervals, we obtain a differ-
ent allocation of the costs, (107.5, 114.64, 145.86). /
In Example 4.4.6 we used two symmetric and continuous bankruptcy rules
that are suitable for allocating q over the maximally concave intervals of C:
the proportional rule and the constrained equal losses-rule. The proportional
rule, PROP , divides the estate proportionally over the claimants, i.e., for
(E, d) ∈ BN and i ∈ N ,









The constrained equal losses-rule, CEL, is based on the opposite principle of
CEA, i.e., for (E, d) ∈ BN and i ∈ N ,
CELi(E, d) = (di − λ)+,
where λ ∈ R+ is such that
∑
j∈N(dj − λ)+ = E.
The idea we presented in the Example 4.4.6, can be formalized for any bank-
ruptcy rule ϕ.
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Definition: The ϕ-piecewise serial rule Ψϕ : CSN,m → RN is determined
in the following way.
Let (C, q) ∈ CSN,m be a cost sharing problem, where [tj−1, tj ] describes the
j-th maximally concave interval of C, j ∈ {1, . . . , m}.
Let qj ∈ RN+ denote the vector of remaining order quantities for interval
j and let xj ∈ RN+ denote the vector of allocated order quantities to interval
j.
With q1 = q, recursively compute the vectors qj and xj for j = 1, . . . , m
{
xj = ϕ(tj − tj−1, qj),
qj+1 = qj − xj . (4.10)
Cj : [0, tj − tj−1] → R+ denotes the translated cost function for interval
j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, i.e.,







Note that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, (Cj , xj) ∈ CSN,1. For arbitrary ϕ, the piece-
wise serial rule is efficient and satisfies demand monotonicity. For symmetric
bankruptcy rules, the piecewise serial rule is symmetric as well.
We will focus on ΨPROP and on ΨCEL as allocation methods for cost sharing
problems with piecewise concave cost functions.
With respect to the proportional rule, let (E, d) ∈ BN be a bankruptcy







118 Chapter 4. Cost sharing methods for CRCP-situations
Furthermore, PROP obeys the property of order preservation: for (E, d) ∈
BN with for some pair i, j ∈ N , di ≤ dj, the following two inequalities hold
{
PROPi(E, d) ≤ PROPj(E, d)
di − PROPi(E, d) ≤ dj − PROPj(E, d).
(4.13)
These properties of PROP result in the fact that ΨPROP satisfies unit cost
monotonicity on CSN,m.
In the context of CRCP-situations, unit cost monotonicity implies discount
monotonicity: quantity discounts are translated in a monotonic way to the
players. Players with larger order quantities obtain a higher quantity dis-
count than players with a smaller order quantity.
Theorem 4.4.7 ΨPROP satisfies unit cost monotonicity on CSN,m.
Proof: For m = 1, by Proposition 4.4.2, unit cost monotonicity is satisfied.
Let m ≥ 2 and let (C, q) ∈ CSN,m be a cost sharing problem. Take j ∈
{1, . . . , m}. Because PROP obeys order preservation, we have
{
xj1 ≤ xj2 ≤ . . . ≤ xjn,
qj1 ≤ qj2 ≤ . . . ≤ qjn.
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Next, we show that PROP is the unique bankruptcy rule for which the
piecewise serial rule satisfies unit cost monotonicity.
Theorem 4.4.8 Let ϕ be a bankruptcy rule. Then, Ψϕ = ΨPROP if and only
if Ψϕ satisfies unit cost monotonicity on CSN,m.
Proof: For the “only if”-part we refer to Theorem 4.4.7. To prove the “if”-
part, let ϕ be a bankruptcy rule such that Ψϕ satisfies unit cost monotonicity.
To show Ψϕ = ΨPROP we show that ϕ = PROP . Let us assume that
ϕ 6= PROP . Then, there exists (E, d) ∈ BN such that for some pair i, j ∈ N
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For both cases we show that there is at least one cost sharing problem







, establishing a contradiction.
Case (i)
Take (C, d) ∈ CSN,m with m ≥ 2 such that t1 = E and t2 ≤
∑
j∈N dj.
Furthermore for t ∈ [0, t2], let C be given by
C(t) =
{
a1t if t ∈ [0, t1]
a2t if t ∈ (t1, t2],
where 0 < a1 < a2.
Then,
Ψϕi (C, d) = a1ϕi(E, d) + a2(di − ϕi(E, d))
Ψϕj (C, d) = a1ϕj(E, d) + a2(dj − ϕj(E, d))



























Take (Cε, d) ∈ CSN,m with m ≥ 2 such that t1 = E and t2 ≤
∑
j∈N dj.







a2t if t ∈ [0, t1]
a3t if t ∈ (t1, t1 + ε]
a1t if t ∈ (t1 + ε, t2],












Note that since we are in case (ii), the righthand side of the above equation
is positive.



































) + ε(a3 − a1)
< 0,
where the last inequality follows from (4.16). 
Although ΨCEL does not satisfy unit cost monotonicity, we can show that if
the smallest player is absent, there is a monotonic relation in the effect on
the cost allocations of the remaining players. Here, the largest player is most
vulnerable for the absence of the smallest player.
Definition: A cost sharing rule f satisfies monotonic vulnerability for the
absence of the smallest player (MOVASP) if for all (C, q) ∈ CSN and all
i ∈ N\{1, n}
fi(C, q)− fi(C, q|N\{1}) ≥ fi+1(C, q)− fi+1(C, q|N\{1}). (4.17)
The property MOVASP is a weaker variant of MOWASP. In the latter case,
cost allocations increase if the smallest player is absent and the larger the
order quantity, the higher the cost increase, i.e., the weaker the player is for
the absence of the smallest player. MOVASP, on the other hand, implies that
increased cost allocations are more likely for larger players, i.e., the larger
the order quantity, the more vulnerable a player is for the absence of the
smallest player.
If we think of applications in CRCP-situations, an allocation method that
satisfies MOVASP can create group cohesiveness in the sense that the small-
est player can contribute to smaller cost allocations of the largest player. Note
that if Z = (q, [α1, α2, QA], [β1, β2, QB]) ∈ ZN and (CZ , q) ∈ CSN,m is the
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corresponding cost sharing problem, then (CZ , q|N\{1}) ∈ CSN\{1},m is the
cost sharing problem corresponding to (q|N\{1}, [α1, α2, QA], [β1, β2, QB]) ∈
ZN\{1}.
Theorem 4.4.9 ΨCEL satisfies MOVASP on CSN,m.
To prove this theorem we first show a property of CEL as a bankruptcy rule
in the context of bankruptcy problems.
Proposition 4.4.10 Let (E, d) ∈ BN with N = {1, 2, . . . , n} such that
d1 ≤ d2 ≤ . . . ≤ dn and such that
∑
j∈N\{1} dj ≥ E. Then, for all j ∈ N\{1}
CELj(E, d|N\{1}) = CELj(E, d) +
CEL1(E, d)
n− 1 .
Proof: Let λ ∈ R+ be such that
∑
i∈N
max{0, di − λ} = E.
Thus for all j ∈ N
CELj(E, d) = max{0, dj − λ}.
If CEL1(E, d) = 0, then by efficiency of CEL
∑
i∈N
max{0, di − λ} =
∑
i∈N\{1}
max{0, di − λ} = E.
Thus for all j ∈ N\{1}
CELj(E, d|N\{1}) = CELj(E, d) + 0
= CELj(E, d) +
CEL1(E, d)
n− 1 .
If CEL1(E, d) > 0, then also CELj(E, d) > 0 for any j ∈ N . Thus
∑
i∈N
max{0, di − λ} =
∑
i∈N
(di − λ) = E.
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Take
µ = λ− d1 − λ
n− 1 .
Then, for all j ∈ N\{1},




di − µ =
∑
i∈N\{1}
di − (n− 1)
(






di − nλ+ d1 =
∑
i∈N
(di − λ) = E.
Thus µ is such that
∑
i∈N\{1}
max{0, di − µ} = E.
Hence, for all j ∈ N\{1}
CELj(E, d|N\{1}) = max{0, dj − µ} = dj − µ
= dj − λ +
d1 − λ
n− 1




Using this result we can show MOVASP for ΨCEL.
Proof of Theorem 4.4.9: Let (C, q) ∈ CSN,m be a cost sharing problem.
For all j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, let qj ∈ RN be the remaining vectors of order quanti-
ties and let xj ∈ RN be the allocated vectors of order quantities for interval
[tj−1, tj ] according to (4.10).
Let (C, q|N\{1}) ∈ CSN,m and set q̄ = q|N\{1}. With q̄1 = q̄, for all j ∈
{1, . . . , m}, let q̄j ∈ RN\{1} be the remaining vectors of order quantities,
and let x̄j ∈ RN\{1} be the allocated vectors of order quantities for interval
[tj−1, tj ] according to (4.10).
Let Cj be the cost function for interval j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, as in (4.11).
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Equation (4.12) tells that Ψ(C, q) =
∑m
j=1 Ser(C
j, xj), so it is sufficient to
show that for each i ∈ {3, . . . , n} and each j ∈ {1, . . . , m}
Seri(C
j, xj)− Seri(Cj , x̄j) ≤ Seri−1(Cj, xj)− Seri−1(Cj, x̄j). (4.18)





















q̄jk > tj − tj−1,
(IV) qj
N\{1} 6= q̄j.
Let (Cj, xj) and (Cj, x̄j) be the two cost sharing problems for interval j.





xj + (n− `+ 1)x`





x̄j + (n− `+ 1)x̄`.
Case I
In this case (Cj, xj) is a cost sharing problem with a concave increasing cost
function. Since tj − tj−1 is sufficient to fulfill all orders, we have that xj = qj










k. Then, for all ` ∈ {2, . . . , n},
x̄j` = CEL(tj − tj−1, q̄) = q̄j` . (4.19)
Moreover,
ε = qj1 − (
∑
k∈N
qjk − (tj − tj−1)) > 0
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and
xj1 = CEL1(tj − tj−1, qj) > 0.
Hence, for all ` ∈ {2, . . . , n} we have that































h − (tj − tj−1)
n
)










h − (tj − tj−1)
n
)








qjh − (tj − tj−1)
)










qjh − (tj − tj−1)
)






Here, the last equality follows from (4.19).
Using (4.8),
Seri(C



















n− i+ 1 ,
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while
Seri(C


















































where the last equality follows from the fact that ε > 0 and that Cj is concave
on [0, tj − tj−1]. Thus
Seri(C
j, xj)− Seri(Cj , x̄j) ≤ Seri−1(Cj, xj)− Seri−1(Cj, x̄j).
Case III
In this case we can show that
Seri(C





k > tj − tj−1, we have that for ` ∈ {2, . . . , n}
x̄j` = CEL`(tj − tj−1, qj|N\{1})
= CEL`(tj − tj−1, qj) +





where the second equality follows from Proposition 4.4.10. Next, note that






= (n− 1)xj2 + xj1
= s2 (4.20)
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and that for ` ∈ {3, . . . , n}



































Combining (4.20) and (4.21), we have that for all ` ∈ {2, . . . , n}
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Case IV
Also, for this final case we show that
Seri(C
j, xj)− Seri(Cj , x̄j) = Seri−1(Cj, xj)− Seri−1(Cj, x̄j).
If qj` 6= q̄j` for some ` ∈ {2, . . . , n}, then j > 1 and for some h ∈ {1, . . . , j−1},
xh1 > 0.
















j, xj)− Seri(Cj , x̄j) = Seri−1(Cj, xj)− Seri−1(Cj, x̄j). 
The next example shows that ΨPROP does not satisfy MOVASP.
Example 4.4.11 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and let (C, q) ∈ CSN,3 be a cost shar-





















t2 if t ∈ [0, 12],
20t− 1
2
t2 if t ∈ (12, 16],
192 + 18(t− 16)− 1
3
(t− 16)2 if t ∈ (16, 17],
18t− 1
3
t2 if t ∈ (17, 18],
216 + 20(t− 18)− 1
2
(t− 18)2 if t ∈ (18, 22],
192 + 18(t− 16)− 1
3
(t− 16)2 if t ∈ (22, 34].
Note that this cost sharing problem corresponds to CRCP-situation
Z = (q, [α1, α2, QA], [β1, β2, QB]) ∈ ZN with unit price functions
{
pA(t) = 20− 12 t for t ∈ [0, 16],
pB(t) = 18− 13t for t ∈ [0, 18].
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The maximal concave intervals of C are [0, 16], [16, 18] and [18, 34]. Hence,






































≈ (33.59, 71.83, 80.46, 102.10),
while
ΨPROP (C, q|N\{1}) ≈ (72.59, 80.82, 100.57).
Thus, without player 1, player 2’s costs increase with 0.76, player 3’s costs
increase with 0.36 and player 4’s costs decrease with 1.53. In this example
player 4 benefits the most from the absence of player 1. /
On the other hand, it need not be the case that if, due to the absence of the
smallest player, the cost allocation to player 2 decreases, all other players’
cost allocations decrease as well.
Example 4.4.12 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and let (C, q) ∈ CSN,2 be a cost shar-
ing problem with q = (0.5, 0.8, 1.5, 2.4) and with
C(t) =
{
20t− 2t2 if t ∈ [0, 5],
50 + 36(t− 5)− 3(t− 5)2 if t ∈ (5, 10.5].
The maximal concave intervals of C are [0, 5] and [5, 10.5]. Note that this cost
sharing problem corresponds to CRCP-situation (q, [α1, α2, QA], [β1, β2, QB]) ∈
ZN with
{
pA(t) = 20− 2t for t ∈ [0, 5],
pB(t) = 36− 3t for t ∈ [0, 5.5].
We have that,
ΨCEL2 (C, q) ≈ 10.68 + 1.77 = 12.45,
ΨCEL3 (C, q) ≈ 10.68 + 4.48 + 1.77 = 16.93,
ΨCEL4 (C, q) ≈ 10.68 + 4.48 + 1.62 + 1.77 = 18.55,
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and
ΨCEL2 (C, q|N\{1}) ≈ 12.16,
ΨCEL3 (C, q|N\{1}) ≈ 12.16 + 5.32 = 17.48,
ΨCEL4 (C, q|N\{1}) ≈ 12.16 + 5.32 + 2.7 = 20.18.
Hence ΨCEL2 (C, q)−ΨCEL2 (C, q|N\{1}) ≈ 0.29 is positive, while ΨCEL3 (C, q)−
ΨCEL3 (C, q|N\{1}) ≈ −0.55 and ΨCEL4 (C, q) − ΨCEL4 (C, q|N\{1}) ≈ −1.63 are
negative. /
4.5 CRCP-situations: comparing cost shar-
ing rules
In the previous section we developed a class of cost sharing rules for cost shar-
ing problems with a piecewise concave cost function. The CEL-piecewise
serial rule and PROP -piecewise serial rule seem particularly appropriate
for allocating the cooperative purchasing costs of a CRCP-situation. The
PROP -piecewise serial rule is appropriate since it satisfies unit cost mono-
tonicity, implying that in the purchasing cooperative larger players obtain a
larger quantity discount. The CEL-piecewise serial rule satisfies MOWASP,
which can create a group cohesiveness in the purchasing cooperative, since
in the allocation the smallest player can directly contribute to cost savings of
larger players. In this section we illustrate numerical differences and similar-
ities between the two piecewise serial rules and the classic serial cost sharing
rule applied to cost sharing problems arising from CRCP-situations.
In the Figures 4.5.2 and 4.5.3 the results of some simulations can be found.
The same type of set-up as in Section 3.7 has been used. As input we take
CRCP-situations where
∑
i∈N qi = 52 and with unit price functions
{
pA(t) = 60− 12 t, witht ∈ [0, 29],
pB(t) = 140− 2t, with t ∈ [0, 35].
The cost function C of the corresponding cost sharing problem can be found
in Figure 4.5.1. It can be seen that C has 2 maximally concave intervals.
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Figure 4.5.1: Cost function for comparing allocation methods
To create a CRCP-situation we randomly generate a vector of discrete order
quantities such that the sum of the order quantities equals 52. Then, the cost
allocations of C(52) according to Ser, ΨCEL and ΨPROP are calculated. As
in Section 3.7, we store the allocations per different value of qi independent
of the index i and we repeat this step successively. For every possible value
of the order quantity, we average the stored cost allocations over the number
of times they have appeared. We compare two instances: |N | = 5 with
Figure 4.5.2: Cost allocations and costs per unit for ‘small’ differences
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Figure 4.5.3: Cost allocations and costs per unit for ‘big’ differences
for all i ∈ N , qi ∈ {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13} and |N | = 4 with for all i ∈ N ,
qi ∈ {1, 5, 9, 13, 17, 21, 25}, i.e., instances with ‘small’ and ‘big’ differences,
respectively, between the possible order quantities.
In Figure 4.5.2 we plotted the average cost allocations according to the three
different solution concepts and we plotted the average costs per unit, i.e., the
cost allocation divided by order quantity, for a player with order quantity
qi ∈ {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13}, according to the three different cost allocation
methods. The cost allocations and costs per unit according to Ser are con-
nected by the dark grey line, ΨCEL by the black line and ΨPROP by the light
grey line. Figure 4.5.3 shows the average cost allocations and costs per unit
for a player with qi ∈ {1, 5, 9, 13, 17, 21, 25}.
We can make the following observations. On average, the serial cost sharing
rule allocates more costs to the largest player than the two piecewise serial
rules. For middle players the cost allocations are almost the same, while for
smaller players the serial cost sharing rule allocates the least costs to smaller
players. The differences between ΨPROP and ΨCEL are smaller. In Figure
4.5.1 we can see that the first concave interval of the cost function gives
higher quantity discounts than the second concave interval (up to t = 52).
As a result, large players prefer ΨCEL over ΨPROP .
Generally, in the first (two) interval(s) of a cost function of a cost shar-
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ing problem corresponding to a CRCP-situation, the quantity discounts will
be larger than in the last interval. This occurs because when having a smaller
order quantity, one is more likely to buy at a single supplier. Using CEL as
a mechanism for allocating q over the intervals will result in larger players
having relatively bigger shares in the first interval than in later ones. This
does not necessarily imply unit cost monotonicity, but in many cases it will.
As we can see in the righthand sided figures, the costs per unit belonging to
ΨPROP and also ΨCEL are decreasing, whereas for Ser this is not the case.
For ΨPROP the decrease in costs per unit seems to follow a more constant
pattern than the decrease in costs per unit for ΨCEL.
Chapter 5




In this chapter we continue the analysis of capacity restrictions in interactive
purchasing situations from Chapter 4, but we take a different perspective.
Instead of a capacity restricted cooperative purchasing situation, we consider
a capacity restricted strategic purchasing (CRSP) situation. In a CRSP-
situation each purchaser strategically splits his order over the suppliers in
order to obtain his desired order quantity for the lowest possible cost. How
an individual purchaser should place his order depends, amongst others, on
fulfillment policies of the suppliers, i.e., how a supplier allocates his restricted
capacity over a set of orders.
The literature on the allocation of scarce capacity from a strategic perspective
is richer than the literature on cooperative purchasing with limited supplies.
Capacity allocation has been considered in various contexts, e.g., in allocat-
ing MRI scanner time in a hospital (Zonderland and Timmer (2012)) or the
allocation of capacity in semiconductor manufacturing (Mallika and Harker
(2004)). Cachon and Lariviere (1998) analyze capacity allocation games
in which a single supplier allocates a scarce commodity among two retail-
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ers. They compare the effect of different allocation policies of the supplier.
It is explained that the possible order inflation by the retailers is a major
drawback of a proportional fulfillment policy. Since capacity is scarce, retail-
ers will ask for more than they need, which might result in an allocation of
the scarce commodity in which some retailers obtain more than they need.
Cachon and Lariviere (1999) analyze capacity fulfillment policies for a sin-
gle capacity restricted supplier. It is also considered how the supplier could
determine an optimal capacity level.
A common aspect of the literature on capacity allocation is the fact that
there is a single supplier and a group of retailers with private information:
the retailers only know their own individual demand. The main topics of
analysis are: whether the fulfillment policy of the scarce commodity induces
truth telling of the retailers, whether in the final allocation of the scarce
commodity no retailer obtains more than he needs and whether the fulfill-
ment policy of the supplier supports maximizing the supplier’s profit or the
combined utility of the supplier and the retailers.
The current setup of CRSP-situations is different. The starting point is the
same: a group of purchasers with individual order quantities with respect to
one commodity. The group faces two suppliers with (possibly) insufficient
individual supplies. The combined capacity of the two suppliers is assumed
to be sufficient and both suppliers offer quantity discounts. The more a
purchaser obtains from one specific supplier, the lower the unit price. In a
CRSP-situation, however, every purchaser strategically places an order at
both or at one of the suppliers in order to obtain his order quantity. Each
supplier has a fulfillment policy: in case the total ordered units exceed the
capacity of the supplier it is prespecified how the supplier allocates his ca-
pacity over the orders. The suppliers are not considered to be interactive
decision makers: their pricing, quantity discounts and fulfillment policies are
fixed before the purchasers make any decisions with respect to their orders.
Furthermore, there is no private information, all suppliers’ and purchasers’
characteristics are publicly known by all purchasers. The reason to choose for
public information is twofold. First, CRSP-situations are the non-cooperative
siblings of CRPC-situations, in which all information is public. Second, pri-
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vate information can make the purchasing situation intractable. Moreover,
tractable results with the assumption of public information can be useful in
future research for understanding CRSP-situations with private information.
The most important difference between our and previous capacity allocation
models, is that in our model purchasers are assumed to obtain at least their
order quantity, because the total available global capacity is sufficient. If
the orders are such that there is local scarcity at one of the two suppliers,
purchasers are forced to reorder at the other supplier. Although seemingly
so, this model and its approach are not the same as non-cooperative es-
tate division problems from Atlamaz, Berden, Peters, and Vermeulen (2011),
where the estate is seen as an interval and where players have to specify
exactly which part of the ‘estate-interval’ they would like to receive. In
CRSP-situations, organizations only need to split their order over the two
suppliers. Our main question is: what is the effect of suppliers’ fulfillment
policies on the ordering strategies of the purchasers? We are not looking for
a ‘best’ fulfillment policy, we want to describe possible equilibrium behavior
of individualistic purchasers in different scenarios.
For the analysis of CRSP-situations we use non-cooperative game theory.
In a non-cooperative game, players are considered to be individual cost min-
imizers. Every player’s costs may depend not only on his own strategy but
also on the strategies of the other players. A central notion in the literature
on non-cooperative games is formulated by Nash (1951): in a Nash equi-
librium every player minimizes his costs given the equilibrium strategies of
the other players. In a non-cooperative game where players have an infinite
number of strategies available, the existence of a Nash equilibrium is not
guaranteed. In a game in which each player has a finite set of actions and in
which one allows for mixed strategies, there exists at least one Nash equilib-
rium in mixed strategies.
In modeling CRSP-situations one can make multiple reasonable assumptions
with respect to the behavior of and limitations set by the suppliers. Since all
information — including the prespecified fulfillment policies of the suppliers
— is publicly available, it seems reasonable to assume that each purchaser
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can only order such that his combined order at the two suppliers equals his
individual order quantity. Moreover, an order cannot exceed the capacity
restrictions of the suppliers. In other words: the purchasers’ orders are re-
stricted by feasibility. Nevertheless, the feasibility restrictions still give each
purchaser an infinite number of possibilities to split his order quantities over
the two suppliers.
For analyzing specific CRSP-situations, in this chapter, we differentiate among
two dimensions: (1) the available ordering options for the purchasers and (2)
the fulfillment policies of the suppliers. Specific choices with respect to these
dimensions lead to scenarios.
With respect to the first dimension, we separate two cases. First we study
infinite ordering games, in which purchasers can place any feasible order.
Second, in order to decrease the number of options for the purchasers we will
also consider ordering games in which the purchasers are allowed to choose
from only a finite but representative set of ordering possibilities, but in which
we allow for mixed strategies.
These two cases along the first dimension result in two different sets of pos-
sible strategies for the purchasers. Hence, we develop two different ordering
games corresponding to a CRSP-situation: an infinite ordering game and a
so-called matrified ordering game. The matrified ordering game can also be
seen as an approximation of the infinite ordering game. The feasibility restric-
tion on the orders ensures that purchasers are not able to inflate their orders
in order to obtain a higher fulfillment level. On the other hand, depending
on the fulfillment policy, purchasers might not obtain enough. Therefore
we allow purchasers to reorder after announcement of the fulfillment levels.
This specific timing of the ordering game is incorporated in the general cost
function of both ordering games. In both ordering games the specific cost
function further depends on the fulfillment policies of the suppliers.
With respect to the second dimension, we consider four different types of
fulfillment policies. Each of these fulfillment policies changes the cost func-
tion of both the infinite as well as the matrified ordering game.
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On the one hand, we consider three different types of fulfillment policies that
are based on a certain preference order over the purchasers. On the other
hand we consider suppliers that allocate their capacity proportionally over
the orders (PROP). Proportional fulfillment is, according to Cachon and
Lariviere (1998), the most intuitive fulfillment policy, although it usually
does not induce truth-telling by the purchasers.
For the fulfillment policies that are based on preference orders, first, we ana-
lyze situations in which suppliers’ fulfillment is based on preferences that are
fixed and identical (FID), i.e., the preference order does not depend on the
orders of the purchasers, but solely on the identity of the purchasers. Second,
one could argue that, in order to maximize profit, suppliers might prefer to
fulfill small orders before large orders (SBL). A third reasonable fulfillment
policy is based on the idea that suppliers might value the purchaser-supplier
relationship with purchasers with large order quantities over the relationship
with smaller purchasers, hence suppliers prefer fulfilling large orders before
smaller orders (LBS).
Next, we summarize the results on infinite ordering games. For an infinite
ordering game we show that if both suppliers’ fulfillment policies are based
on FID, there exists a profile of orders that corresponds to a Nash equilib-
rium in which there is no need to correct orders after announcement of the
fulfillment level by the suppliers. On the other hand, if the fixed preferences
are not identical, it remains an open problem whether the infinite ordering
game has an equilibrium.
If both suppliers’ fulfillment policies are based on LBS, the infinite ordering
game has a Nash equilibrium which can be found at the boundaries of the
strategy space. On the other hand, if the fulfillment policy of both suppliers
is based on (SBL), the infinite ordering game does not need to have a Nash
equilibrium.
In an infinite ordering game in which suppliers use a proportional fulfillment
policy, we show that if there is an equilibrium, the equilibria of the game
can be found at the boundaries of the strategy space. General existence of
equilibria in this scenario, however, is an open problem.
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As explained, in the matrified ordering game purchasers are only allowed
to choose from a limited number of actions. In order to decrease the number
of ordering possibilities we use the knowledge that in an infinite ordering
game, equilibria can often be found at the boundaries of purchasers’ strategy
spaces. Purchasers have two extreme options: order as much as possible at
supplier A or order as much as possible at supplier B. Here, we allow for
mixed strategies.
Also in the matrified ordering game we differentiate with respect to the fulfill-
ment policies of the suppliers. We show that, if suppliers’ fulfillment is based
on LBS, the matrified ordering game has a pure Nash equilibrium. This
equilibrium corresponds to a Nash equilibrium in the infinite ordering game.
Not every equilibrium of the infinite ordering game corresponds, however, to
a pure equilibrium in the matrified ordering game.
On the other hand, if both suppliers’ fulfillment policies are based on SBL,
the matrified ordering game also has a pure Nash equilibrium, whereas the
infinite ordering game does not necessarily have an equilibrium.
And, in case suppliers fulfill orders proportionally, the existence of a pure
equilibrium in the matrified game corresponds to the existence of an equilib-
rium in the original infinite ordering game.
We conclude the chapter by a few remarks on some of the assumptions we
have made. Furthermore we summarize the remaining open problems.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. In Section 5.2 we formally
introduce capacity restricted strategic purchasing situations and in Section
5.3 we explain some important notions on non-cooperative cost games. Sec-
tion 5.4 analyzes infinite ordering games, while Section 5.5 analyzes matrified
ordering games. In Section 5.6 we state some concluding remarks.
5.2 Capacity restricted strategic purchasing
situations
A capacity restricted strategic purchasing (CRSP) situation can be described
by similar parameters as its cooperative counterpart from Chapter 4. There
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is a set of players N = {1, . . . , n} with order quantities q ∈ RN++. There are
two suppliers, A and B, with respective supply capacities QA, QB ∈ R++
such that QA + QB ≥
∑
j∈N qj . Supplier A has unit price function pA :
[0, QA] → R+ and B has unit price function pB : [0, QB] → R+.
Without loss of generality we assume that the order quantities are arranged
in nondecreasing order, i.e., q1 ≤ q2 ≤ . . . ≤ qn, and that QA ≤ QB.
Furthermore, we assume that the unit price functions of the suppliers are de-
creasing and twice differentiable. The unit price function of supplier A is such
that the turnover function of A, for all t ∈ [0, QA] defined by cA(t) = pA(t)t,
is increasing and strictly concave on [0, QA]. Similarly, we assume that the
unit price function of B is such that the turnover function, cB, is increasing
and strictly concave on [0, QB].
Instead of purchasing cooperatively, the players in N act strategically. Each
player i ∈ N places an order 0 ≤ xAi ≤ QA at A and an order 0 ≤ xBi ≤ QB




Both suppliers have a certain order fulfillment policy . Let xA ∈ RN+ be
the vector of orders of the players in N at supplier A. Then A uses policy
πA : RN+ → RN+ to allocate QA over the orders at A. Similarly πB : RN+ → RN+
gives for each set of orders xB ∈ RN+ , an allocation of QB.

















and πB(xB) ≤ xB.
We have that cA is increasing if for all t ∈ [0, QA], c′A(t) = p
′
A(t)t+pA(t) > 0,






































Let W be the CRSP-situation given by q, supplier A’s characteristics, pA,
QA, and π
A, and supplier B’s characteristics, pB, QB, and π
B. The set WN
contains all CRSP-situations on N .
Due to the assumptions we make with respect to the unit price functions
of A and B, we can generalize the results of Theorem 4.3.1; it is optimal to
either order as much as possible at A or as much as possible at B.
Proposition 5.2.1 Let W = (q, [pA, QA, π
A], [pB, QB, π
B]) ∈ WN be a CRSP-
situation. Then, for all t ∈ [0, QA +QB]
min
{




cA (min{QA, t}) + cB((t−QA)+) ,
cB(min{QB, t}) + cA((t−QB)+)
}
. (5.5)
Proof: Let t ∈ [0, QA +QB]. First, we observe that
min
{




cA(tA) + cB(t− tA)|tA ∈ [(t−QB)+,min{QA, t}]
}
.
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The interval [(t−QB)+,min{QA, t}] is nonempty since QA > 0 and QB > 0
and t ≤ QA +QB.
Let h : [(t−QB)+,min{QA, t}] → R+ be defined in the following way,
h(tA) = cA(tA) + cB(t− tA).










A(tA)tA + pA(tA)− p
′















B(t− tA)(t− tA) + 2p
′
B(t− tA) < 0,
where the inequality follows from the assumptions we made on the unit price
functions of A and B.
The objective function h(tA) is strictly concave. Hence the ordering costs
are minimized by choosing tA at one of the boundaries of the domain, i.e.,
tA = (t − QB)+ or tA = min{QA, t} . Consequently t − tA = min{QB, t} or
t− tA = (t−QA)+. Hence,
min{cA(tA) + cB(t− tA)|0 ≤ tA ≤ QA, t− tA ≤ QB}
=min
{
cA (min{QA, t}) + cB((t−QA)+) ,
cB(min{QB, t}) + cA((t−QB)+)
}
. 
In the next example we show the various assumptions we can make with
respect to the possible order fulfillment policies of the suppliers and the
consequences on reordering possibilities, as they will be formally defined and
analyzed in the upcoming sections.
Example 5.2.2 LetN = {1, 2, 3}. LetW = (q, [pA, QA, πA], [pB, QB, πB]) ∈
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First, we verify that both cA and cB are increasing and strictly concave.



















Hence, the conditions in (5.1) and (5.2) are satisfied. Similarly, we find that




















Based on Proposition 5.2.1, since cA(8) = 124
2
3
< 130 = cB(8), player






= cB(9), it would be best to obtain all 9 units from





= cB(15), it would
be best to obtain all 15 units from supplier B.
Let us assume that xA1 = 8 and x
B
1 = 0, that x
A
2 = 9 and x
B
2 = 0 and that
xA3 = 0 and x
B




j = 17 > 16 =
QA.
Next, we make various assumptions on how supplier A and B react upon
the orders xA and xB .
Let us assume that πA and πB are such that large orders are fulfilled before
the smaller orders (LBS). Then, πA(xA) = (7, 9, 0) and πB(xB) = (0, 0, 15).
For player 1, however, πA1 (x
A) + πB1 (x
B) = 7, while q1 = 8. Since player 1
can only place orders such that xA1 + x
B
1 = 8, we allow him to change his
order at B.
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For these fulfillment policies and under the assumption of order adjustment,
the ordering costs for player 1 are cA(7) + cB(1) = 131
1
6
, while the ordering
costs for player 2 are cA(9) = 137
1
4




On the other hand, one can also assume that πA and πB are such that
both suppliers first fulfill small orders before fulfilling large orders (SBL).
Hence, πA(xA) = ((8, 8, 0)) and πB(xB) = (0, 0, 15). Here, player 2 needs
to reorder an extra unit at supplier B. For these fulfillment policies, the
ordering costs for player 1 are cA(8) = 124
2
3
, the ordering costs for player
2 are cA(8) + cB(1) = 144
5
12





Note that for the fulfillment policy based on SBL, the turnover of sup-
plier A is larger than in the case of a fulfillment policy based on LBS,





= cA(7) + cA(9).
Another reasonable assumption is that supplier A is indifferent with respect
to the identity of the players, and distributes QA proportionally over the
orders, i.e., πA(xA) = 16
17
(8, 9, 0). Here, both player 1 and player 2 need to

















) ≈ 141.25. /
To analyze the effect of fulfillment policies on purchaser’s behavior in CRSP-
situations we will model these situations as non-cooperative cost games.
5.3 Non-cooperative cost games
A non-cooperative cost game G in strategic form with players N = {1, . . . , n}
is given by
G = ((Xj)j∈N , (fj)j∈N),
where Xi denotes the strategy space and fi : Πj∈NXj → R the cost function
of player i ∈ N . It is assumed that all information is publicly available and
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that players choose their strategies simultaneously and independently. Let
G = ((Xj)j∈N , (fj)j∈N) be a non-cooperative cost game. A strategy profile
x̂ = (x̂1, . . . , x̂n) ∈ Πj∈NXj is called a Nash equilibrium (Nash (1951)) of G
if for all xi ∈ Xi and all i ∈ N ,
fi(x̂) ≤ fi(xi, x̂−i),
where x−i is a shorthand notation for (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn). A game
can have no, one or multiple Nash equilibria and the set of Nash equilibria
of G is denoted by E(G).
An alternative characterization of a Nash equilibrium can be provided by
using best reply correspondences. Let G = ((Xj)j∈N , (fj)j∈N) be a non-
cooperative cost game. For i ∈ N , the best reply correspondence bi(x−i) ex-
plains how player i could optimally react to strategy profile x−i ∈ Πj∈N\{i}Xj,
i.e.,
bi(x−i) = argmin{fi(xi, x−i)|xi ∈ Xi}.
Note that there can be no, one or multiple best replies. If, for a strategy
profile x̂ ∈ Πj∈NXj, for all i ∈ N , x̂i ∈ bi(x̂−i) then x̂ ∈ E(G), and conversely.
A strategy x∗i ∈ Xi is called a dominant strategy for player i if for all xi ∈ Xi
and all strategy profiles x−i ∈ Πj∈N\{i}Xj ,
fi(x
∗
i , x−i) ≤ fi(xi, x−i)
or alternatively, if for all x−i ∈ Πj∈N\{i}Xj, x∗i ∈ bi(x−i).
If player i ∈ N has dominant strategy x∗i , in finding a Nash equilibrium of
G we can limit ourselves to the reduced strategy space {x∗i } × Πj∈N\{i}Xj.
If there exists a sequence of players, such that in every reduced strategy
space, there exists a player with a dominant strategy, we have constructed a
recursive dominant Nash equilibrium.
If the strategy spaces of all players are finite, i.e., if for all i ∈ N , Xi =
{x1i , . . . , xmii } with mi ∈ N+, the game is called finite and one can allow for
mixed strategies. For a finite game G = ((Xj)j∈N , (fj)j∈N) the corresponding
mixed extension ∆(G) = (∆(Xj)j∈N , (f̄j)j∈N) is defined in the following way.
In a mixed strategy, a player i ∈ N can play each of his actions xi ∈ Xi
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with a probability δi(xi) ≥ 0 such that
∑
xi∈Xi
δi(xi) = 1. The set of mixed
strategies of player i ∈ N is given by
∆(Xi) =
{




δi(xji ) = 1
}
.
The costs, f̄i(δ) for i ∈ N , corresponding to a profile of mixed strategies
(δ1, . . . , δn) are in fact expected costs and can be computed using the Von
Neumann Morgenstern expected cost (payoff) function (Von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1944)). The mixed extension of a finite game always has at
least one Nash equilibrium (Nash (1951)).
On the other hand, the existence of Nash equilibria for arbitrary games is
not guaranteed. Sufficient conditions have been developed by, e.g., Rosen
(1965). Especially if the cost functions of the players are not continuous, the
existence of Nash equilibria is hard to verify.
5.4 Infinite ordering games
To define an ordering game corresponding to a CRSP-situation we need to
define the strategy space of the purchasers, which depends on possible limits
on their order sizes, and we need to define the cost function for a profile of
strategies, which depends on the fulfillment policies of the suppliers. In this
section we will define an infinite ordering game corresponding to a CRSP-
situation. First, we will illustrate the underlying idea behind the strategy
space by means of an example.
Example 5.4.1 Let N = {1, 2, 3} and consider the CRSP-situation of Ex-
ample 5.2.2 with W = (q, [pA, QA, π
A], [pB, QB, π
B]) ∈ WN given by q =














Assuming that for each player i ∈ N , an order has to sum up to qi and
does not exceed the capacity restrictions of A and B, the possible ordering





1 )|xA1 + xB1 = 8, xA1 ∈ [0, 16], xB1 ∈ [0, 20]
}
.
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Note that, due to the feasibility restrictions on the orders, a strategy (xA1 , x
B
1 )
of player 1 can be represented by a scalar: y1 ∈ [0, 8] corresponds to the order
xA1 at A and x
B
1 = 8−y1 at B. We set Y1 = [0, 8]. Similarly we set Y2 = [0, 9]
and Y3 = [0, 15]. /
As illustrated in Example 5.4.1, assuming that each player i in total orders
qi, a strategy yi ∈ Yi of player i ∈ N can be represented by a scalar. Here, yi
denotes the amount player i ∈ N would like to purchase at A. Automatically
he would like to purchase the complementary amount qi−yi at firm B. Since,
0 ≤ yi ≤ QA and at the same time 0 ≤ qi − yi ≤ QB, we formally define the
strategy space of player i ∈ N , with y
i
= (qi −QB)+ and yi = min{qi, QA},
by
Yi = [yi, yi].
Next, we define the cost functions {gi}i∈N . Given a profile of orders y ∈
Πj∈NYj, the suppliers announce the levels of fulfillment, i.e., π
A(y) and
πB(q − y). In case for some player i ∈ N , πAi (y) + πBi (q − y) < qi he is
allowed to increase his order at the supplier that has enough supply capac-
ity left, such that he will obtain exactly qi. The reason to allow for order
adjustment is that, although player i might know that he will only obtain
πAi (y) < yi from A, initially he is not allowed to order qi − πAi (y) at B.
Thus given y ∈ Πj∈NYj and i ∈ N , if
∑




i (y)) + cB(qi − πAi (y)).
If
∑
j∈N(qj − yj) > QB, the ordering costs equal
cA(qi − πBi (q − y)) + cB(πBi (q − y))
and if both
∑
j∈N yj ≤ QA and
∑
j∈N(qj − yj) ≤ QB the ordering costs equal
cA(yi) + cB(qi − yi).





i (y)) + cB(qi − πAi (y)) if
∑
j∈N yj ≥ QA,
cA(qi − πBi (q − y)) + cB(πBi (q − y)) otherwise.
(5.6)
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In the next subsections we vary the fulfillment policies πA and πB of the
suppliers, based on the ideas we formulated in Example 5.2.2.
5.4.1 Order fulfillment based on fixed and identical
preferences
In this section we analyze infinite ordering games that correspond to CRSP-
situations in which suppliers’ fulfillment policies πA and πB are based on
specific preset preferences of the suppliers with respect to the players in N .
Let W ∈ WN . Supplier A has a fixed and strict preference order σA ∈ Π(N)
on the players in N , and σB ∈ Π(N) represents the fixed and strict pref-
erences of supplier B. These preferences imply that, independent of the
ordering strategies, supplier A fulfills the order of player σA(i) before he ful-
fills the order of player σA(i+1). Fixed preference orders are called identical
if σA = σB.
Given y ∈ Πj∈NYj, supplier A’s and supplier B’s order fulfillments πA and

























By WN,FID we denote the set of CRSP-situations in which πA and πB are
based on fixed and identical preferences (FID).
Example 5.4.2 LetN = {1, 2, 3}. LetW = (q, [pA, QA, πA], [pB, QB, πB]) ∈
WN,FID be the CRSP-situation from Example 5.2.2 given by q = (8, 9, 15),














Here, the fulfillment policies πA and πB are based on the fixed and identical
preferences of A and B given by σA = (2, 1, 3) = σB. Let GW = ((Yj)j∈N ,
150 Chapter 5. Ordering strategies for CRSP-situations
(gj)j∈N) be the corresponding infinite ordering game.
As we have seen before, Y1 = [0, 8], Y2 = [0, 9] and Y3 = [0, 15] are the
strategy spaces of the players. For the strategy profile of Example 5.2.2,
y = (8, 9, 0), we find that πA(y) = (7, 9, 0) and πB(q− y) = (0, 0, 15). Hence,












This profile of strategies is not a Nash equilibrium of GW . Player 1 can obtain
lower ordering costs by changing his ordering strategy to ỹ1 = 0. Then, with
ỹ = (0, 9, 0), fulfillments πA(ỹ) = (0, 9, 0), and πB(q − ỹ) = (8, 0, 12), the
ordering costs of player 1 decrease to







Next, we will argue that y∗ = (0, 9, 3) is a Nash equilibrium of GW . Since
player 2 is strictly preferred over the other players by both suppliers, he can
simply solve the minimization problem
min{cA(y2) + cB(9− y2)|y2 ∈ [0, QA], (9− y2) ∈ [0, QB]},
which is equivalent with
min{cA(y2) + cB(9− y2)|y2 ∈ [0, 9]}.
Using Proposition 5.2.1, we find that y∗2 = 9 is a dominant strategy for player
2. In the reduced strategy space Y1 × {y∗2} × Y3, players 1 and 3 can limit
themselves to ordering in between 0 and 7 at A. Since player 1 is strictly
preferred over player 3 by both suppliers, he can find his optimal strategy by
solving
min{cA(y1) + cB(8− y1)|y1 ∈ [0, QA − 9], (8− y1) ∈ [0, QB]},
which is equivalent with
min{cA(y1) + cB(8− y1)|y1 ∈ [0, 7]}.
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Using Proposition 5.2.1, we find that y∗1 = 0 is a dominant strategy for player
1 in the reduced strategy space. For player 3, in the reduced strategy space
{y∗1} × {y∗2} × Y3, he can limit himself to ordering up between 3 and 7 at A
(there is 12 left at B). Solving
min{cA(y3) + cB(15− y3)|y3 ∈ [0, 7], (15− y3) ∈ [0, 12]}
we find that in this reduced strategy space y∗3 = 3 is a dominant strategy for
player 3.
Clearly, no player can reduce his ordering costs, thus y∗ ∈ E(GW ). Further-
more, looking at the procedure we used in establishing y∗ we can conclude
that it is a recursive dominant equilibrium. /
If both suppliers fulfill orders based on fixed and identical preferences the
infinite ordering game has a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 5.4.3 Let W ∈ WN,FID and let GW = ((Yj)j∈N , (gj)j∈N) be the
corresponding infinite ordering game. Then, there exists a Nash equilibrium
y∗ ∈ E(GW ).
Proof: Let W = (q, [pA, QA, π
A], [pB, Q
B, πB]) and let σ ∈ Π(N) be the
fixed and identical preferences of the suppliers.
Define y∗ by letting the players choose their optimal strategies as if they
may decide according to order σ.
Thus, choose
y∗σ(1) ∈ argmin{gσ(1)(y)|yσ(1) ∈ Yσ(1)}. (5.7)
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(y∗σ(1), . . . , y
∗




y∗σ(i) ∈ argmin{gσ(i)(yσ(i), y−σ(i))|yσ(i) ∈ Y rσ(i)}. (5.8)
If we can show that the minima of (5.7) and (5.8) exist, then we have shown
that
(i) y∗σ(1) is a dominant strategy for σ(1), and that
(ii) y∗σ(i), i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, is a dominant strategy for σ(i) within the reduced
strategy space
{
(y∗σ(1), . . . , y
∗
σ(i−1), yσ(i), . . . , yσ(n))|yσ(k) ∈ Yσ(k) for k = i, . . . , n
}
,
which shows that y∗ is a Nash equilibrium of GW .
With respect to (5.7). For all y ∈ Πj∈NYj,
{
πAσ(1)(y) = yσ(1)
πBσ(1)(q − y) = qσ(1) − yσ(1).
Hence,
gσ(1)(yσ(1), y−σ(1)) = cA(yσ(1)) + cB(qσ(1) − yσ(1)).
and thus
min{gσ(1)(y)|yσ(1) ∈ Yσ(1)} = min{cA(yσ(1))+cB(qσ(1)−yσ(1))|yσ(1) ∈ Yσ(1)},
and by Proposition 5.2.1, the minimum exists.
With respect to (5.8), take i ∈ {2, . . . , n} and assume that for all ` ∈
{1, . . . , i− 1}, y∗σ(`) is a dominant strategy in the reduced strategy space
{
(y∗σ(1), . . . , y
∗
σ(`−1), yσ(`), . . . , yσ(n))|yσ(k) ∈ Yσ(k) for k = `, . . . , n
}
,
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We have that σ(i) is, after σ(1) up to σ(i − 1), first in line with respect to
order fulfillment. Thus for all y ∈
{
(y∗σ(1), . . . , y
∗
σ(i−1), yσ(i), . . . , yσ(n))|yσ(k) ∈
Yσ(k) for k = i, . . . , n
}
, satisfying yσ(i) ∈ Y rσ(i),
{
πAσ(i)(y) = yσ(i)
πBσ(i)(q − y) = qσ(i) − yσ(i).
Hence, for all yσ(i) ∈ Y rσ(i),
gσ(i)(yσ(i), y−σ(i)) = cA(yσ(i)) + cB(qσ(i) − yσ(i)).
Again, by Proposition 5.2.1 there exists a minimum in (5.8). 
Note that the Nash equilibrium we constructed in the proof of Theorem 5.4.3
is a dominant recursive equilibrium. Moreover, in the equilibrium we con-
structed, there is no need for the players to adjust their orders at one of the
suppliers after announcement of the order fulfillment levels.
If suppliers’ preferences are fixed but not identical, it is not clear whether
there exists an equilibrium in the infinite ordering game. This remains an
open problem.
5.4.2 Order fulfillment based on order size
Suppliers’ preferences can also be based on the orders that are placed. If sup-
plier A faces a set of orders y that cannot be fulfilled by QA, he can maximize
his turnover by splitting QA over as much orders as possible. The smaller the
order quantity, the higher the unit price. This preference order myopically
maximizes the turnover of A. It is myopic in the sense that suppliers do not
take into account possible reactions of the purchasers towards the fulfillment
policy.
More formally, the set WN,SBL describes the set of CRSP-problems where
suppliers’ fulfillment policies are based on small before large preferences (SBL).
Let W = (q, [pA, QA, π
A], [pB, Q−B, πB]) ∈ WN,SBL and let GW = ((Yj)j∈N ,
(gj)j∈N) be the corresponding infinite ordering game. Let y ∈ Πj∈NYj and
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take i ∈ N . Then, SAi (y) denotes the amount of smaller orders that are ful-
filled by A before player i’s order is fulfilled. Hence, with T1 = {j ∈ N |yj <





Thus small orders are fulfilled before larger orders, and in case of a tie the
supplier prefers the player with smallest index.
Due to this tie breaking rule, for each profile of strategies y ∈ Πj∈NYj it is
determined which orders are (partially) fulfilled at A.
Similar for supplier B, SBi (q−y) denotes the amount of smaller orders that are
fulfilled by B before player i’s order is fulfilled. With T1 = {j ∈ N |qj − yj <
qi − yi} and with T2 = {j ∈ N |qj − yj = qi − yi and j < i},




Thus for each i ∈ N , the SBL-fulfillment policies of A and B are given by
















The next example shows that when both suppliers fulfill orders based on
small before large (SBL), there need not be a Nash equilibrium in the infinite
ordering game.
Example 5.4.4 LetN = {1, 2} and letW = (q, [pA, QA, πA], [pB, QB, πB]) ∈















The fulfillment policies πA and πB are based on SBL.
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Figure 5.4.1: Best reply correspondences in the infinite ordering game of
Example 5.4.4
Let GW = ((Yj)j∈N , (gj)j∈N) be the corresponding infinite ordering game.
To show that GW does not have a Nash equilibrium, we will construct the
best reply correspondences for both players.
The stand alone strategies for both players are to order at A, since pA(18) <
pB(18) and pA(19) < pB(19).
Let us look at the best replies of player 2. Recall that it is always opti-
mal to buy as much as possible at one of the suppliers. If y1 is sufficiently
small, player 2 can best respond by buying as much as possible at A. The first
turnover point is y1 = 7.2, since cA(20−7.2)+cB(19−(20−7.2)) = 277.62 =
cB(25− (18− 7.2)) + cA(19− (25− (18− 7.2))). The second turnover point
is y1 = 17.6. If y1 lies in between 7.2 and 17.6, player 2 better purchases
as much as possible at supplier B. If y1 > 17.6, then since the suppliers
treat smaller orders first, player 2 should order slightly less than y1, hence
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19 if y1 ∈ [0, 1],
[20− y1, 19] if y1 ∈ (1, 7.2),
[0, 4.8] ∪ [12.8, 19] if y1 = 7.2,
[0, 12− y1] if y1 ∈ (7.2, 12),
0 if y1 ∈ [12, 17.6],
∅ if y1 ∈ (17.6, 18].




























18 if y2 ∈ [0, 1],
[20− y2, 18] if y2 ∈ (1, 7.6),
[0, 4.4] ∪ [12.4, 18] if y2 = 7.6,
[0, 12− y2] if y2 ∈ (7.6, 12),
0 if y2 ∈ [12, 16.8),
{0, 16.8} if y2 = 16.8,
y2 if y2 ∈ (16.8, 18),
18 if y2 ∈ [18, 19].
In Figure 5.4.1 one can find a sketch of the best reply correspondences of the
players. We can see that they do not intersect, so this ordering game does
not have a Nash equilibrium. /
The opposite of SBL constitutes another fulfillment policy for A and B. In
this case a supplier invests in a relation with a large purchaser by preferring
him over a smaller purchaser. The possible fixed ordering costs are not neces-
sarily an argument for a supplier to choose a large before small fulfillment, as
opposed to the myopic SBL. These economies of scale are already translated
in the decreasing unit price functions of the suppliers.
The set WN,LBS contains all CRSP-situations where the fulfillment poli-
cies are based on large before small. Take W ∈ WN,LBS and let GW =
((Yj)j∈N , (gj)j∈N) be the corresponding infinite ordering game. Then the
fulfillment policies of A and B are based on large before small preferences
(LBS) if orders are fulfilled in the following way. Let y ∈ Πj∈NYj and take
i ∈ N . Then LAi (y) denotes the amount of larger orders that are fulfilled by
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A before player i’s order is fulfilled. Hence, with T1 = {j ∈ N |yj > yi} and





Similarly for supplier B, LBi (q − y) denotes the amount of larger orders
that are fulfilled by B before player i’s order is fulfilled. With T1 = {j ∈
N |qj − yj > qi − yi} and with T2 = {j ∈ N |qj − yj = qi − yi and j > i},




Thus for each i ∈ N , the fulfillment policies of A and B, based on LBS, are
given by
















Thus a supplier fulfills a large order before a smaller order, and in case of a
tie the order of the player with largest index goes first.
Due to this tie breaking rule for each profile of strategies y ∈ Πj∈NYj it is
determined which orders are (partially) fulfilled.6
Whereas for SBL fulfillment policies, the ordering game does not necessarily
have an equilibrium, for CRSP-situations with LBS fulfillment policies, there
exists a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding infinite ordering game.
Theorem 5.4.5 Let W ∈ WN,LBS and let GW = ((Yj)j∈N , (gj)j∈N) be the
corresponding infinite ordering game. Then, there exists a Nash equilibrium
of GW .
Proof: Let W = (q, [pA, QA, π
A], [pB, QB, π
B]). Define y∗ in the following
backward recursive way.
6If we replace this tie breaking rule with another one, Theorem 5.4.5 remains valid.









and set tn = y
∗
n.
For i ∈ {n − 1, . . . , 1}, with yr
i
= (qi − (QB −
∑
j>i(qj − tj)))+ and yri =
min{qi, QA −
∑





















if y∗i = yi.
We will show that
(i) y∗n is a dominant strategy for n,
(ii) y∗i is a dominant strategy for i ∈ {n − 1, . . . , 1} within the reduced
strategy space
{
(y1, . . . , yi, y
∗
i+1, . . . , y
∗
n)|yk ∈ Yk for k = 1, . . . , i
}
,
which shows that y∗ is a Nash equilibrium of GW .
With respect to (i), note that for all y = (yn, y−n) ∈ Πj∈NYj, LAn (y) = 0.
Similarly, for all y = (y
n
, y−n) ∈ Πj∈NYj, LBn (q − y) = 0. Hence, for all
y−n ∈ Πj∈N\{n}Yj,
{
πAn (yn, y−n) = yn,
πBn (qn − yn, q−n − y−n) = qn − yn.
Thus for all y−n ∈ Πj∈N\{n}Yj,
{
gn(yn, y−n) = cA(yn) + cB(qn − yn),
gn(yn, y−n) = cB(qn − yn) + cA(yn).
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By Proposition 5.2.1, at least one of the following two inequalities is true,
for all yn ∈ Yn:
cA(yn) + cB(qn − yn) ≤ cA(yn) + cB(qn − yn),
cA(yn) + cB(qn − yn) ≤ cA(yn) + cB(qn − yn).
Hence, by (5.9), y∗n is a dominant strategy for player n.




n, y−n) = tn,
πBn (qn − y∗n, q−n − y−n) = qn − tn.
With respect to (ii) take i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} and assume that for all ` ∈
{i+ 1, . . . , n}, y∗` is a dominant strategy in the reduced strategy space
{
(y1, . . . , y`, y
∗
`+1, . . . , y
∗
n)|yk ∈ Yk for k = 1, . . . , `
}
,
and that for all y ∈
{
(y1, . . . , y`, y
∗
`+1, . . . , y
∗




πA` (y) = t` if y
∗
` = y`,
πB` (q − y) = q` − t` if y∗` = y`.
Take y = (yi, y−i) ∈
{
(y1, . . . , yi, y
∗
i+1, . . . , y
∗
n)|yk ∈ Yk for k = 1, . . . , i
}
.





Furthermore, if LAi (y) <
∑
j>i tj , then there is a player k > i with y
∗
k = yk
and with qk > QB − (
∑
j>k qj − tj). By the global sufficient capacity of A
and B, qi ≤ QA −
∑
j>i tj . Thus
πAi (yi, y−i) = min{qi, QA −
∑
j>i
tj} = yri .
Therefore,
gi(yi, y−i) = cA(y
r
i ) + cB(qi − yri ).
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(y1, . . . , yi, y
∗
i+1, . . . , y
∗
n)|yk ∈ Yk for k = 1, . . . , i
}
. Using
the same reasoning as above we find that




gi(yi, y−i) = cA(y
r
i
) + cB(qi − yri ).
For any y ∈
{
(y1, . . . , yi, y
∗
i+1, . . . , y
∗
n)|yk ∈ Yk for k = 1, . . . , i
}
, we have that
πAi (y) ≤ yri and πBi (q− y) ≤ qi − yri . By Proposition 5.2.1 at least one of the









) + cB(qi − yri ) ≤ cA(yi) + cB(qi − yi).
Hence, by (5.10), y∗i is a dominant strategy for player i in the reduced strategy
space. Furthermore, for all y ∈
{
(y1, . . . , yi, y
∗
i+1, . . . , y
∗
n)|yk ∈ Yk for k =




πAi (y) = ti if y
∗
i = yi,
πBi (q − y) = qi − ti if y∗i = yi. 
In the Nash equilibrium we constructed in the proof above, players choose
a (dominant) strategy that is either y
i
or yi, just to be next in line when it
comes to order fulfillment. Hence, there are equilibria in an infinite ordering
game corresponding to a CRSP-situation with LBS fulfillment, that can be
found at the boundaries of the combined strategy space. Also here, the equi-
librium we constructed in the proof is a recursive dominant equilibrium.
Hence, we can conclude that a myopic fulfillment policy does not result in
a Nash equilibrium, whereas a more farsighted fulfillment policy does. A
possible explanation for this phenomenon is that LBS combined with the
feasibility restrictions induces some sort of truth telling by the purchasers.
In the equilibrium constructed in the proof of Theorem 5.4.5 each purchaser
truthfully reveals the maximum amount he would like to receive from his
preferred supplier, whereas in Example 5.4.4 with SBL fulfillment the pur-
chasers undermine each other’s ordering strategies by ordering slightly less
than they actually would like to receive.
5.4. Infinite ordering games 161
5.4.3 Proportional order fulfillment
The last fulfillment policy we study, in this section, is proportional order
fulfillment. A reason for suppliers to fulfill orders proportionally is that they
are indifferent with respect to the identity of the players or do not want to
discriminate for another reason.
We denote by WN,PROP the set of CRSP-situations in which both suppli-
ers fulfill orders proportionally. Let W = (q, [pA, QA, π
A], [pB, QB, π
B]) ∈
WN,PROP be a CRSP-situation and let GW = ((Yj)j∈N , (gj)j∈N) be the cor-
responding infinite ordering game. Given y ∈ Πj∈NYj, the proportional order





πB(q − y) = (q − y) QB
max{∑j∈N(qj − yj), QB}
.
Note that for i ∈ N , πAi and πBi are strictly monotonic in yi. Let y ∈ Πj∈NYj,
take i ∈ N and ỹi > yi. Then,




πBi (q − y) > πBi (qi − ỹi, q−i − y−i).
In Proposition 5.2.1 we have shown that for increasing and strictly concave cA
and cB, it is optimal to order as much as possible at one of the two suppliers.
If we combine this fact with the the strict monotonicity of πA and πB, we can
show that against a strategy profile y−i, the set of best replies consists of one
or both of the two extreme strategies y
i
= (qi −QB)+ and yi = min{qi, QA}.
Proposition 5.4.6 Let W ∈ WN,PROP be a CRSP-situation. Let GW =
((Yj)j∈N , (gj)j∈N) be the corresponding infinite ordering game. Let y ∈ Πj∈NYj
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be such that for i ∈ N , yi ∈ (yi, yi). Then, at least one of the following two
inequalities is true,
(i) gi(yi, y−i) < gi(y), (5.11)
(ii) gi(yi, y−i) < gi(y). (5.12)
Proof: Let W = (q, [pA, QA, π
A], [pB, QB, π
B]). We first show that y
i
or yi
is a best reply for player i against y−i.
With yi ∈ (yi, yi), we have that
πAi (yi, y−i) < π
A
i (y) < π
A
i (yi, y−i),
πBi (qi − yi, q−i − y−i) < πBi (q − y) < πBi (qi − yi, q−i − y−i).
Thus, given y−i, player i can maximally realize π
A
i (yi, y−i) at supplier A.
Similarly at B, the maximal order fulfillment equals πBi (qi − yi, q−i − y−i).
Since in the end, player i will obtain qi, player i will obtain at least qi −
πBi (qi − yi, q−i − y−i) from A and at least qi − π
A
i (yi, y−i) from B.
Hence the possible obtained orders at A can be represented by the inter-
val [t, t], define by
[t, t] = [qi − πBi (qi − yi, q−i − y−i), π
A
i (yi, y−i)].
Note that for any t ∈ [t, t], qi − t ∈ [qi − πAi (yi, y−i), πBi (qi − yi, q−i − y−i)],
i.e., the possible obtained orders at B. For determining a best reply against
y−i, player i has to decide how much is optimal to be obtained from supplier
A (and the remainder from B) and choose yi accordingly.
We need to solve the following minimization problem
min
{
cA(t) + cB(qi − t)|t ∈ [t, t]
}
. (5.13)
Define h : [t, t] → R+ in the following way,
h(t) = cA(t) + cB(qi − t).
Note that h is strictly concave on [t, t]. Thus, t = qi − πBi (qi − yi, q−i − y−i)
or t = πAi (yi, y−i) minimizes (5.13).
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We finish the proof by stating that gi(yi, y−i) = h(t), that gi(yi, y−i) = h(t)
and that gi(y) = h(t) for some t ∈ (t, t). 
Using Proposition 5.4.6 we know where to look for equilibria. A possible
best reply for player i against strategy y−i is either yi = (qi − QB)
+ or
yi = min{QA, qi}. Hence, a possible Nash equilibrium can be found in one
of the extreme points of Πj∈NYj.
Example 5.4.7 We consider the CRSP-situation from Example 5.4.4, but
now the suppliers fulfill orders proportionally. Let N = {1, 2} and let W =
(q, [pA, QA, π
A], [pB, QB, π
B]) ∈ WN,PROP be given by q = (18, 19), QA = 20,












t if t ∈ [0, QB].
Let GW = ((Yj)j∈N , (gj)j∈N) be the corresponding infinite ordering game.
We have Y1 = [0, 18] and Y2 = [0, 19].
Using Proposition 5.4.6 we know that if GW has a Nash equilibrium, it can
only be at the boundaries of the strategy space. Hence, the candidates are
y1 = (0, 0), y2 = (18, 0), y3 = (18, 19) and y4 = (0, 19). We can eliminate
y1, since g1(y
1) ≈ 273.83 > g1(y2) = 202.5. And since g1(y2) < g1(y3),
g2(y
2) < g2(y
3) and also g2(y
2) < g1(y
1), y2 is an equilibrium of GW . Be-
cause g2(y
2) < g2(y
3), y3 is not an equilibrium. Similarly one can check that
for y4 there are no unilateral deviations that decrease the purchasing costs
of the deviating player. Hence E(GW ) = {(18, 0), (0, 19)}. /
The observations of Example 5.4.7 can be generalized. One only needs to
compare the extreme points of the combined strategy space to verify whether
the infinite ordering game has a Nash equilibrium.
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Theorem 5.4.8 Let GW = ((Yj)j∈N , (gj)j∈N) be the infinite ordering game
corresponding to CRSP-situation W ∈ WN,PROP . If ŷ ∈ E(GW ), then ŷ ∈
Πj∈N{yj , y
j}.
It is an open problem whether in an infinite ordering game corresponding to
a CRSP-situation in which both suppliers fulfill orders proportionally, there
exists an equilibrium.
5.5 Matrified ordering games
In this section we use a different approach for analyzing equilibrium behavior
in CRSP-situations. Instead of infinitely many options, the purchasers can
only choose from a limited but representative set of ordering options. We
matrify the infinite ordering game to a finite game.
Proposition 5.2.1 and the result of the previous section can be used as an
argument to limit the ordering possibilities of the purchasers to two extreme
actions: either order as much as possible at A or as much as possible at B.
Let W ∈ WN be a CRSP-situation and let GW = ((Yj)j∈N , (gj)j∈N) be the






corresponding to W ∈ WN .
For each player i ∈ N the limited set of actions is given by
Ȳi = {yi, yi}.
The mixed strategy space of player i ∈ N is given by
∆(Ȳi) = {δi : Ȳi → [0, 1]|δi(yi) + δ
i(yi) = 1}.
The interpretation of δi ∈ ∆(Ȳi) is that player i chooses strategy yi with
probability δi(y
i
) and yi with probability δ
i(yi). The extreme points of ∆(Ȳi)
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are identified with y
i
and yi and are called the pure strategies of player i.
Every mixed strategy δi ∈ ∆(Ȳi) corresponds to an ordering strategy yi ∈ Yi,





+ δi(yi)yi. A mixed strategy is a linear combination of yi
and yi. Since Yi = [yi, yi], every linear combination of yi and yi falls within
this set.
The cost function for a profile of mixed strategies is based on the cost function
of the infinite ordering game. The costs are an approximation of the actual
ordering costs for a mixed strategy. Let δ ∈ Πj∈N∆(Ȳj), for each i ∈ N , the






If the mixed extension of a finite game G has an equilibrium in which each
player plays a pure strategy, this is called a pure Nash equilibrium.
In the next subsections we show that for some of the possible order ful-
fillment policies we discussed in Section 5.4, there exist pure equilibria in the
matrified ordering game. Moreover, we explain the relation between equi-
libria in the infinite ordering game and (pure) equilibria in the matrified
ordering game.
5.5.1 Order fulfillment based on small before large
In this section we analyze matrified ordering games corresponding to CRSP-
situations with SBL-fulfillment policies. We start by providing an example
of a matrified ordering game.
Example 5.5.1 We consider the CRSP-situation from Example 5.2.2, but
we assume that suppliers’ fulfilment policies are based on SBL. Let N =
{1, 2, 3} and let W = (q, [pA, QA, πA], [pB, QB, πB]) ∈ WN,SBL be given by



















be the corresponding matrified ordering
game. Then, Ȳ1 = {0, 8}, Ȳ2 = {0, 9} and Ȳ3 = {0, 15}.
In Table 5.5.1, we present the costs for the pure strategies. The vectors
in the cells represent the ordering costs of the three players, given the com-
binations of pure strategies.
Table 5.5.1: Matrified ordering game of Example 5.5.1
Player 1 y1
Player 3 y3 Player 3 y3































Player 3 y3 Player 3 y3





















For example, the profile of pure strategies y = (y1, y2, y3) has corresponding
fulfillments πA(y) = (8, 8, 0) and πB(q − y) = (0, 0, 15). The correspond-




player 2 are given by g2(y) = cA(8) + cB(1) = 144
5
12
and for player 3 by




If all players play both of their pure strategies with probability 1
2
, i.e., for all
i ∈ N and all yi ∈ Ȳi, δi(yi) = 12 , then the corresponding costs in the matri-
fied ordering game can be computed using the payoffs for the pure strategies,


















y1 = 4 at A
and thus 4 at B, player 2 ordering 4.5 at A, and player 3 ordering 7.5 at A.
Thus δ corresponds with the strategy profile y = (4, 4.5, 7.5) of the infinite
ordering game. In fact, ḡ1(δ) can be seen as an approximation of g1(y).
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The combination of pure strategies ŷ = (y1, y2, y3) ∈ Πj∈N Ȳj results in a
Nash equilibrium. This is a pure Nash equilibrium of the matrified ordering
game. /
In the previous section, Example 5.4.4 showed that in the infinite ordering
game corresponding to a CRSP-situation with fulfillments based on SBL
there need not be a Nash equilibrium. In the matrified game corresponding to
such CRSP-situations, however, we can always find a pure Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 5.5.2 Let W ∈ WN,SBL be a CRSP-situation. Let GWm =
(∆(Ȳj)j∈N , (ḡj)j∈N) be the corresponding matrified ordering game. Then,
there exists a pure Nash equilibrium of GWm .
Proof: Let W = (q, [pA, QA, π
A], [pB, QB, π
B]). The proof follows the same









and set t1 = y
∗
1.















= (qi − (QB −
∑











if y∗i = yi.
Using the same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 5.4.5, one can show
that
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(i) the pure strategy y∗1 is a dominant strategy for player 1, i.e., for all
y ∈ Πj∈N Ȳj,
g1(y
∗
1, y−1) ≤ g1(y),
(ii) the pure strategy y∗i is a dominant strategy for player i ∈ {2, . . . , n}
within the reduced strategy space, i.e., for all y ∈
{
(y∗1, . . . , y
∗
i−1, yi, . . . , yn)|




i , y−i) ≤ gi(y),
which shows that y∗ is a pure Nash equilibrium of GWm . 
5.5.2 Order fulfillment based on large before small
In Theorem 5.4.5 we have shown that an infinite ordering game corresponding
to a CRSP-situation with LBS-fulfillment has a Nash equilibrium. In this
section we analyze the correspondence between a Nash equilibrium in the
infinite ordering game and a pure Nash equilibrium in the matrified game.
Example 5.5.3 We consider the CRSP-situation from Example 5.2.2, but
we assume that suppliers’ fulfilment policies are based on LBS. Let N =
{1, 2, 3} and let W = (q, [pA, QA, πA], [pB, QB, πB]) ∈ WN,LBS be given by














Let GW = ((Yj)j∈N , (gj)j∈N) be the corresponding infinite ordering game




be the corresponding matrified order-
ing game.
Then, for the infinite ordering game, following the proof of Theorem 5.4.5, we
find that y∗ = (8, 9, 0) is an equilibrium of GW , with g1(y
∗) = cA(7) + cB(1),
g2(y
∗) = cA(9) and g3(y
∗) = cB(15). Note that y
∗ ∈ Πj∈N Ȳj and thus that
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y∗ is a pure equilibrium of GWm with exactly the same ordering costs.
The strategy profile ỹ = (7, 9, 0), however, has exactly the same ordering
costs as y∗. Hence, ỹ is also an equilibrium of GW . But the strategy profile
ỹ does not correspond to a pure strategy in the matrified ordering game,
because it corresponds to δ̃1(y1) =
7
8
, δ̃2(y2) = 1 and δ̃
3(y
3







(cA(3) + cB(5) < g1(y
∗). Thus δ̃ is not an equilibrium of
GWm . /
In the Nash equilibrium we have constructed in the proof of Theorem 5.4.5,
each player chooses one of the two extreme strategies. This Nash equilibrium
corresponds to a pure equilibrium in the matrified ordering game. Hence,
for a CRSP-situation in which both suppliers have relationship maximizing
preferences, the matrified ordering game has a pure equilibrium. Without
proof, we can state the following.
Theorem 5.5.4 Let W ∈ WN,LBS be a CRSP-situation. Let GW = ((Yj)j∈N ,
(gj)j∈N) be the corresponding infinite ordering game and let G
W
m = (∆(Ȳj)j∈N ,
(gj)j∈N) be the corresponding matrified ordering game. Then, there exists a
pure equilibrium y∗ ∈ E(GWm ) such that y∗ ∈ E(GW ).
5.5.3 Proportional order fulfillment
In the previous subsections we showed that for SBL and LBS fulfillment
policies, there is not a one-to-one correspondence between equilibria of the
infinite ordering game and pure equilibria of the matrified ordering game.
For proportional order fulfillment, however, one can easily verify that the
existence of a pure equilibrium of the matrified ordering game corresponds
to the existence of a Nash equilibrium of the infinite ordering game and vice
versa.
Theorem 5.5.5 Let W ∈ WN,PROP be a CRSP-situation. Let GW =
((Yj)j∈N , (gj)j∈N) be the corresponding infinite ordering game and let G
W
m =
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(∆(Ȳj)j∈N , (gj)j∈N) be the corresponding matrified ordering game. Then, G
W
m
has a pure equilibrium ŷ if and only if ŷ ∈ E(GW ).
Proof: For the “only if”-part. Let W ∈ WN,PROP be such that the corre-
sponding matrified ordering game has a pure equilibrium ŷ ∈ E(GWm ). Take
i ∈ N . Then, for all yi ∈ {yi, yi}
gi(ŷ) ≤ gi(yi, ŷ−i). (5.16)
By Proposition 5.4.6 and by (5.16), for all yi ∈ (yi, yi),
gi(ŷ) ≤ gi(yi, ŷ−i).
Hence, for all yi ∈ Yi = [yi, yi],
gi(ŷ) ≤ gi(yi, ŷ−i).
Thus, ŷ ∈ E(GW ).
For the “if”-part. Let W ∈ WN,PROP be such that the corresponding in-
finite ordering game has an equilibrium ŷ ∈ E(GW ). By Proposition 5.4.8
ŷ ∈ Πj∈N{yj , yj} and thus
ŷ ∈ Πj∈N Ȳj.
Since ŷ ∈ E(GW ), for all yi ∈ {yi, yi} = Ȳj ,
gi(ŷ) ≤ gi(yi, ŷ−i).
Thus ŷ ∈ E(GWm ). 
5.6 Concluding remarks
This section briefly discusses the effects of the order adjustment assumption
we made in this chapter. Furthermore, we summarize the remaining open
questions.
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We assumed that, since purchasers’ orders are restricted by feasibility, these
purchasers are allowed to adjust their orders after announcement of the ful-
fillment levels. One could argue that purchasers, that have obtained insuf-
ficient supplies, have to place an extra separate order at the supplier with
remaining capacity, or even worse, have to place a rush order for which they
do not receive quantity discounts. These alterations change the cost func-
tion of the ordering game and this can affect some of the obtained results,
e.g., Proposition 5.4.6. However, if purchasers are responsible for obtaining
enough supplies, they can also demand that they are given the opportunity to
obtain enough, which would imply dropping the feasibility restriction on the
ordering strategies. This gives rise to a completely different class of CRSP-
situations.
For the SBL and LBS fulfillment policies we have introduced a tie breaking
rule that depends on the identity of the players. In our setting the tie break-
ing rule is identical for both suppliers. If the tie breaking rule is different
per supplier, the results of Theorem 5.4.5, Theorem 5.5.2 and Theorem 5.5.4
still hold.
Which brings us to one of the open problems. If suppliers fulfillment policies
are based on fixed but non-identical preferences, does there exist an equilib-
rium in the infinite ordering game (Section 5.4.1)? The last open problem
is whether in an infinite ordering game where suppliers fulfill orders propor-
tionally there is an equilibrium (Section 5.4.3). Using Theorem 5.5.5, the
answer to this question also verifies whether the matrified game has a pure
equilibrium (Section 5.5.3).
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